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ABSTRACT 
 
 This dissertation encompasses three chapters that explore determinants of parental 
investments in their children’s health and education in developing countries.  Below are the 
individual abstracts for each chapter.  
Chapter 1: Child Ability, Parental Investments and Child Nutrition in Ecuador 
This paper investigates the role of family composition and child cognitive ability in explaining 
how resource-constrained households make nutritional investment decisions in their children. 
Parents have private information about their children’s abilities and health that is typically not 
available to researchers. I use a unique panel household dataset from Ecuador’s Bono de Desarrollo 
Humano that contains a measure of child cognitive ability and allows me to estimate its affect on 
resource allocation.  I address reverse causality due to the effects of investments on ability and I use 
within household fixed effects to look at children to look at the intra-household investment 
decision.  Findings point to the existence of sibling rivalry due to resource constraints; children with 
more siblings, and children in poor households, are less likely to eat high-quality food.  Children 
with higher abilities are less likely to share a nutritional supplement with another family member, 
suggesting that parents must decide how to invest their limited resources, and child ability informs 
that decision.  Within households of more than one child, children with higher abilities are more 
likely to eat higher quality foods than their siblings, even after controlling for child body size.   
Chapter 2: Child Ability and Household Human Capital Investment Decisions in Burkina Faso 
Using data we collected in rural Burkina Faso, we examine how children’s cognitive abilities 
influence resource constrained households’ decisions to invest in their education. We use a direct 
measure of child ability for all primary school-aged children, regardless of current school enrollment. 
We explicitly incorporate direct measures of the ability of each child’s siblings (both absolute and 
relative measures) to show how sibling rivalry exerts an impact on the parent’s decision of whether 
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and how much to invest in their child’s education. We find children with one standard deviation 
higher own ability are 16 percent more likely to be currently enrolled, while having a higher ability 
sibling lowers current enrollment by 16 percent and having two higher ability siblings lowers 
enrollment by 30 percent. Results are robust to addressing the potential reverse causality of 
schooling influencing child ability measures and using alternative cognitive tests to measure ability. 
Chapter 3: Risk and Protective Factors for School Dropout in Mexico and Chile 
Fourteen percent of Chilean youth and 30 percent of Mexican youth have dropped out prior 
to completing secondary school.  Of these youth, 90 to 97 percent are considered “at risk,” meaning 
that they engage in or are at risk of engaging in risky behaviors that are detrimental to their own 
development and to the well-being of their societies.  This paper uses youth surveys from Chile and 
Mexico to demonstrate that early school dropout is strongly correlated with a range of risky 
behaviors as well as typically unobservable risk and protective factors.  We test which of a large set 
of potential factors are correlated with dropping out of school early and other risky behaviors.  
These factors range from relationships with parents and institutions to household behaviors (abuse, 
discipline techniques) to social exclusion.  We use stepwise regressions to sort out which variables 
best explain the observed variance in risky behaviors. We also use a non-parametric methodology to 
characterize different sub-groups of youth according to the amount of risk in their lives. We find 
that while higher socioeconomic status emerges as key explanatory factors for school dropout and 
six additional risky behaviors for boys and girls in both countries, it is not the only one. A good 
relationship with parents and peers, strong connection with local governmental institutions and 
schools, urban residence, younger age, and spirituality also emerge as being strongly correlated with 
school dropout and different risky behaviors.  Similarly, young people that leave school early also 
engage in other risky behaviors.  The variety of factors associated with leaving school early suggests 
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that while poverty is important, it is not the only risk factor.  This points to a wider range of policy 
entry points than currently used, including targeting parents and the relationship with schools.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Parental decisions about whether and how much to invest in their children’s human capital 
depend on many factors, and these decisions have long-lasting impacts on each child’s future 
wellbeing. A large literature attempts to understand the source of inequalities for children’s 
educational investments within a household building on seminal work by Becker and Tomes (1976) 
that delineates the tradeoff between the quantity of children and their ‘quality.’  For poor households 
seeking to maximize the returns to their human capital investments, schooling and health decisions 
will depend on parent perceptions about the returns to human capital for a given child and that 
child’s ability. In making investment decisions, parents will have information about a child’s ability 
and that information will often not be available to researchers.  This partly explains why much of the 
empirical research on the determinants of household investments in children’s schooling focuses on 
easy to observe demographic characteristics of the child such as gender, birth order, and family 
composition. Recent research attempts to overcome this difficulty by using datasets with typically 
unavailable information about child characteristics such as cognitive ability, child comportment, and 
household environment, to better understand factors that influence investment decisions. 
This work contributes to this body of literature, with three chapters that use typically 
unavailable information about child characteristics to better understand health and education 
investments in children.  In the first chapter, a measure of child cognitive ability is used to 
understand nutrition investments and within household differences in these investments in 
Ecuador.  The second chapter uses alternative measures of child cognitive ability to better 
understand education investments in Burkina Faso.  In the third chapter, the relationship between 
different risk and protective factors and school dropout of young people in Mexico and Chile is 
explored.   
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Chapter 1, entitled “Child Ability, Parental Investments and Child Nutrition in Ecuador” 
investigates the role of family composition and child cognitive ability in explaining how resource-
constrained households make nutritional investment decisions in their children. I use a unique panel 
household dataset from Ecuador’s Bono de Desarrollo Humano which contains a measure of child 
cognitive ability, the Spanish version of the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test, and allows me to 
estimate its affect on resource allocation.  Reverse causality of the effects of investments on ability 
is addressed through the use of panel data.  Findings point to sibling rivalry due to resource 
constraints; children with more siblings, and children in poor households, are less likely to eat high 
quality food.  Children with higher abilities are less likely to share a nutritional supplement with 
another family member, suggesting that parents must decide how to invest their limited resources, 
and child ability informs that decision.  Within households with more than one child, children with 
higher abilities are more likely to eat higher quality foods than their siblings, even after controlling 
for child body size.   
Chapter 2, entitled “Child Ability and Household Human Capital Investment Decisions in 
Burkina Faso” and co-authored with Richard Akresh, Damien de Walque, and Harounan Kazianga, 
looks at schooling decisions in Burkina Faso.  Using data we collected in rural Burkina Faso, this 
paper examines how children’s cognitive abilities influence resource constrained households’ 
decisions to invest in their education. We directly measure child ability for all primary-school-aged 
children, regardless of current school enrollment, using the Raven’s Colored Progressive Matrices 
and the Wechsler Intelligence Scales. We explicitly incorporate direct measures of the ability of each 
child’s siblings (both absolute and relative measures) to show how sibling rivalry exerts an impact 
on the parent’s decision of whether and how much to invest in their child’s education. We find 
children with one standard deviation higher own ability are 16 percent more likely to be currently 
enrolled, while having a higher ability sibling lowers the likelihood of current enrollment by 16 
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percent and having two higher ability siblings lowers it by 30 percent. Results are robust to 
addressing the potential reverse causality of schooling influencing child ability measures and using 
alternative cognitive tests to measure ability. 
Chapter 3, entitled “Risk and Protective Factors for School Dropout in Mexico and Chile” 
and co-authored with Wendy Cunningham, aims to characterize the heterogeneity in the youth 
population and identify risk and protective factors related to school dropout. Using non-parametric 
methodologies and specialized youth surveys from Mexico and Chile, different sub-groups of youth 
are characterized according to the amount of risk in their lives that might contribute to school 
dropout and other poor outcomes. Then factors and behaviors that are correlated with school 
dropout, and yet typically not observed in large household datasets, are identified.  These factors 
range from relationships with parents and institutions to household behaviors (abuse, discipline 
techniques) to social exclusion. 
Overall this dissertation aims to improve our understanding of why young people in 
developing countries may not receive desired levels of education and health investments.  Improving 
child nutrition, health, education and human capital development are recognized as important goals 
as indicated by the Millennium Development Goals.  Understanding if and why parents in resource 
constrained households may sacrifice one child’s educational or nutritional investments for another, 
or if children self-select out of school, thus contributing to overall inequalities in human capital, can 
inform policy makers’ decisions when attempting to improve human capital levels.   
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CHAPTER 1 
CHILD ABILITY, PARENTAL INVESTMENTS, AND CHILD NUTRITION IN 
ECUADOR 
 
1. Introduction  
Parents face a well-documented tradeoff between the quantity of children they might have 
and the level of investments in human capital that they make in each child, as posited by Becker and 
Lewis (1973).  Children in the same household might compete with one another to receive human 
capital investments since parents must divide resources amongst all children in the household and 
may perceive the payoff to investments in one child to be greater than in another. This inequality in 
investments may, in turn, lead to inequalities in their success later in life.  This project studies these 
intra-family dynamics by investigating whether or not child cognitive ability can help to explain 
differences in nutritional investments in young children in Ecuador, a country with high levels of 
malnutrition.  
Using panel data from Ecuador’s cash transfer program, the Bono de Desarrollo Humano 
(BDH), this paper models various measures of children’s nutritional investment as a function of 
children’s cognitive ability, controlling for current health status, family composition, and other 
factors. I use two measures of nutritional investment or lack thereof: the first is an indicator that a 
child was given a nutritional supplement, but had to share it with a sibling or adult in the family. 
This variable indicates whether or not parents redistribute nutritional investments away from the 
intended recipient to other members within the household.  Parents in the survey are also asked to 
report whether their children ate certain types of food during the past week. I classify these foods as 
either “nutritious” or “non-nutritious,” and my second measure of nutritional investment is a 
measure of how often the child eats more nutritious foods.  
This paper builds upon a body of literature that explores the determinants of human capital 
investments.  Much of the empirical research is limited to the use of easy-to-observe demographic 
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characteristics such as gender, birth order, birth spacing, and sibling sex-mix (Garg and Morduch 
1998).  Recent studies use different direct measures of child ability including cognitive tests (Ayalew 
2005 and Akresh, Bagby, de Walque and Kazianga 2010), IQ scores (Kim 2005), achievement tests 
(Glick and Sahn 2010) and birth weight (Datar et al. 2010, Rosenzweig and Zhang 2009, Loughran 
et al. 2004) to understand how parents use information about their children when making 
investment decisions.   
This study is unique in identifying the role that child ability plays in explaining child nutrition 
investments.  First, I use family composition in the estimates of nutritional investments to see if 
there is a tradeoff between the quantity of children and the quality of their nutritional investments, 
while controlling for child body size and ability. This approach takes current family composition and 
child characteristics as given at the time the parents make the investment decision.  I then use 
within-household fixed effects to identify how a child’s cognitive ability relative to the ability of his 
or her siblings plays a role in decisions about nutrition to control for any unobserved characteristics 
that are common to all children in a household, but vary from one household to another. Additional 
specifications explore the precise role that sibling ability plays in a child’s nutrition.  
The key challenge in using measures of child ability to explain parental investment decisions 
is that a child’s ability is endogenous and reflects past parental investments and other factors that are 
unobservable to the researcher. This paper addresses this in several ways. First, I use two measures 
of body size, child height-for-age and weight-for-height, from the first wave of the panel to control 
for the stock of previous investments.  Height-for-age is considered to be a good measure of long 
term investments in a child, while weight-for-height is a more contemporaneous measure of a child’s 
nutrition.  Second, since current nutrition can affect a child’s ability to perform well on a cognitive 
ability test, I use child cognitive ability measured in the first wave of the panel to explain nutrition 
investments in the second wave.  
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Another challenge is that children themselves may influence the investment decision through 
their own preferences and behaviors.  They may make their own choices as to what foods to eat 
based on their tastes and preferences rather than relying on what their parents tell them to consume.  
Also, more able children might be more willing to ask for or take the foods they want rather than 
waiting for someone to tell them what to eat.  I cannot address either of these potential explanations 
for different nutritional consumption among siblings using this dataset.  A third explanation has to 
do with child labor activities; children engaging in demanding physical labor have been shown to 
consume more calories than their siblings engaging in less demanding activities.  However, I argue 
that since the age of the children at the time of the nutritional input is between 4 to 7 years in this 
study, the children are at similar points in their lives and therefore less likely to be treated differently 
because of age related activities.  Young children are less likely than older youth to be engaging in 
labor requiring high energy, which limits this as a possible explanation for why one sibling might 
consume more than another. In addition, since these children are not spaced far apart, they are more 
likely to be competing based upon what parents observe about their children rather than with 
feedback from sources outside of the household (such as through the use of grades in school). 
The results from this study indicate that higher ability children receive greater nutritional 
investments than their lower ability siblings. Children with a one standard deviation higher ability 
consume 5 percent more nutritious foods.  Results are robust to the use of different measures of 
nutritious food consumption.  I also find that young children in poor households with more children 
have lower levels of consumption of nutritious foods compared to children in non-poor households 
with similar numbers of children. Children with one additional sibling are 16 percentage points more 
likely to share nutritional supplements and three percentage points less likely to consume high levels 
of nutritious foods.  These findings point to inequalities within the household as one source of 
inequality in nutrition amongst children in Ecuador.  
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The results in this paper are consistent with, and build upon, those in previous work by 
Akresh, Bagby, de Walque and Kazianga (2010), who examine a similar question with regards to 
school enrollment in Burkina Faso. In that paper we focus on the role of ability on the household 
decision to invest in the education of each child between the ages of 5-15, finding that higher ability 
children receive more education investments than their lower ability siblings.  A potential concern 
with that paper is that cognitive ability is measured at the time of and just prior to the education 
investment, and therefore might be capturing all investments in the life of the child up until age 5 or 
older.  In this paper I focus on a younger age group, ages 3-6 at the time of the ability measure, and 
look at the relationship between ability and parent investments in nutrition. There are still previous 
investments from birth to age 3, but this window is smaller, and controlling for height-for-age and 
weight-for-height captures some of the previous investments.   
Ecuador is a country with a well documented level of failure to provide adequate nutrition to 
all children, with 23 percent of the children under 5 being stunted.1  Understanding how households 
make decisions to invest in each of their children can inform policies aimed at eliminating 
malnutrition as well as those focused on improving overall human capital.  Targeted nutritional 
interventions or non-targeted poverty reduction strategies can have different affects on the nutrition 
of children in the same household. Under Becker’s (1974) unitary model of the household, a total 
increase in household resources is equivalent to transfers to individual members in the household.  
If the cost of targeting to individuals is high, or the benefit to the household is lower from in-kind 
nutrition transfers to the household than from cash transfers or poverty alleviation programs, then 
poverty reduction strategies could have a larger impact on child nutrition.  On the other hand, 
targeted transfers to individuals may be more likely to stick to the individual than to be reallocated 
away, or act as “flypaper”, as discussed in Jacoby (2002) and Afridi (2010).  Similarly, the presence of 
                                                 
1 See World Bank (2007) for a description of the stunting in Ecuador 
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nutrition programs that target individuals may have a “labeling” effect as discussed by Kooreman 
(2000), or a change the way parents make decisions because of the new information they have about 
the nutritional status of their children.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the conceptual 
framework about the household nutrition investment decision. Section 3 describes the survey data 
used in the analysis and explains the construction of the different nutrition measures. Section 4 
describes the empirical identification strategy and section 5 presents the main results as well as 
robustness tests. Section 6 concludes.  
2. Conceptual Framework  
Becker and Lewis’ (1973) tradeoff between the quantity of children and the quality of each 
child in the household has been documented around the world.  In addition, inequalities in human 
capital outcomes for children in the same family have been observed. Parental preferences and 
resource constraints are one explanation for these inequalities.  If parents have limited resources, 
they may have to make sacrifices when choosing how to distribute these resources within the 
household.  These decisions are made by parents based on preferences over their children’s futures, 
knowledge about the labor and marriage markets and information about their children.   
A large body of literature attempts to explain why children in the same household might 
have differing human capital outcomes or investments.  Many developing country empirical analyses 
use characteristics that are easily observable and typically available in large household surveys, such 
as gender, birth order, sibling sex mix and other measures of family composition.2  If parents are 
forced to choose amongst their children in distributing limited resources, then siblings become rivals 
and family composition is important in determining investments.  Garg and Morduch (1998) find 
that sibling rivalry plays a strong role in child health outcomes including height-for-age, weight-for-
                                                 
2 See Strauss and Thomas (1995), Strauss and Beegle (2000) and Glewwe and Kremer (2006) for reviews of the literature. 
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height, stunting, wasting and being underweight in Ghana. They also find that children with only 
sisters are better off than their counterparts with only brothers, and children with older siblings are 
better off than children with younger siblings.  Their explanation of credit constraints and 
differences in relative returns to education is consistent with findings by Dahan and Gaviria (2003) 
who propose a model of inequalities in human capital investments within households even if 
children have no differences in abilities.   
Additional recent studies that look at different human capital outcomes find results 
consistent with sibling rivalry.  For instance, Edmonds (2007) in Nepal, Ota and Moffatt (2007) in 
India, and Dammert (2010) in Nicaragua and Guatemala find evidence consistent with sibling rivalry 
in education investments and in child labor. Most of these developing country studies also find birth 
order and gender effects; children with older siblings are better off than their older siblings, and 
children with sisters are better of than children with brothers. For instance, Parish and Willis (1993) 
find that children receive different investments based on gender as a result of cultural traditions in 
Taiwan. On the other hand, studies in the United States suggest different patterns.  Butcher and 
Case (1994) find evidence of sibling rivalry; however they also find that children with only brothers 
receive more education than children with only sisters.  Such studies do not address the relationship 
between child ability and human capital investments.   
One set of models of the parents’ decision making process from the human capital literature 
takes into account the fact that parents have more information about their children’s potential to 
succeed in the labor or marriage markets than is available to the typical researcher.   These models 
assume that parents have preferences over their children’s future success and use the information 
they have about a child’s ability when making investment decisions.3  Becker and Tomes (1976) and 
                                                 
3 These models assume that parents come to a consensus when making these decisions as opposed to other models 
which take into account bargaining power in the household.  See Behrman (1997) for a complete explanation of the 
consensus parental preferences models 
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Behrman, Pollack and Taubman (1982) use child ability in the model to attempt to identify parental 
preferences in making the investment decision.  They examine the role of endowments without 
directly observing child abilities or endowments (additional related papers include Rosenzweig and 
Schultz, 1982 and Behrman, Rosenzweig and Taubman, 2004).  Results from these studies suggest 
that parents slightly reinforce differences in their children’s human capital by providing more 
investments to the more able children.   
Direct measures of a child’s endowments, or innate ability, are virtually impossible to come 
by.  A growing body of literature uses the first observable measure of endowment, a child’s birth 
weight, while another strand uses different direct measures of a child’s ability such as height or 
cognitive ability tests to look at both health and education investments and outcomes.     
Empirical analyses that use measures of cognitive ability or birth weight to explain 
educational outcomes find results consistent with those studies that do not directly measure 
endowments.  Behrman and Rosenzweig (2004) use birth weight to explain later success in earnings 
and completed education.  A growing literature that directly measures a child’s cognitive ability to 
explain the education investment decision includes papers by Ayalew (2005) in Ethiopia, Kim (2005) 
in Wisconsin, and Glick and Sahn (2010) in West Africa.   Akresh, Bagby, de Walque and Kazianga 
(2010) expand on this literature by measuring child ability for all children ages 5-15 in the household, 
regardless of school enrollment status in Burkina Faso.  By measuring the cognitive abilities of all 
children in the household, we show that sibling ability rivalry impacts the parents’ decisions about 
whether and how much to invest in each child’s education.  
The literature that evaluates the determinants of health investments is mixed.  Some analyses 
in developing countries have found that parents tend to compensate for differences in health 
endowments while others find that parents reinforce for differences in child endowments when 
making health investments early in life.  As with the educational investments literature, some studies 
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that look at health investments (or outcomes) use birth weight as a measure of child endowment.  
Rosenzweig and Zhang (2009) use information about birth weight in twins in China, finding 
evidence of the quantity-quality tradeoff and of preferences towards stronger children. Loughran, 
Kilburn and Datar (2007) find that low birth weight children fare better in smaller families than in 
larger ones.  Datar, Kilburn and Loughran (2010) and Datar, Ghosh and Sood (2007) find that 
parents tend to reinforce for differences in birth weight when making investments in a child’s health 
early in life.  Ayalew (2005), on the other hand, uses predicted values from a health production 
function as a measure of exogenous child endowment, finding that children with lower health 
endowments receive more health inputs.  While Pitt, Rosenzweig and Hassan (1990) find that 
households are inequality averse, they also find that boys receive more calories because they are 
more likely to engage in activities requiring better health status to be more productive. These studies 
do not consider the role that cognitive ability plays separately from the child’s health. 
Studies that explore the relationship between nutrition and cognitive development in 
developing countries find that malnutrition, resulting from a low level and poor mix of nutritional 
investments, can explain poor cognitive development. For instance, Glewwe and King (2001) find 
that malnutrition is an important determinant of cognitive development.  Aldermen et al (2006) find 
large effects of the impact of malnutrition prior to starting school on later human capital formation. 
To the author’s knowledge, there are no papers to date which directly explore the role of child 
cognitive ability in explaining parental investments in a child’s nutrition.   
3. Data  
The data used in this analysis were collected to evaluate Ecuador’s cash transfer program, the 
Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH). The data have a panel structure; the baseline was collected in 
2003-2004 and the follow-up in 2005. The data were collected to evaluate the impact of the health 
intervention which focuses on health inputs and outcomes of children under age 8 in the second 
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wave.  Households residing in 6 different provinces, Pichincha, Loja, and Azuay in the highlands 
and Los Ríos, El Oro and Esmeraldas on the coast, were randomly assigned to treatment.  Only 
households with at least one child under age 6 and no child over age 15 during the first wave were 
eligible.  
The sample used in this analysis is comprised of 3,485 children between the ages of 4-7 years 
in the second wave (or 3-6 years in the first wave) as shown in the summary statistics in Table 1.1. 
Of these children, 769 are children with siblings in the same age range and these children are in 389 
households.  Most children in this sample have one sibling in the same age group (4-7), of which 
half are female.  69 percent of the sample is located in rural areas.  On average, both father’s and 
mother’s education is just under 8 years.4  72 percent of the children have their father present in the 
home.   
Families were assigned to treatment after having qualified for the intervention through the 
use of the Selben index, which is a system of selecting beneficiaries of social programs.  This index is 
comprised of 27 different variables including demographic and education characteristics of the 
household and household assets.5 41 percent of the sample was assigned to the treatment group and 
is classified as “poor” in this analysis.  Beneficiaries received $15 per family per month, which is 
approximately 15 percent of the average monthly expenditure of eligible families.   
The survey uses the Spanish version of the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (TVIP) to 
evaluate the cognitive development of young children and is used as the measure of child ability in 
this analysis.  The TVIP or its English counterpart, the PPVT, are tests of language comprehension 
and are internationally used as approximations of IQ. Because of the age component to the test, this 
study normalizes the score to have a mean zero and standard deviation of one for each age group.  
                                                 
4 Additional information about the mother is available, including the mother’s TVIP score and her height.  I do not 
report these here since the main result of child ability does not change in the regressions with the inclusion of mother’s 
ability or height.   
5 See Ponce and Bedi (2008) for a detailed explanation of the Selben 
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In addition to cognitive ability, these data have anthropometric measures for all children in the 
household under age 8.  Height-for-age and weight-for-height z-scores were normed using CDC 
growth charts.  On average, the height-for-age z-score is -1 and weight-for-height z-score is -0.2 for 
this sample, reflecting Ecuador’s high level of malnutrition.   
This analysis uses two different measures of investment in nutrition.  The first measure is an 
indicator for whether or not the children who received a government nutrition supplement, called 
Nutrinnfa, shared their supplement with someone else in the household, either a sibling or adult.  
This supplement is a powdered food that is reinforced with micronutrients.6  528 children in the 
sample received the nutrition supplement.  Parents redistributed this nutritional investment away 
from the intended recipient to other members within the household in 63 percent of the cases.  
The second measure of nutrition investments aggregates different food consumption 
variables into a single variable which represents nutritional investments in nutritious foods. 
Respondents were asked of each young child whether or not the child ate a particular type of food in 
the past week and if so, how many times.  The food categories include: liver; cow internal organs; 
noodles, bread and other wheat products; spinach or chard; citric fruits; other non-citrus fruits; 
carrot or similar vegetable; soda or ice-cream; cookies or pastries; fried snacks including fries, fried 
bananas, and pork skin; and candies, chocolate, lollipops, or gum.  The values of liver, cow internal 
organs, noodles or bread or other foods derived from wheat flour, spinach or chard, and carrots are 
summed together to create a nutritious food variable.  Wheat flour in Ecuador is fortified with iron 
and other nutrients, and these other nutritious foods are mechanisms of receiving iron or vitamin A 
amongst other micronutrients.7  Deficiencies from iron and Vitamin A are well documented in 
Ecuador and iron is of particular importance in the high altitudes many of the children are living.  
While fruits are also nutritious foods, they are very common and very cheap in Ecuador and are 
                                                 
6 World Bank (2007) has a discussion of the supplement and how it fits within Ecuador’s strategy to improve nutrition.   
7 World Bank (2007) discusses Ecuador’s fortification of wheat flour.   
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therefore not included.  Children consumed the total of the individual nutritious food items a total 
of nine times in the previous week with a standard deviation of five times. Four percent of the 
children ages 4-7 with siblings in the same age group consumed more than one standard deviation 
above the household average of the sum of nutritious foods.   
This measure of nutritious food consumption is somewhat imprecise; it simply asks whether 
the child ate a certain type of food in the past week or not, and if so, the number of times.  There is 
no information as to how much of each food the child ate at each sitting.  In addition, studies have 
observed that food recall is imprecise.8  However, this analysis is concerned primarily with the 
differences in sibling nutrition, and since recall for the nutrition of children in the same family 
should have similar measurement error, the use of these variables is reasonable.  In addition, the 
impact evaluation of this intervention, by Paxson and Schady (2007), finds that while the 
intervention had an impact on health and education outcomes, there is no impact on food 
consumption using these variables. Therefore, it is reasonable to use the nutrition variables from the 
second wave of the survey, after the intervention, as outcome variables.   
To check the robustness of the results, alternative forms of high nutritious food 
consumption, groupings of the nutritious foods, and a measure of non-nutritious foods are used.  
First, an indicator for whether or not the child received more than one standard deviation above the 
average family consumption of the nutritious food variable, since within-household differences in 
nutritional investments are of interest.  Second, consumption of liver and spinach only is therefore 
summed as an alternative measure of nutritious food investments.  Liver and spinach are both foods 
that provide iron, a vitamin of importance for children living in high altitudes.  Finally, non-
nutritious foods are then considered, to see if similar decisions are being made as in nutritious foods.  
                                                 
8 See Baranowski, Sprague, Baranowski and Harrison (1991) 
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The measure of non-nutritious foods sums the number of times the child consumed soda or ice-
cream, cookies or pastries, fried snacks, and candies.   
Figure 1.1a shows that children in non-poor households consume more nutritious food than 
children in poor households and that children with more siblings consume less on average than 
children with fewer siblings in poor households. On the other hand, as shown in Figure 1.1b, 
children in both poor and non-poor households consume similar levels of non-nutritious foods, 
regardless of the number of siblings.  This suggests that children in poor households are more likely 
to be rivals for parental investments in their human capital than children in non-poor households.  
Panel B of Table 1.1 shows that 30-36 percent of the overall sample variation in weight-for-height 
and height-for-age z-scores arises from within household variation, while three percent of the overall 
variation in consumption of nutritious foods arises from variation within households.   
4. Empirical Specification  
The empirical strategy is an expansion of the typical parental investment or sibling rivalry 
models, which do not include a measure of child ability.  The role of family composition in the 
investment decision is identified using an ordinary least squares model as follows:  
(1) ihhihihihihih ZXFSAI ηααωωβ +++++= 11101110102  
where Iih2 
is the nutrition investment for child i in household h in period 2, Aih1 is a measure 
of observed child ability in period 1, Sih1 is a count of the total number of siblings the child has in 
period 1, Fih1 is a count of the total number of female siblings the child has in period 1, Xih1 is a 
vector of individual characteristics from period 1 such as age, gender, height-for-age and weight-for-
height z-scores that might influence parental investments, Zh1 is a vector of observed household 
characteristics in period 1, and ihη is composed of the unobserved characteristics of child i in 
household h that might influence the decision, all unobserved characteristics about the household 
that are constant across siblings, and a random idiosyncratic error term.  
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Several measures of the nutrition investment are considered in this specification, including 
whether or not a child shared a nutrition supplement with another household member, consumption 
of nutritious foods, and consumption of non-nutritious foods.  The interpretation of ω0 is the 
change in Iih2 associated with an additional male sibling. The interpretation of ω1 is the change in Iih2 
associated with converting a sibling from a male to a female while holding the number of siblings 
constant. ω0 + ω1 is the change in Iih2 associated with the addition of a female sibling.  To address for 
the reverse causality of nutrition affecting ability, as well as for individual child heterogeneity, this 
study uses a value added approach.  The ability measure from the first wave of the survey, Aih1, is 
used to look at investments in the second wave, Iih2.  In addition, the height-for-age z-score and the 
weight-for-height z-score from the first wave of the survey are included in Xih1 
to control for 
previous investments in the children. Xih1 also includes child gender, birth order and age dummies. 
Estimates from equation (1) identify the role of family composition in explaining nutrition 
investments. These estimates, however, do not look at the decision within households.  A household 
fixed effects model is therefore used to identify the role of child ability in the decision within the 
household.  This model controls for observed and unobserved household level characteristics that 
are constant across siblings.  This compares a child’s own ability to the average ability for siblings in 
the household as follows:  
(2) ihhihihih XAI ελαβ +++= 110102  
where Iik2, Aih1, and Xih1 are as defined above, λh1 is the household fixed effect that captures 
all characteristics about the household that are constant across siblings, and εih is a random, 
idiosyncratic error term. Observed household characteristics, Zh1 and number of siblings, Sih1, have 
no variation across children within the household and are therefore dropped. The number of sisters, 
Fih1, is also dropped because it is constant within a given household for children of the same gender.  
The coefficient β0 can be interpreted as the impact on nutritious food consumption of child i’s 
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ability relative to his or her siblings’ average abilities.  This specification is used to consider 
consuming nutritious and non-nutritious foods.  Sharing a nutrition supplement is not considered in 
this specification for sample size issues.  The sample is restricted to children between the ages of 4-7 
who have at least one sibling in the same age range.  While this is a data limitation, since only 
children in this age range have ability measures, the result is to compare only children that are in 
similar situations in life as previously discussed.   
The household fixed effects estimation compares own ability to average sibling ability; 
however it is possible that alternative forms of the relationship of a child’s ability with his or her 
siblings’ abilities might be more representative of reality.  For instance, it could be that parents 
consider only the highest ability amongst their children when making investment decisions rather 
than average overall ability.  I therefore estimate a variation of equation (1) to include explicit 
measures of sibling ability as follows:  
(3) ihhihihihihihih ZXFSAgAI ηααωωββ ++++++= − 1110111011102 )(  
where all terms are as defined in equation (1) except for the new term g(A-ih1) which is the 
direct measure of the abilities of other children (-i) in household h during period 1.  The coefficients 
β0 and β1 respectively give an estimate of the impact of child i’s own ability and his sibling’s ability 
on child i’s investments. The different measures of sibling ability which are used include the average 
and the highest ability.  Similar controls for sibling height-for-age and weight-for-height are 
included.   
5. Results 
5.1 Sibling Rivalry and Child Ability 
The results presented in Table 1.2 provide evidence that parents decide to reallocate 
resources within the household and that child ability plays a role in the decision.  One purpose of 
this dataset is to evaluate the effects of a government intervention to provide nutritional 
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supplements to young children.  Poor households were assigned to treatment groups that receive 
different supplements for each young child in the household depending on each child’s age.  A 
probit analysis is used to predict the probability that a child who received the government nutrition 
supplement shares their supplement with someone else in the household, either a sibling or adult. If 
a child is sharing the supplement that is intended for him or her, then parents are deciding that 
someone else in the household deserves the supplement in addition to that child and the child 
should share it and not consume their total allotted amount.  Regressions control for individual and 
family characteristics from first wave of the panel with the nutrition supplement received afterwards.  
Regressions in columns 1 to 4 include controls for family wealth level and living in a rural area.9   
Results point to sibling rivalry since children with more siblings are more likely to share the 
supplement than children with fewer siblings.  An additional sibling increases the probability of 
sharing the supplement by 15 to 20 percentage points.  Column 1 presents the results for the typical 
sibling rivalry analysis, which does not include child ability as an explanatory term, showing evidence 
of sibling rivalry.  The point estimate decreases in magnitude with the inclusion of additional 
controls in columns 2 to 6 such ability, child body size, and other family characteristics, however it 
remains significant and large at 15 percentage points. Columns 1 and 3 suggest that gender may be 
important as well. Boys are more likely to share their supplement with another member of the 
household, however once controlling for additional household characteristics, the coefficient is no 
longer significant in column 5.10 Column 2 presents the results with controls for child height-for-age 
and weight-for-height, neither of which is significant.  Column 3 shows that children with higher 
cognitive abilities are 12 percentage points less likely to share their nutritional supplement . Column 
                                                 
9 Regressions include child gender and age dummies and province fixed effects.  Correlation among the error terms of 
children in a given parish experiencing the same nutrition environment might bias the standard errors downward, so in 
all regressions the standard errors are cluster by parish. 
10 Additional specifications that interact gender with ability were run and are not presented here.  They show that while 
ability is protective, boys of higher ability are more likely to share the supplement. Additional specifications where ability 
was interacted with birth order were run, with no significant effect of the interaction term.   
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4 includes controls for height-for-age and weight-for-height and column 5 includes additional family 
characteristics including parent’s educations, father’s presence in the home, and being indigenous.  
Children with a one standard deviation higher ability are 12 to 15 percentage points less likely to 
share their supplement with another member of the household.  Also, height-for-age and weight-
for-height z-scores are not significant, suggesting that cognitive ability may play a larger role in this 
decision than body size.  Concerns about the multi-colinearity of the height-for-age and weight-for-
height z-scores might suggest that only one of these measures be included as a control.  However, 
results are robust to controlling for only height-for-age or weight-for-height z-scores, or both.11   
Ordinary least squares estimates in equation (1) describe the role of family composition and 
child ability across households in Tables 1.3 and 1.4.  The dependant variable in Table .3 is the 
nutritious food variable, and in Table 1.4 is an indicator for whether or not the child consumed 
more than one standard deviation above the household mean of nutritious food.12 Results were 
separated for poor and non-poor households since wealthier households consume more and have 
less inequality in food consumption as shown in Figure 1.1a.  Cognitive ability, body size, and family 
and child characteristics as measured in the baseline are used to explain nutrition in the follow-up.  
Regressions include controls for family wealth level, living in a rural area and receiving the cash 
transfer intervention.13  Regressions in columns 4 and 8 for both tables also include parent’s 
education, and father’s presence in the home and the sample of children in all households is used.   
Results suggest the presence of sibling rivalry in the household; controlling for household 
wealth, children with more siblings are less likely to consume as much nutritious foods as children 
with fewer siblings (columns 1-2 Table 1.3, columns 1-8 Table 1.4).  Birth order effects consistent 
                                                 
11 Results are consistent with and without controls for being a treatment household or not and for controlling for 
mothers TVIP score and mother’s height.  In the interest of space, only the results when including both height-for-age 
and weight-for-height are presented.   
12 Results for the binary variable are consistent when run using a logit model rather than ordinary-least-squares. 
13 Regressions include child gender and age dummies and province fixed effects.  Correlation among the error terms of 
children in a given parish experiencing the same nutrition environment might bias the standard errors downward, so in 
all regressions the standard errors are cluster by parish. 
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with the developing country literature are also present with the nutritious food variable in Table 1.3; 
younger children are more likely to consume more nutritious foods than their older siblings.  Child 
ability is also positively correlated with food consumption in the specifications that do not include 
controls for parent education.  Having a one standard deviation higher ability is correlated with 
consuming up to five percent more nutritious foods.   Once additional controls for parent’s 
education levels, for being indigenous, and for the father being present in the home, are included 
child ability is no longer significant.  This might suggest that children in wealthier households or 
with more educated parents have higher abilities and therefore these household controls are 
absorbing the effect of child ability.  In Table 1.4, when considering high levels of food 
consumption relative to one’s siblings, the coefficient on ability remains significant and positive for 
children in poor households in all specifications.  Having a one standard deviation higher ability is 
correlated with 0.02 percentage point higher probability of consuming one standard deviation above 
the household mean.  In non-poor households, the coefficient for ability is zero but insignificant.  
Results are robust to controlling for height-for-age, weight-for-height, or both.14  With these 
controls, body size appears to be important as well with as strong correlation between nutrition and 
body size.  The point estimates for children in poor households are similar to those in non-poor 
households in Table 1.3, but are very different in Table 1.4.  To look more closely at the relationship 
between resource constraints and ability, the sample was pooled and ability was interacted with 
household poverty indicator.  In those regressions, the point estimates for Table 1.3 do not vary, 
ability is positively correlated with nutritious food consumption, but once including controls for 
parent education the coefficient is not significant.  Also, the interaction of ability with poverty level 
was not significant.15 
                                                 
14 Again, in the interest of space, only the results when including both height-for-age and weight-for-height are 
presented.  If included individually results are consistent with those presented.   
15 These results will be provided upon request.  
 18 
The findings suggest that children in larger households with more siblings consume less 
nutritious foods and are more likely to be in competition with each other in poor households than in 
non-poor households.  Also, these findings suggest that while higher ability children are consuming 
more nutritious foods across households, this could simply reflect that more able children are in 
more able households that can afford to purchase more healthy foods. The results in Tables 1.3 and 
1.4 do not inform us about what is happening within-households.   
In order to understand the intra-household relationship between ability and food 
consumption, it is important to look at the determinants of food consumption within, rather than 
across, households. Table 1.5 presents the within-household fixed effects estimates from equation 
(2) for the two alternative measures of nutritious food consumption used in Tables 1.3 and 1.4.  The 
sample is limited to households with at least 2 children between the ages of 4-7 during the second 
wave of the survey to compare children that are in similar places in life, and is split by household 
wealth.16  Results provide evidence that within the household, child ability is correlated with food 
consumption for poor households but not in non-poor households.17  Poor children with a one 
standard deviation higher ability consume nutritious foods 0.55 more times in a week, which 
corresponds to consuming 6 percent more nutritious food.  In other terms, children with a one 
standard deviation higher ability have a 0.04 percentage point higher likelihood of consuming more 
than one standard deviation above the household mean.  Cognitive ability matters more than body 
size, regardless of whether height-for-age or weight-for-height are included individually or together.18    
                                                 
16 This is due to data restrictions, since only children under age 8 in the follow-up have ability measures and other 
characteristics.  
17 These findings are even more interesting when considering that the OLS regressions (tables 3 & 4) on this sample of 
household with at least 2 children.  OLS regressions across households in Tables 3 and 4 do not show a relationship 
between ability and food consumption on this sample.   
18 Results when pooling the sample and interacting child ability with the household povery indicator are insignificant.  
The point estimates for poor and non-poor households are different, and leaving the sample split by household wealth 
shows the different coefficients.   
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Table 1.6 presents the estimates from equation (3) which explicitly measures sibling ability to 
look closely at sibling ability rivalry.19  Results are consistent with the within-family fixed effects 
estimates from Table 1.5.  A child with siblings of higher ability is less likely to consume nutritious 
foods.  A child whose siblings have a one standard deviation higher average ability consumes 
nutritious foods 0.6 fewer times in a week and has a 0.02 percentage point lower likelihood of 
consuming one standard deviation above the household mean.  The point estimate for the average 
and the highest sibling ability values is similar because most children have only one sibling with 
whom they are being compared in this sample.  This data limitation also explains why I am unable to 
use the varied specifications used in Akresh et al. (2010).  In that paper, we had large households 
with many children between the ages of 5-15 and explicitly measured sibling ability using three 
different forms: highest sibling ability, a dummy for having any sibling with a higher ability and 
dummies for the number of siblings of higher ability.  This sample does not allow such varied 
specifications.  I do, however, include explicit measures of sibling height-for-age and weight-for-
height in Table 1.6.  Their coefficients are largely insignificant, as expected given the results in Table 
1.5.   
5.2 Robustness Checks 
The subsequent specification considers the relationship between child ability and 
consumption of non-nutritious foods within households.  If parents are concerned about their 
children’s nutritious development when making choices of how to invest their resources, then eating 
non-nutritious foods should not be a significant factor.  The non-nutritious food variable is the 
summation of the number of times the child consumed each of 4 different categories of food in the 
previous week.  These categories are soda or ice-cream, cookies or pastries, fried snacks, and candy; 
all are foods that do not provide high levels of micronutrients necessary for healthy child 
                                                 
19 The sample is split by poor and non-poor households with at least 2 children.   
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development. Results from the within household fixed-effects specification are presented in Table 
1.7.  Contrary to its relationship with nutritious foods, child ability does not play an explanatory role 
in the consumption of non-nutritious foods in poor and non-poor households.  Regardless of the 
form that the non-nutritious food variable takes, the coefficient on child ability is non-zero and 
insignificant.   
As a second robustness check, a different measure of nutritious food consumption is 
presented in Table 1.8.  The measure is an indicator for whether or not the child consumed more 
than one standard deviation above the household mean consumption of liver and spinach.  Both are 
foods high in iron, which is particularly important to those living in high altitudes as are many of 
Ecuador’s children.  Results are consistent with those from previous tables.  Having a sibling with a 
one standard deviation higher ability corresponds to a 0.02 percentage point lower probability of 
eating more than one standard deviation of the household mean consumption of liver or spinach.  
The sample of poor families that consume liver or spinach is small since both are relatively 
expensive foods, which can explain why the point estimates are small across the various 
specifications and insignificant in the within-household fixed effect specification.  Results are 
present for children in poor households and not in non-poor households.   
6. Conclusion 
In this paper I provide evidence that sibling rivalry affects nutritional investments in 
Ecuadorian children using multiple measures of nutritional consumption. Children receiving 
supplements from a government intervention are more likely to share their supplement with other 
members of a household when they have more siblings.  However, children with higher abilities are 
less likely to share their supplement than children with low abilities.  Children with a one standard 
deviation higher ability are 15 percentage points less likely to share a government-provided 
nutritional supplement, which corresponds to a 24 percent lower likelihood of sharing the 
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supplement.   Child cognitive ability is also significant in explaining within household differences in 
the consumption of nutritious foods.  Children with a one standard deviation higher ability consume 
6 percent more nutritious food than their lower ability siblings.  Results hold regardless of whether 
or not controls for previous investments and individual child heterogeneity, by using height-for-age 
or weight-for-height or both, are included.  Taken together, these findings suggest that parents use 
information about child ability in making the decision to (re)allocate resources within the household. 
Results are present for poor households and are not present for non-poor households, suggesting 
that resource constraints are one explanation for why children may experience sibling ability rivalry.     
Improving child nutrition, health and human capital development are recognized as 
important goals as indicated by the Millennium Development Goals.  If parents in resource 
constrained households sacrifice one child’s nutritional investments for another, thus contributing to 
inequalities in human capital, policy makers must take this into account when attempting to reduce 
malnutrition.  Direct nutritional interventions targeting a single child may be thwarted by within-
household decisions that divert resources to 'stronger' or more able sibling rivals. However, non-
targeted overall reduction in poverty and reduced credit constraints might actually help the weaker 
siblings particularly if the overall benefit to the household is larger from the poverty reduction 
strategy than from a transfer targeted at individuals.  While studies do find “flypaper” effects of 
nutrition programs, where the transfer sticks to the targeted individual, who benefits from the more 
nutritious supplement that was distributed, they do find more reallocation in poorer households. 
Any project to evaluate the impact of nutritional interventions should include measures of cognitive 
ability in addition to child health, body size and work effort to understand the intra-household 
investment implications. 
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FIGURES AND TABLES FOR CHAPTER 1 
 
Table 1.1.  Summary Statistics  
Poor Households Only Non-Poor Households Only Panel A: Sample of households with at least 1 child in the 4-7 age 
range during Second Wave Obs Mean Std. Dev Obs Mean Std. Dev 
Own Ability (TVIP age adjusted z-score) 2650 -0.23 0.83 835 0.79 1.11 
Height-for-age Z-Score 2393 -1.07 1.07 802 -0.96 0.96 
Weight-for-height Z-Score 2535 -0.22 1.05 783 -0.07 1.03 
Number of Siblings 14 and Younger 2650 1.22 1.15 835 0 .83 0.89 
Number of Female Siblings 14 and Younger 2650 0.59 079 835 0.41 065 
Number of Siblings Ages 4-7 during Second Wave 2650 1.19 0.92 835 0.91 092 
Male 2648 0.50 0.50 833 0.52 0.50 
Age in Years 2650 5.42 0.84 835 5.04 0.87 
Treatment or Control Household 2650 0.54 0.50 835 0.01 0.09 
Quintile grouping from Selben Index 2650 12 0 835 34 0 
Log Selben (Wealth Index) 2650 13.89 0.59 835 14.11 0.75 
Indigenous Indicator 2650 0.06 0.24 835 0.04 0.19 
Rural Indicator 2650 0.59 0.49 835 1 0 
Father’s years of education 2409 7.11 3.20 796 10.42 3.72 
Mother’s years of education 2647 7.13 3.11 835 10.42 3.69 
Father is present in the home 2649 0.69 0.46 835 0.80 0.40 
Sharing of the Nutrition Supplement (Nutrinnfa) 465 0.63 0.48 63 0.65 0.48 
Nutritious Food 2649 8.48 4.93 835 11.99 4.93 
Greater than 1st dev above mean HH Nutritious Food  1992 0.07 0.25 451 0.09 0.29 
Non-nutritious Food 2649 7.61 5.96 835 7.95 6.0 
Greater than 1st dev above mean HH Non-nutritious Food 1992 0.13 0.33 451 0.15 0.36 
Panel B: Percent of overall variation arising from variation within households with at least 2 children ages 4-7 during wave 2 
Height-for-age Z-Score 30%      
Weight-for-height Z-Score 36%      
Nutritious Food 3%      
Non-nutritious Food  4%      
Notes: : All summary statistics are based on information for the 3485 children age 4 to 7 in Wave 2 unless data is missing for the variable. Child ability is measured using the 
Spanish language version of the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (TVIP) and normed by age (z-score). 528 children received the government nutrition intervention, a 
supplement called Nutrinnfa.  The nutritious food variable is the summation of the number of times the child consumed liver, cow internal organs, noodles or bread or 
other wheat flour products, spinach/chard, and carrots or similar vegetables in the previous week.  The non-nutritious food variable is the summation of the number of 
times the child consumed soda or ice-cream, cookies or pastries, fried snacks, and candies in the previous week.  The Selben is an index created by the government to 
identify potential beneficiaries of social programs.  Data source: Ecuador’s Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH) data from 2003-2005. 
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Table 1.2. Probability that a Child Receiving Nutrition Supplement (Nutrinnfa) Shares it with Siblings or Other Family 
Members, As a Function of Child Ability, All Children Receiving the Supplement 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
          
  -0.126* -0.103 -0.152** Own Ability (TVIP age adjusted z-score) 
  [0.067] [0.070] [0.076] 
Height-for-age Z-Score  -0.015  -0.009 -0.027 
  [0.064]  [0.064] [0.071] 
Weight-for-height Z-Score  -0.017  -0.014 -0.035 
  [0.057]  [0.056] [0.059] 
Number of Siblings 0.200*** 0.183** 0.195*** 0.179** 0.163** 
 [0.070] [0.073] [0.068] [0.072] [0.075] 
Number of Sisters -0.118 -0.108 -0.119 -0.105 -0.123 
 [0.099] [0.101] [0.098] [0.101] [0.116] 
Male 0.201* 0.177 0.207* 0.184 0.210 
 [0.110] [0.117] [0.112] [0.118] [0.130] 
Birth order -0.048 -0.030 -0.035 -0.019 -0.003 
 [0.179] [0.189] [0.182] [0.192] [0.194] 
Father’s years of education     0.016 
     [0.025] 
Mother’s years of education     0.015 
     [0.022] 
Father is present in the home     -0.088 
     [0.153] 
Indigenous Identifier     0.337 
     [0.318] 
Rural 0.475** 0.391* 0.471** 0.389* 0.459* 
 [0.219] [0.224] [0.223] [0.226] [0.239] 
Log Selben (Wealth Index) 0.144 0.142 0.139 0.134 0.144 
 [0.110] [0.115] [0.110] [0.115] [0.116] 
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 528 470 528 470 428 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at parish level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. All probit regressions run with age and province fixed effects.  Independent variables are from wave 1 
of the panel, while the dependent variable is from wave 2 of the panel.  Regression sample includes 528 children that 
were eligible and received the Nutrinnfa supplement and had taken the TVIP test, of which 470 had anthropometric 
measures and 428 had anthropometric measures and additional information about the household.  All children are in 
poor households and therefore eligible for the BDH intervention, or children are in households that were just above the 
cutoff for being poor.  Data source: Ecuador’s Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH) data from 2003-2005. 
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Table 1.3. Relationship between Nutritious Food Investments and Child Ability, by Household Wealth 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Poor Non-Poor 
 0.436*** 0.378*** 0.076  0.333* 0.333* 0.215 Own Ability (TVIP age 
adjusted z-score)  [0.119] [0.128] [0.132]  [0.169] [0.170] [0.155] 
  0.307*** 0.231**   0.156 0.010 Height-for-age Z-Score 
  [0.112] [0.109]   [0.157] [0.175] 
  0.206* 0.219*   0.260 0.293 Weight-for-height Z-Score 
  [0.112] [0.117]   [0.189] [0.177] 
Number of Siblings -0.263** -0.214* -0.143 -0.068 0.041 0.091 0.212 0.278 
 [0.122] [0.123] [0.141] [0.149] [0.235] [0.224] [0.262] [0.283] 
Number of Sisters -0.018 -0.029 -0.045 -0.081 -0.295 -0.330 -0.535 -0.561 
 [0.185] [0.188] [0.204] [0.209] [0.382] [0.367] [0.400] [0.392] 
Male -0.120 -0.123 -0.105 -0.182 -0.011 -0.019 0.130 0.188 
 [0.190] [0.189] [0.201] [0.210] [0.257] [0.253] [0.263] [0.284] 
Birth order 0.072 0.055 0.023 0.175 0.767* 0.777* 1.096** 0.941** 
 [0.265] [0.266] [0.280] [0.277] [0.437] [0.436] [0.430] [0.472] 
   0.141***    0.170*** Father’s years of education 
   [0.039]    [0.047] 
   0.244***    -0.019 Mother’s years of education 
   [0.042]    [0.046] 
   0.111    0.195 Father is present in the home 
   [0.270]    [0.339] 
   0.932*    0.010 Indigenous Identifier 
   [0.542]    [0.769] 
Household Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,647 2,647 2,352 2,143 833 833 766 731 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at parish level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All OLS regressions run with age and 
province fixed effects.  Independent variable from wave 1 of panel and dependent variable from wave 2 of the panel. Regression sample in columns 1-4 includes 2647 
poor children that had taken the TVIP cognitive ability test, of which 2352 had both anthropometric measures and 2143 had additional household information available. 
Regression sample in columns 5-8 includes 833 non-poor children that had taken the TVIP cognitive ability test, of which 766 had both anthropometric measures and 
731 had additional household information available. The nutritious food variable is the summation of the number of times the child consumed liver, cow internal organs, 
noodles or bread or other wheat flour products, spinach or chard, and carrots or similar vegetables in the previous week.  Household Characteristics include a rural 
indicator, log wealth index and an indicator for whether or not the household received the cash transfer.  Data source: Ecuador’s Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH) 
data from 2003-2005.  
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Table 1.4. Relationship between Investments above one Standard Deviation of Household Mean Nutritious Food and Child Ability, by Household Wealth 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Poor Non-Poor 
 0.018* 0.025** 0.022**  0.003 0.004 0.008 Own Ability (TVIP age 
adjusted z-score)  [0.010] [0.011] [0.011]  [0.015] [0.015] [0.016] 
  -0.005 -0.006   0.020 0.026 Height-for-age Z-Score 
  [0.006] [0.006]   [0.020] [0.018] 
  -0.013** -0.012*   -0.005 0.002 Weight-for-height Z-Score 
  [0.006] [0.006]   [0.011] [0.010] 
Number of Siblings -0.020*** -0.018** -0.020*** -0.030*** -0.089*** -0.088*** -0.083*** -0.094*** 
 [0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.009] [0.020] [0.020] [0.023] [0.024] 
Number of Sisters -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 -0.005 0.031 0.030 0.026 0.029 
 [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.023] [0.022] [0.024] [0.026] 
Male -0.004 -0.005 0.002 0.006 -0.037 -0.037 -0.030 -0.025 
 [0.012] [0.012] [0.013] [0.014] [0.023] [0.023] [0.024] [0.024] 
Birth order -0.047*** -0.048*** -0.050*** -0.036** 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.027 
 [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.016] [0.033] [0.034] [0.035] [0.031] 
   -0.001    -0.005 Father’s years of education 
   [0.002]    [0.005] 
   0.002    -0.003 Mother’s years of education 
   [0.003]    [0.006] 
   -0.019    -0.207** Father is present in the home 
   [0.017]    [0.103] 
   0.015    -0.000 Indigenous Identifier 
   [0.025]    [0.054] 
Household Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,991 1,991 1,770 1,633 450 450 411 403 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at parish level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All OLS regressions run with age and 
province fixed effects.  Independent variable are from wave 1 of panel and dependent variables are from wave 2. Regression sample in columns 1-4 includes 1991 poor 
children that had taken the TVIP cognitive ability test, of which 1770 had both anthropometric measures and 1633 had additional household information available. 
Regression sample in columns 5-8 includes 450 non-poor children that had taken the TVIP cognitive ability test, of which 411 had both anthropometric measures and 
403 had additional household information available. The nutritious food variable is an indicator for whether or not the child consumed more than 1 standard deviation 
above the nutritious food variable (the summation of the number of times the child consumed liver, cow internal organs, noodles/bread, spinach/chard, and carrots or 
similar in the previous week).  Household Characteristics include a rural indicator, log wealth index and an indicator for whether or not the household received the cash 
transfer.  Data source: Ecuador’s Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH) data from 2003-2005. 
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Table 1.5. Relationship between Investments and Child Ability Within the Household, by Household Wealth  
 Nutritious Food Greater than 1 standard deviation from household mean of 
Nutritious Food 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Poor Non-Poor Poor Non-Poor 
                  
0.466** 0.547** -0.389 -0.232 0.038** 0.039* -0.049 -0.025 Own Ability (TVIP age 
adjusted z-score) [0.182] [0.217] [0.458] [0.532] [0.019] [0.022] [0.040] [0.044] 
 0.140  0.065  0.023*  0.035 Height-for-age Z-Score 
 [0.141]  [0.296]  [0.013]  [0.031] 
 0.101  0.301  -0.009  0.033 Weight-for-height Z-Score 
 [0.121]  [0.193]  [0.013]  [0.021] 
Male -0.019 -0.039 0.348 0.386 0.009 0.009 0.082 0.081* 
 [0.188] [0.237] [0.407] [0.373] [0.017] [0.020] [0.052] [0.047] 
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province FE No No No No No No No No 
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 643 572 126 115 639 569 126 115 
Number of Households 326 313 63 61 322 310 63 61 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at parish level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All household fixed effects 
regressions run with age fixed effects.  Independent variables are from wave 1 of the panel, while the dependent variable is from wave 2 of the panel.  Regression sample 
limited to children in households with at least two young children between the ages of 4-7 in the follow-up survey and includes 769 children that had taken the TVIP 
cognitive ability test (643 poor children, 126 non-poor children), of which 687 had both anthropometric measures (572 poor children, 115 non poor children). The 
sample size in columns 5 to 8 is slightly smaller from a lack of variation in some households.  The nutritious food variable is the summation of the number of times the 
child consumed each of 5 different categories of food in the previous week.  These categories are liver, cow internal organs, noodles/bread, spinach/chard, and carrots 
or similar vegetables.  Data source: Ecuador’s Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH) data from 2003-2005. 
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Table 1.6.  Relationship between Investments, Child Ability and Sibling Ability, by Household Wealth 
 Nutritious Food Greater than 1 standard deviation from household 
mean of Nutritious Food 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Poor Non-Poor Poor Non-Poor 
-0.627**  -0.100  -0.023**  0.039  Average Sibling Ability (TVIP age 
adjusted z-score) [0.253]  [0.636]  [0.011]  [0.039]  
 -0.581**  -0.089  -0.023**  0.035 Highest Sibling Ability (TVIP age 
adjusted z-score)  [0.253]  [0.630]  [0.011]  [0.038] 
0.012  0.026  -0.012  -0.034  Average Sibling Height-for-age Z-
Score  [0.197]  [0.356]  [0.009]  [0.033]  
0.419**  0.203  0.001  -0.029  Average Sibling Weight-for-height 
Z-Score  [0.208]  [0.320]  [0.007]  [0.021]  
 -0.100  -0.005  -0.011  -0.045 Highest Sibling Height-for-age Z-
Score   [0.187]  [0.340]  [0.007]  [0.032] 
 0.279  0.083  0.002  -0.031 Highest Sibling Weight-for-height Z-
Score   [0.194]  [0.275]  [0.007]  [0.019] 
-0.064 -0.077 -0.159 -0.139 0.015 0.016 0.004 0.001 Own Ability (TVIP age adjusted z-
score) [0.204] [0.203] [0.556] [0.537] [0.015] [0.016] [0.042] [0.041] 
0.311 0.358* 0.377 0.390 0.017** 0.017* 0.010 0.008 Height-for-age Z-Score 
[0.199] [0.208] [0.459] [0.505] [0.009] [0.009] [0.031] [0.032] 
0.359** 0.406** 0.715* 0.736* -0.002 -0.002 0.007 0.006 Weight-for-height Z-Score 
[0.160] [0.174] [0.348] [0.362] [0.009] [0.009] [0.025] [0.024] 
Individual Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Household Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 512 512 109 109 510 510 109 109 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at parish level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All OLS regressions run with age 
and province fixed effects.  Independent variables are from wave 1 of the panel, while the dependent variable is from wave 2.  Regression sample includes 655 children 
from households that had taken the TVIP cognitive ability test and had at least one sibling between the ages of 4-7 in the follow-up survey that also had taken the 
TVIP cognitive ability test, of which 540 were from poor households and 115 are from non-poor households. The sample size in columns 5 to 8 is slightly smaller 
from a lack of variation in some households.  The nutritious food variable is the summation of the number of times the child consumed each of 5 different categories 
of food in the previous week.  These categories are liver, cow internal organs, noodles or bread or other wheat flour products, spinach or chard, and carrots or similar 
vegetables.  Individual Characteristics include number of siblings, number of sisters, gender and birthorder.  Household Characteristics include father’s years of 
education, mother’s years of education, father’s presence in the home, an indigenous identifier, a rural indicator, log wealth index and an indicator for whether or not 
the household received the cash transfer.  Data source: Ecuador’s BDH data from 2003-2005.
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Table 1.7.  Relationship between Non-nutritious Food Consumption and Child Ability Within the Household, by 
Household Wealth 
 
Non-nutritious Food 
 
 
Greater than 1 standard deviation 
from household mean of Non-
nutritious Food 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Poor Non-Poor Poor Non-Poor 
-0.069 0.078 0.015 0.033 Own Ability (TVIP age adjusted z-score) 
[0.260] [0.330] [0.025] [0.024] 
0.148 -0.387 0.009 -0.055 Height-for-age Z-Score 
[0.236] [0.306] [0.021] [0.046] 
-0.172 -0.151 -0.017 -0.001 Weight-for-height Z-Score 
[0.200] [0.312] [0.020] [0.037] 
Male -0.397 0.432 -0.012 0.006 
 [0.444] [0.606] [0.031] [0.059] 
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 572 115 569 115 
Number of Households 313 61 310 61 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at parish level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%. All household fixed effects regressions run with age fixed effects.  Independent variables are from wave 1 of the panel, 
while the dependent variable is from wave 2 of the panel.  Regression sample includes 687 children that had taken the TVIP 
cognitive ability test and had both anthropometric measures (572 poor children, 115 non-poor children). The sample size in 
column 3 is slightly smaller from a lack of variation in some poor households. The non-nutritious food variable is the 
summation of the number of times the child consumed foods from four different categories in the previous week.  These 
categories are soda or ice cream, cookies or pastries, fried snacks, and candies.  Data source: Ecuador’s Bono de Desarrollo 
Humano (BDH) data from 2003-2005.  
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Table 1.8.  Relationship between an Alternative Measure of Nutritious Food Investments and Child Ability, by 
Household Wealth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Poor Non-poor 
 -0.016*   0.026  Average Sibling Ability (TVIP 
age adjusted z-score)  [0.009]   [0.030]  
  -0.016*   0.026 Highest Sibling Ability (TVIP 
age adjusted z-score)   [0.009]   [0.030] 
0.027 0.012 0.012 -0.002 0.008 0.008 Own Ability (TVIP age adjusted 
z-score) [0.021] [0.015] [0.015] [0.057] [0.036] [0.036] 
Height-for-age Z-Score 0.016 0.011 0.011 -0.008 -0.006 -0.006 
 [0.016] [0.009] [0.009] [0.046] [0.022] [0.022] 
Weight-for-height Z-Score 0.009 -0.003 -0.003 -0.007 0.020 0.020 
 [0.010] [0.005] [0.005] [0.035] [0.018] [0.018] 
Number of Siblings  -0.010 -0.010  -0.012 -0.012 
  [0.009] [0.009]  [0.033] [0.033] 
Number of Sisters  0.007 0.007  -0.010 -0.010 
  [0.010] [0.010]  [0.039] [0.039] 
Male -0.009 -0.003 -0.003 0.029 0.038 0.038 
 [0.024] [0.016] [0.016] [0.048] [0.045] [0.045] 
Birth order  -0.006 -0.006  -0.110** -0.110** 
  [0.021] [0.021]  [0.047] [0.047] 
 -0.000 -0.000  -0.001 -0.001 Father’s years of education 
 [0.003] [0.003]  [0.007] [0.007] 
 -0.000 -0.000  0.002 0.002 Mother’s years of education 
 [0.002] [0.002]  [0.009] [0.009] 
 0.018 0.018  -0.082 -0.082 Father is present in the home 
 [0.017] [0.017]  [0.096] [0.096] 
Household Characteristics No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province Fixed Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Household Fixed Effects Yes No No Yes No No 
Observations 569 537 537 115 115 115 
Number of Households 310   61   
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at parish level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. All regressions run with age fixed effects.  The regressions in columns 1 and 4 are run with household 
fixed effects, while the regressions in columns 2, 3, 5 and 6 are run with province fixed effects.  Independent variable is 
from wave 1 of the panel, while the dependent variable is from wave 2 of the panel.  Regression sample includes 684 
children that had taken the TVIP cognitive ability test and had both anthropometric measures (569 poor children, 115 
non-poor children), of which 652 had additional household information available (537 poor children, 115 non poor 
children). The nutritious food variable is an indicator of whether or not the child ate more than one standard deviation 
above the household mean of the summation of the number of times the child consumed each of 2 different categories 
of food in the previous week.  These categories are liver and spinach or chard. Household Characteristics include an 
indigenous identifier, a rural indicator, log wealth index and an indicator for whether or not the household received the 
cash transfer.  Data source: Ecuador’s Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH) data from 2003-2005.  
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Figure 1.1a.   Graph of the average number of times nutritious food was eaten in the past week by 
number of siblings and by household wealth, full sample 
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Figure 1.1b.   Graph of the average number of times non-nutritious food was eaten in the past week 
by number of siblings and by household wealth, full sample 
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CHAPTER 2 
CHILD ABILITY AND HOUSEHOLD HUMAN CAPITAL INVESTMENT 
DECISIONS IN BURKINA FASO20 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Parental decisions about whether and how much to invest in their children’s human capital 
depend on many factors, and these decisions have long-lasting impacts on each child’s future 
earnings, marital prospects, and overall welfare. A large literature attempts to understand the source 
of inequalities for children’s educational investments within a household building on seminal work 
by Becker and Tomes (1976) that delineates the tradeoff between the quantity of children and their 
‘quality.’ In making the schooling investment decision, parents will have information about a child’s 
ability and that information will often not be available to researchers, which partly explains why 
much of the empirical research on the determinants of household investments in children’s 
schooling focuses on easy to observe demographic characteristics of the child such as gender, birth 
order, and family composition (Parish and Willis 1993; Garg and Morduch 1998; Black, Devereux, 
and Salvanes 2005).21 More recent papers attempt to use direct measurements of a child’s ability such 
as IQ scores (Kim 2005) or cognitive tests (Ayalew 2005) to better understand which factors 
influence investment decisions. 
In this paper, we build on the seminal empirical work by Rosenzweig and Schultz (1982) to 
examine the role that a child’s cognitive ability plays in a resource constrained household’s decision 
to invest in that child’s education. For poor households seeking to maximize the returns to their 
human capital investments, schooling decisions will depend on parent perceptions about the returns 
to school for a given child and that child’s ability. In a setting where few households ever enroll all 
                                                 
20 This work is co-authored with Richard Akresh, Damien de Walque and Harounan Kazianga 
21 See Strauss and Thomas (1995) and Glewwe and Kremer (2006) for reviews of the literature. Related research explores 
the relationship between these demographic characteristics and the non-schooling outcomes of employment (Kessler 
1991), risky behaviors (Aizer 2004), and child labor (Emerson and Souza 2008). 
 32 
of their children in school, as is true in many developing countries, understanding the link between 
child ability and school enrollment and school continuation decisions is critical for developing policy 
prescriptions to improve educational outcomes. 
We make four main contributions to the literature on explaining household school 
investment decisions. First, we employ direct measures of a child’s ability for all children of primary 
school age (5 to 15), regardless of whether they are currently enrolled in school. This differs from 
existing papers that tend to have ability measures only for children that are currently enrolled in 
school (Glick and Sahn 2010). We use the Raven’s Colored Progressive Matrices (CPM) and the 
Weschler Intelligence Scales (WISC) Digit Span as measures of a child’s cognitive ability. Second, 
our paper is unique in explicitly incorporating direct measures of the ability of each child’s siblings 
(both absolute and relative measures) and to show how sibling ability ‘rivalry’ exerts a strong impact 
on the parents’ decision of which child to send to school. Third, the survey instrument asks parents 
to provide their perceptions about the likely chances of future economic success for each of their 
children, information that is not often gathered in surveys. We show that a similar pattern of sibling 
rivalry is observed using either these parent perceptions or the externally validated cognitive ability 
tests measuring child ability. Fourth, we address potential concerns about schooling influencing 
measures of child ability by exploiting the panel data structure and focusing on the relationship 
between the enrollment decision in the survey’s second year and the ability measures observed in the 
survey’s first year for the subset of young children who were not enrolled and not yet of typical 
school age in the first year. 
We explore both the extensive margin of school enrollment during the 2007-2008 school 
year and grade progression measures, as well as the intensive margin of school related expenses. We 
find that a child with a one standard deviation higher ability test score has a 16 percent higher 
likelihood of being currently enrolled in school, while a child with a higher ability sibling is 16 
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percent less likely to be currently enrolled and having two higher ability siblings lowers a child’s 
probability of enrollment by 30 percent. Household fixed effects regressions show that within a 
given household, a child with one standard deviation higher ability compared to the average ability 
of their siblings is 31 percent more likely to be enrolled. On the intensive margin, controlling for 
household fixed effects, we find that a child with one standard deviation higher ability receives 20 
percent more discretionary school expenditures by the parents. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the conceptual 
framework about sibling rivalry and the household schooling investment decision. Section 3 
describes the survey data used in the analysis and explains the construction of the different child 
ability measures. Section 4 describes the empirical identification strategy and section 5 presents the 
main results as well as robustness tests. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Sibling Rivalry Conceptual Framework 
A number of studies examine the interaction of siblings to understand schooling outcomes and why 
girls often receive less education than their brothers. Butcher and Case (1994), using United States 
data that contains explicit information on an individual’s completed education and the education of 
their brothers and sisters, find that women with only brothers receive significantly more education 
on average than women with any sisters.22 Their finding differs from what is typically found in 
developing country studies. Parish and Willis (1993) examine how sibling sex composition influences 
girls’ education in Taiwan. They emphasize that cultural traditions favoring male descent can cause 
parents to manipulate daughters for the benefit of their sons. Garg and Morduch (1998) emphasize 
sibling rivalry using data from Ghana. Child education decisions in credit constrained households are 
                                                 
22 They highlight three potential explanations for why sibling sex composition might influence education decisions: 
sibling resource competition, sex-typing of tasks, and peer effects. Resource competition occurs if boys and girls have 
different relative prices for educational investments or investment returns. Sex-typing stems from parents sending 
messages to children describing appropriate behaviors and goals, while peer effects come from children developing traits 
that depend on how they interact with their siblings. 
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influenced by the number of children they have, resource dilution, and the sex composition of their 
children, sibling rivalry. Resource dilution occurs because more children imply fewer resources per 
child and credit constraints limit the family's ability to borrow against future returns. Sibling rivalry 
occurs because all children benefit from having fewer educated siblings with comparatively higher 
returns on investment. 
Resource dilution and sibling rivalry in educational investments in poor countries is well 
documented. In addition to the Taiwan and Ghana studies, the list includes: Binder (1998) for 
Mexico, Morduch (2000) for Tanzania, Edmonds (2007) for Nepal, Ota and Moffatt (2007) for 
India, and Dammert (2010) for Guatemala and Nicaragua. While Garg and Morduch focus on credit 
constraints and differences in relative returns to education as the cause for sibling rivalry, Edmonds 
(2007) emphasizes that comparative advantage in home production can lead to similar implications 
when girls have comparative advantage and it is not possible to hire labor for home production. 
Both Edmonds (2007) and Dammert (2010) find evidence consistent with this sibling rivalry 
interpretation. 
Such models of sibling rivalry neglect that parents have additional knowledge about their 
children’s capabilities and use this information to make school investment decisions. A literature 
embedded in testing the one-period consensus parental preferences model of human capital 
investment of Becker and Tomes (1976) and Behrman, Pollack, and Taubman (1982) uses child 
endowments in modeling the investment decision.23 Most studies that examine the investment 
decision process have to work around the fact that actual child ability or endowment is typically not 
observed (Rosenzweig and Schultz 1982; Behrman, Pollack and Taubman 1982; Behrman, 
Rosenzweig and Taubman 1994). Some recent studies are able to use direct measures of child ability. 
Kim (2005) uses an IQ test administered to Wisconsin high school juniors and finds that higher 
                                                 
23 See Behrman (1997) for an overview of the consensus parental preferences models. 
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ability children receive more parent transfers. Glick and Sahn (2010) use achievement test scores 
from Senegalese children taken in Grade 2 to explain school outcomes seven years later, but this 
neglects the role of siblings that may not have been enrolled in school. 
The most closely related paper to ours is by Ayalew (2005) who uses Raven’s CPM test 
scores for school-age children in one village in Ethiopia to measure child ability and using a 
household fixed effects model finds that parents consider child ability when making school 
enrollment decisions. There are several key differences between our papers. First, we focus on 
absolute and relative direct measures of the ability of a child’s siblings to generate inferences about 
the role of sibling rivalry in influencing schooling decisions. Second, we explore both alternative 
ability measures by using different cognitive tests and alternative outcomes such as school 
expenditures and grade progression, in addition to current enrollment, which is the focus of the 
Ayalew paper. Third, we exploit the panel data structure as a robustness check to address potential 
reverse causality concerns about schooling influencing measures of child ability. 
3. Burkina Faso Social Protection Evaluation Survey 
The panel survey was conducted in June 2008 (Year 1) and June 2009 (Year 2) in Nahouri province 
in southern Burkina Faso, located approximately 100 miles from the capital and bordering Ghana. 
Households were randomly selected from a village-level census conducted by our project team 
immediately prior to the Round 1 survey in the 75 rural villages of Nahouri province that each has a 
primary school. The survey is part of an ongoing project evaluating social protection strategies in 
Burkina Faso. Households in this region are predominantly subsistence farmers growing sorghum 
and groundnuts and have mean annual per capita expenditures of approximately $90. 
Our analysis focuses on primary school-aged children ages 5 to 15 in households with 
multiple biological children. There are 4,635 children in this age range in 1,507 different households. 
As shown in Table 2.1, parental schooling is low, with only 13 percent of the children having a 
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parent that ever attended school. Fifty-four percent of this children’s sample is male and the average 
age is 9.4 years old. On average, these children have 3.8 siblings under age 15, including 1.8 sisters. 
They live in households with an average of 8.9 individuals, including a head of household, 1.5 wives, 
4.8 biological children of the household head under age 15, 0.4 children under age 15 that are not 
the biological children of the head, and 1.2 other members that include grandparents, aunts, uncles, 
and other extended family members. 
Parents were directly asked about the chance of future success they believe each of their 
children will have in formal employment, a reasonable measure of parental perceptions about the 
investment return on their child’s education, since most jobs in “formal employment” in Burkina 
Faso require a level of education beyond primary school and in particular French skills.24 This 
parental perception measure is based on everything the parent knows about the child and about the 
labor market, whether right or wrong, and was asked about every child in the household. For each 
child, the parents responded whether that particular child had a ‘small’, ‘medium’, ‘large’, or ‘very 
large’ chance of future success in formal employment. Parents considered 25 percent of these 
children to have a ‘small’ chance of future success and only 8 percent to have a ‘very large’ chance of 
future success. Parents viewed most children (67 percent) to have a ‘medium’ (38 percent) or ‘large’ 
(29 percent) chance of future success. 
To corroborate these parent perceptions, we also consider externally validated measures 
about a child. We use the Raven’s CPM and the WISC Digit Span to measure a child’s cognitive 
ability; both are tests that do not require formal schooling to be able to answer the questions. The 
Raven’s CPM is a measure of fluid intelligence or problem solving ability. The test does not depend 
heavily on verbal skills, making it relatively “culture free” (Borghans, Duckworth, Heckman, and 
                                                 
24 Schultz (2004) and Kazianga (2004) using Burkina Faso nationally representative data report substantial returns (9 to 
16 percent) for an additional year of primary school, highlighting the importance of schooling in this context. Returns to 
secondary (14 to 26 percent) and tertiary (13 to 23 percent) schooling are even higher. 
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Weel 2008). In Figure 2.1 Panel A, we show two sample problems from the Raven’s test (Raven, 
Raven, and Court 1998). The child respondent is asked to select the image that is missing in order to 
complete the picture. This type of question is novel to the children in Nahouri Province, thus 
providing a more natural or true measure of problem solving skills. 
We ask 18 questions from the Raven’s CPM and on average, children in our sample answer 
4.9 questions correctly.25 Younger children answer fewer questions correctly than older children (the 
average number correct for children age 5 is 2.8 and for children age 15 is 7.6).26 To control for this 
relationship between age and raw test scores, we calculate a z-score for each child measured as the 
child’s raw test score minus the average score for the same age children divided by the standard 
deviation of test scores for children of that age.27 Therefore, the mean of the Raven’s z-score is zero 
and the standard deviation is one for each age and across all ages.28 
The WISC Digit Span is a measure of working memory and ability to concentrate and has 
both a forward and backward component. The respondent repeats a string of numbers to the 
enumerator and is scored by whether or not they repeat the full string correctly as shown in Figure 
2.1 Panel B (Weschler 1974). In the Digit Span Forward, the child must repeat the string of numbers 
exactly as stated by the enumerator. The string of numbers increases in length as the child answers 
correctly. With the Digit Span Backward, similar strings of numbers are to be repeated in the reverse 
order from that stated by the enumerator until the child can no longer continue. We calculate a total 
combined score of the forward and backward digit spans, and the children have an average score of 
                                                 
25 During extensive pretesting of the Raven’s test, results were consistent whether children were asked the entire set of 
36 questions or only the odd-numbered questions, so to save interview time we only administered the 18 odd-numbered 
questions (Sets A, Ab, and B). 
26 The average number of questions answered correctly for children ages 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14 is respectively 
2.8, 3.6, 4.4, 5.1, 5.3, 5.6, 6.1, 6.5, and 6.4. 
27 We did not use the international Raven’s norming standards since we asked a subset of the Raven’s test and what is 
most important here is how the children in rural Burkina Faso compare to each other, not internationally. 
28 Note that in Section 5.2, we estimate alternative specifications to test the robustness of using the Raven’s age-adjusted 
z-score instead of the raw test scores. 
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7.6 correct answers out of a total possible 32.29 As with the Raven, we calculate a WISC Digit Span 
age-adjusted z-score to control for age effects. 
In Table 2.1, we present summary statistics about children’s schooling. Few households in 
rural Burkina Faso ever enroll all of their children. Only 54 percent of children are enrolled in the 
2007-2008 school year. Fifty-six percent of households experience variation in enrollment among 
their children age 5 to 15, while 17 percent enroll no children and only 27 percent of households 
currently enroll all of their primary school-aged children. If we consider whether a child has ever 
been enrolled in school rather than current enrollment during 2007-2008, then 59 percent of 
children in the sample have ever been enrolled and 54 percent of households experience variation 
across their children in whether a child has ever been enrolled. Given these low enrollment rates, on 
average these children only have completed 1.8 years of school. Child labor rates are high, with 
children heavily involved in agriculture and household production.   
In addition to examining the relationship between parent perceptions, child ability and 
school enrollment, we explore three alternative schooling-related outcomes (on-time start, grade 
progression, and discretionary school expenses) where sibling rivalry might matter. In Burkina Faso, 
parents typically enroll their children starting at age seven, so we construct a variable to indicate if 
children started school by this age or if they were delayed. The ‘on-time start’ variable shows that 
only 40 percent of primary school-aged children start school by age seven, with the rest either 
starting at a later age or never attending school. Fifty-four percent of households have variation 
across their children in whether each child started school by age seven. Second, we consider grade 
progression through school, which we calculate by dividing the child’s highest grade attended by the 
number of years since the child started school.30 The grade progression measure ranges from zero to 
one, with higher numbers indicating quicker progress towards completing primary school. Third, for 
                                                 
29 Our regression results are robust to keeping the forward and backward digit span scores separate. 
30 For children who never attended school, they are assigned a grade progression measure of zero. 
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each child we calculate the total schooling-related discretionary expenditures during the 2007-2008 
school year. While school in Burkina Faso has relatively low registration fees (904 FCFA on average 
per year, about $2.18 using the June 2008 exchange rate of 415 FCFA = $1 USD), there are 
additional expenditures expected of each family when they enroll their child. These can include 
purchasing uniforms, contributions for the school cafeteria, and transportation costs. Spreading 
resources evenly across children to pay the fixed costs associated with schooling may not be possible 
in the presence of liquidity constraints. However, for some of these expenditures, such as school 
supplies and parent association fees, parents have discretion in the amount spent each year on a 
child who is enrolled, and these discretionary expenditures are important in this setting as well as in 
developing countries that currently have free schooling. In our sample, the total average cost of 
sending a child to school is 3867 FCFA per school year (about $9.32), with parents spending on 
average 845 FCFA (about $2.04) on these discretionary items per child (about 22 percent of total 
educational expenses). 
4. Empirical Identification Strategy 
4.1 Econometric Specification 
Studies of sibling rivalry in education typically use counts of the number of siblings and the number 
of sisters that a child has to explain different schooling outcomes (attendance, enrollment, 
attainment) as follows: 
(1) ihhihihihih ZXFSe εααωω ++++= 1010  
where eih 
is the educational outcome for child i in household h, Sih is a count of the number of 
siblings the child has, Fih is a count of the number of female siblings the child has, Xih is a vector of 
individual characteristics such as age and gender that might influence parental investments, Zh is a 
vector of household characteristics, and εih is a random, idiosyncratic error term. The interpretation 
of ω0 is the change in eih associated with an additional male sibling. The interpretation of ω1 is the 
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change in eih associated with the thought experiment of converting a sibling from a male to a female. 
ω0 + ω1 is then the change in eih associated with adding an additional female sibling. This approach 
takes current family size and composition as given at the time the parents make the enrollment 
decision. 
To better understand the parental schooling investment decision, we expand on the sibling 
rivalry model in Equation 1 to control for previously unobserved characteristics about the child (his 
ability) and his home environment (his siblings’ ability) that might influence the parent’s decision. 
We employ two empirical approaches to estimate this relationship. First, we estimate the following 
household or sibling fixed effects logit regression that will control for all household level 
characteristics that are constant across siblings: 
(2) ihhihihih XAe ηλαβ +++= 00  
where eih and Xih are defined as above, Aih is a direct measure of observed child ability, λh is the 
household fixed effect that captures all characteristics about the household that are constant across 
siblings, and ηih is the child specific idiosyncratic error term. In Equation 1 and previous sibling 
rivalry papers, child ability was part of the error term, εih, but in our analysis we are able to directly 
control for its effect on educational outcomes.31 This within family estimate compares a child’s own 
ability to the average ability of all the other children in the household to examine if parents compare 
a child’s ability to the average ability of his siblings when making human capital investment 
decisions. 
While the household fixed effects estimation compares own ability to average sibling ability, 
the second approach we adopt is to be more specific about the functional form of the sibling ability 
term and to include direct measures of sibling ability in the regression. This approach has the 
                                                 
31 Note that in the household fixed effects specification, household characteristics, Zh, and number of siblings, Sih, will 
drop out of the specification because there is no variation across children within the household. In the household fixed 
effects regressions, we also drop the number of sisters variable, Fih, because it is constant within a given household for 
children of the same gender. 
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additional advantage that we can include the same variables as in the sibling rivalry literature (in 
Equation 1) and allows us to examine how the relevant coefficients vary when controlling for a 
child’s own ability and his sibling’s ability. We estimate the following extended Equation 1 sibling 
rivalry regression: 
(3) ihhihihihihihih ZXFSAhAe µααωωββ ++++++= − 101010 )(  
where h(A-ih) is a measure of the ability of the other children (-i) in household h with varying 
functional forms that we discuss in detail below, and the other variables are as defined above. The 
error term, µih, measures the child specific idiosyncratic part of εih not captured by a child’s own 
ability, Aih, or his sibling’s ability, h(A-ih). The coefficients β0 and β1 respectively give an estimate of 
the impact of child i’s own ability and his sibling’s ability on child i’s enrollment. 
We use several alternative measures of sibling ability, h(A-ih), including both absolute 
measures (highest sibling ability) and relative measures (whether there are any siblings with a higher 
ability score and dummies for the number of siblings with higher ability scores). Absolute measures 
provide insight into the role of the level of sibling ability in a household. Having siblings with high 
ability might raise overall enrollment levels in a family, or it might represent competition for the 
child. It could be that the average level of sibling ability affects a child’s enrollment differently than 
the ability level of the household’s ‘best’ sibling (with the highest ability). If sibling rivalry influences 
parents deciding who to send to school, then parents might consider how a child compares in ability 
to his siblings rather than considering the child’s ability on its own, and relative sibling ability 
measures might be more informative. In our sample, 40 percent of the overall variation in ability 
arises from within family variation across siblings, while 60 percent is between families. 
4.2 Potential Threats to Identification Strategy 
Since schooling potentially affects cognitive ability, reverse causality is the primary problem we face. 
We attempt to address this in two ways. First, we estimate robustness specifications in which we 
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limit the sample of children to Grades 2 and lower or to Grade 1 and lower. The decision to use this 
grade cutoff point is based on a regression of the Raven’s age adjusted z-score on grade in school, 
and the coefficients for Grades 1 and 2 are close to zero (0.05 and 0.09 respectively) and not 
statistically significant. The coefficients for Grade 3 and 4 are slightly larger (0.14 and 0.12 
respectively), but only the Grade 3 coefficient is statistically significant, while the Grade 4 coefficient 
is not statistically significant. We interpret this lack of relationship between the lower grades and 
ability test scores as evidence that children in Grade 2 and lower have not yet received enough 
schooling to influence their cognitive ability test scores. Based on this information and to be 
conservative in our robustness specifications, we select Grades 1 and 2 as the cutoff levels. Second, 
we restrict the sample to young children ages 5 to 7 (and 5 to 6) who are not enrolled in year 1 but 
for whom we have ability measures in year 1 and look at their enrollment in year 2. This eliminates 
any potential effect of schooling on the ability measures as these children were not enrolled at the 
time of taking the ability test. 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Sibling Rivalry, Parent Perceptions, and Child Ability 
Since we are building upon the sibling rivalry literature, we begin our analysis estimating Equation 1 
that uses the standard observable family composition characteristics, number of siblings, number of 
sisters, and birth order. Results of this regression are presented in Table 2.2, column 1. We find 
evidence of resource dilution and sibling rivalry consistent with the literature. We find that the 
number of siblings has a negative effect on enrollment (resource dilution) while the number of 
sisters has a positive effect (sibling rivalry). Holding constant the number of sisters, the addition of a 
male sibling is correlated with 2.5 percentage points (or 4.6 percent) lower likelihood of attending 
school. An additional female sibling has no impact on whether the child attends school. 
Subsequently, switching from a male to female sibling corresponds to a 2.2 percentage point higher 
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likelihood of enrollment, or 4.1 percent of the base enrollment level. Birth order has a positive but 
not statistically significant coefficient indicating younger siblings are more likely to be enrolled, as is 
consistent with the literature in developing countries. 
As discussed in Section 4.1, other factors about the child besides these observable 
demographic characteristics are likely to influence the parent’s schooling investment decision. 
Parents know more about their children’s characteristics than simply their gender and sibling 
composition. Since it is the parents’ perceptions of their child’s ability or potential for future success, 
whether correct or not, that informs and affects their decision about educational investment, we first 
examine the relationship between school enrollment and these parents’ perceptions about each of 
their children.32 We estimate both a household fixed effects logit as in Equation 2 and an extended 
sibling rivalry logit regression as in Equation 3, and in columns 2 to 5 of Table 2.2 we present the 
corresponding results.33 We find a positive relationship between what parents think about a child 
and his current enrollment. On the other hand, perceptions of the child’s siblings in the same age 
group have a negative relationship with the child’s enrollment, suggesting parents make educational 
investment decisions based not only on what they think of one child but also what they think of that 
child’s siblings. 
The household fixed effects specification presented in Table 2.2 column 2 shows that 
children with one level higher parental perceptions compared to the average perceptions of their 
siblings have an 18.4 percentage point higher probability of enrollment, which corresponds to a 34.1 
percent higher enrollment level. In columns 3 to 5, we explicitly estimate the relationship between 
parent perceptions about the child’s siblings and a child’s enrollment. Controlling for direct 
                                                 
32 The parent perception variable takes values of 0 to 3, where 0 means a child has a small chance of future success, 1 a 
medium chance, 2 a large chance, and 3 a very large chance. Parents on average report that their children have a medium 
chance of success, with the variable having a mean of 1.2 and a standard deviation of 0.9. 
33 Parent perceptions may be influenced by the child’s enrollment status, and therefore the results presented in this table 
should not necessarily be interpreted as causal. 
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measures of parent perceptions of siblings, the parental perceptions of the child are still positively 
correlated with the child’s enrollment and statistically significant at the one percent level. One level 
higher parent perceptions is correlated with a 10.9 to 16.2 percentage point higher likelihood of 
being enrolled. However, parental perceptions of a child’s siblings are negatively correlated with the 
child’s enrollment status. Compared to the household fixed effects specification in which the 
parental perceptions of the child are compared to the average of his siblings, an alternative is to 
make the comparison with the parental perceptions of the ‘best’ sibling. Results in column 3 show 
that children whose sibling with the highest perception in the family has a one level higher value 
have a 6.5 percentage point lower likelihood of enrollment. 
Relative sibling perceptions might be more relevant than absolute sibling perceptions since it 
is possible that having a sibling whom the parents think of more highly than oneself matters more 
than the overall perception level of one’s siblings. Column 4 uses an indicator of whether the child 
has any sibling with parental perception higher than himself while column 5 uses indicators for 
whether the child has one, two, or three or more siblings with higher parental perceptions. Children 
having any sibling with better parent perceptions have a 7.0 percentage point lower probability of 
enrollment. Children with three or more siblings with higher parental perceptions have a 14.6 
percentage point lower probability of being enrolled, corresponding to a 27 percent lower 
enrollment, and the coefficient is significant at the five percent level. 
While the relationship between parental perceptions of a child and his schooling is strong, it 
does not eliminate the role of sibling composition. Having more brothers is correlated with lower 
enrollment, while having more sisters instead of brothers and holding the number of siblings 
constant is correlated with higher enrollment. Birth order is also important; younger siblings have a 
2.3 to 2.5 percentage point higher probability of being enrolled (columns 3 to 5). Consistent with 
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inter-generational education transmission and wealth effects, better educated parents and wealthier 
households have children who are more likely to be enrolled. 
While parental perceptions about their child’s chance of future success are correlated with 
the child’s current school enrollment, these perceptions may or may not be accurate or well-
informed. There may also be significant differences across households in how parents perceive their 
own children and what factors they take into account in formulating perceptions. To further explore 
these issues, we incorporate an externally validated measure of the child’s cognitive ability using the 
Raven’s CPM test. These tests were administered during the baseline survey to every child age 5 to 
15 regardless of their current enrollment status and provide a consistent measure of child ability 
across children in all households. There is a strong positive relationship between the ability measure 
and parent perceptions. Higher ability children are viewed by their parents to have a higher chance 
of future success. However, after controlling for gender and age, the ability measure only explains 
about 20 percent of the variation in parental perceptions. 
In Table 2.3, we estimate the relationship between child ability (as measured by the Raven’s 
age adjusted z-score) and current school enrollment using a household fixed effects logit as 
described in Equation 2 and a logit regression with alternative sibling ability measures as described in 
Equation 3.34 The household fixed effects logit results in column 1 indicate that a child with one 
standard deviation higher own ability compared to the average of his siblings has a 16.5 percentage 
point higher likelihood of being currently enrolled, corresponding to 30.6 percent of the base 
enrollment. The coefficient is significant at the one percent level. This is evidence parents take into 
account a child’s cognitive ability in deciding enrollment, and the magnitude of the effect is large. 
                                                 
34 All regressions include child gender and age dummies, and the regressions estimating Equation 3 also include village 
fixed effects, parent schooling, household assets, and family demographic composition measures. Results presented in 
Table 3 are consistent when using the number of siblings and the number of sisters age 5 to 15 rather than the number 
of siblings and sisters age 0 to 15. Correlation among the error terms of children in a given village experiencing the same 
enrollment environment might bias the standard errors downward, so in all regressions we cluster the standard errors by 
village. 
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When considering how parents make this enrollment decision, one approach would be for 
them to compare a child’s ability with the average ability of his siblings, and this is captured in the 
household fixed effects specification. An alternative that takes into account the non-linear 
relationship between siblings’ abilities would consider the impact of the sibling with the highest 
ability. Another approach would include relative measures indicating if the child has any sibling with 
a higher ability measure or whether the child has one, two, or three or more siblings with higher 
ability measures.35 Controlling for these direct measures of sibling ability (in columns 2 to 4), the 
child’s own ability is still positively correlated with the child’s enrollment and statistically significant 
at the one percent level. One standard deviation higher own ability is correlated with 15.7 to 27.2 
percent higher likelihood of enrollment compared to the base enrollment level. Having one’s ‘best’ 
sibling have a one standard deviation higher ability is correlated with a 6.8 percentage point lower 
enrollment rate (column 2), and the coefficient is significant at the one percent level. Likewise, 
having any sibling with a higher ability is correlated with 11 percentage points lower likelihood of 
being enrolled (column 3), and this effect is magnified if there are two siblings with higher abilities 
(16.1 percentage points). Both coefficients are significant at the one percent level. 
Including child ability and sibling ability measures does not significantly alter the family 
demographic composition variables. The sign and level of statistical significance are consistent with 
the initial regression presented in Table 2.2 column 1, while the magnitude of the coefficient for the 
number of siblings and number of sisters is somewhat reduced. It is worth noting that the 
relationship between a child’s own ability and current school enrollment is four to eight times larger 
than the corresponding relationship between the standard demographic composition variables and 
enrollment. These sibling ability rivalry results are consistent with the parental perceptions 
                                                 
35 Results are robust to additional sibling ability measures including median sibling ability, the number of siblings with a 
higher ability, dummies for whether a child’s ability is highest or lowest in the household, and whether the child has any 
siblings who have ability measures one-half or one standard deviation higher. 
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regressions in Table 2.2 and indicate that part of what is driving the relationship between parental 
perceptions and the school enrollment decision is the child’s ability.36 
Having explored the relationship between child ability and the extensive margin of school 
enrollment, we next turn to the intensive margin of educational expenditures. This allows us to rule 
out the interpretation that the results presented in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 reflect solely the desire of the 
child to attend school. If higher ability children have more motivation to attend school and this 
reduces the parents’ cost of effort to make the child attend, then we would not expect the parents to 
make additional discretionary monetary investments in these children. We focus on expenses for 
school supplies and parent association voluntary fees because these have a discretionary component, 
whereby parents have some leeway in how much they spend on each of their children.37 For the 
regressions presented in Table 2.4, we restrict the sample of 4,635 children age 5 to 15 living in 
households with multiple siblings to only the 2,511 children who are currently enrolled in school. 
We estimate a similar series of regressions as in Table 2.3 (household fixed effects in column 1 and 
then including alternative sibling ability measures in columns 2 to 4). Results in column 1 indicate 
that within a given household, children with a one standard deviation higher ability receive 170 
FCFA more in discretionary expenditures, representing 20.1 percent of mean discretionary expenses, 
and the coefficient is significant at the one percent level. Controlling directly for alternative 
functional forms of sibling ability in columns 2 to 4 does not alter the positive relationship between 
a child’s own ability and educational expenses, with coefficients ranging from 112 to 139 FCFA. 
                                                 
36 We also estimate the regressions separately by child gender and find no strong gender difference. Sibling rivalry 
appears to be more important for girls than boys, but we cannot reject the equality of coefficients between the genders. 
Similarly we cannot reject that the role of own ability or parent perceptions are the same for both genders. We also 
estimate the regressions broken down by poverty level, defining poor households to have log assets below the mean, 
below the median, or in the bottom quintile, and while the estimates for poor families are larger, we cannot reject that 
poor and non-poor families have the same level of sibling rivalry. 
37 School registration fees are not considered since all enrolled children have to pay the same fees. School meal fees, 
lodging fees, uniforms, and transportation expenses are the other educational expenses that are not included as these 
have much less variation across siblings within a household. 
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Finally, children with two siblings of higher ability have 136 FCFA lower educational expenditures, 
corresponding to 16.1 percent of discretionary educational expenses. 
5.2 Robustness Checks 
To test the robustness of our results, we present four tables of regressions where we explore 
different educational outcomes, use two approaches to address potential reverse causality issues 
between schooling and cognitive ability, and use alternative cognitive tests to measure child ability. 
First, in Table 2.5, we present results for alternative schooling outcomes including ever enrolled in 
school, on-time school start, and grade progression through school. Results are consistent with 
those in Table 2.3 for current enrollment. We use household fixed effects as well as the relative 
measure of whether a child has one, two, or three or more siblings of higher ability.38 Relative to the 
base levels, in the household fixed effects specifications (columns 1, 3, and 5), children with one 
standard deviation higher own ability are 29.5 percent more likely to be ever enrolled, 39 percent 
more likely to start school on time, and 28.1 percent more likely to progress through school. 
Children with one sibling of higher ability have lower probability of these outcomes (12 percent 
lower level of ever being enrolled, 11 percent lower level of starting school on time, and 8 percent 
lower level of grade progression). Negative effects are larger for children who have two siblings of 
higher ability (27 percent lower level of ever being enrolled, 24 percent lower level of starting school 
on time, and 20 percent lower level of grade progression). 
Second, in Table 2.6, we attempt to address the potential reverse causality of schooling 
affecting a child’s cognitive ability by limiting the regression sample to children that are in Grade 2, 
Grade 1, or not enrolled (columns 1 to 4) and children in Grade 1 or not enrolled (columns 5 to 8) 
because the regression evidence discussed previously indicates that children in these grades have not 
yet received enough schooling to influence their cognitive ability test scores. Results for this 
                                                 
38 We also estimate regressions including the highest sibling ability and whether the child has any sibling of higher ability 
and find consistent results, but due to space limitations we present the limited set of results. 
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restricted sample are consistent with those in Table 2.3. Household fixed effects logit regressions in 
columns 1 and 5 indicate that within a given household, relative to the base enrollment levels, a child 
with one standard deviation higher ability is respectively 33 and 36 percent more likely to be 
enrolled.39 Children with two siblings of higher ability have a 6.2 or 3.9 percentage point lower 
probability of enrollment (columns 4 and 8 respectively), corresponding to 17.7 and 17.0 percent of 
the base level of enrollment. 
Third, in Table 2.7, we further address any potential reverse causality between schooling and 
cognitive ability by using the ability measure of young children who are not enrolled in 2007-2008 to 
measure the effect on schooling in 2008-2009. This approach eliminates any potential effect of 
schooling on the ability measure as these children had never been enrolled at the time of taking the 
ability test, so the comparison is for the children not enrolled in year 1 to their siblings that are not 
enrolled. In columns 1 to 4, we first consider only children ages 5 to 7 and not enrolled in year 1 
since many children in Burkina Faso are not enrolled at this young age. Then in columns 5 to 8, we 
further restrict the sample to only children ages 5 to 6 and not enrolled in year 1 to remove any 
potential concern that the not-enrolled seven year olds are somehow different than other seven year 
old children.40 The household fixed effects logit regressions in columns 1 and 5 indicate that within a 
given household, a young child with a one standard deviation higher ability measured in year 1 is 
respectively 19.2 and 20.4 percentage points more likely to be subsequently enrolled in year 2.41 The 
coefficient in column 1 is statistically significant at the five percent level. While the coefficient in 
column 5 is not statistically significant at standard levels, there are only 52 children in the regression 
as the household fixed effects logit is only identified from households with multiple children ages 5 
                                                 
39 Mean enrollment for the sample of children in Grades 2, 1 or not enrolled (columns 1 to 4) is 0.35, while for children 
in Grade 1 or not enrolled (columns 5 to 8), average enrollment is 0.23. 
40 In 2007-2008, 74 percent of children ages 5 to 7 were not enrolled, and of these children 31 percent are then enrolled 
in 2008-2009. For children 5 to 6 years old, 89 percent of them were not enrolled in 2007-2008, and of these children, 28 
percent are then enrolled in the subsequent year. 
41 Mean enrollment in Year 2 for the sample of children ages 5 to 7 (columns 1 to 4) is 0.29, while for children ages 5 to 
6 (columns 5 to 8) average enrollment in Year 2 is 0.27. 
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to 6 who were not enrolled in year 1. Young children 5 to 6 years old who are not enrolled in year 1 
and who have two siblings of higher ability who also are not enrolled in year 1 subsequently have a 
17.3 percentage point lower probability of enrollment in year 2 (column 8). 
Fourth, in Table 2.8, we present two alternative measures of a child’s cognitive ability. To 
allay any concerns that transforming the Raven’s scores into age-adjusted z-scores might have 
introduced bias, in columns 1 to 4, we estimate regressions using the Raven’s raw test score. Results 
are consistent with those in Table 2.3. In the household fixed effects specification, within a given 
household, a child with a one standard deviation higher Raven’s raw score (3.35 questions), has an 
18.4 percentage point higher likelihood of being enrolled. In columns 5 to 8, we also employ an 
alternative measure of cognitive ability, the WISC Digit Span, to examine the relationship with 
current enrollment and find results consistent with using the Raven’s test. Children with a one 
standard deviation higher own WISC z-score have a 17 to 22 percentage point higher probability of 
enrollment, representing 32 to 41 percent of the mean enrollment level. Children with two siblings 
having a higher WISC z-score have a 14 percentage point lower probability of enrollment (26 
percent of the mean level of enrollment). 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we find strong evidence of sibling rivalry when parents make educational investment 
decisions in rural Burkina Faso. However, in contrast with previous research that generally focuses 
on easily observable demographic characteristics to measure sibling rivalry, we use measures of a 
child’s own cognitive ability and different specifications of his siblings’ abilities to test for how 
parents make schooling investment decisions. We examine both the extensive margin (school 
enrollment and grade progression) as well as the intensive margin of discretionary school 
expenditures. Own ability has a positive effect on educational outcomes, after controlling for 
individual and family characteristics and when using a family fixed effect specification. We find that 
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within a given household a child with one standard deviation higher ability compared to the average 
ability of their siblings is 31 percent more likely to be enrolled. Regardless of how we measure 
sibling ability, we find evidence of sibling rivalry, and our results are particularly strong when we 
consider relative measures of sibling ability. The magnitude of these impacts is large. For a child that 
has one higher ability sibling the probability of enrollment declines by 16 percent and having two 
higher ability siblings lowers enrollment by 30 percent. Our findings are robust to using alternative 
objective measures of cognitive ability and the parent’s perceptions of a child’s chance of future 
success and to addressing issues about the potential reverse causality of schooling influencing child 
ability measures. 
Our results can likely be generalized to other developing countries that have not yet achieved 
universal primary or secondary education and in which parents are deciding whether to send their 
children to school in a given year. This paper explores the context in which the decision is made 
during primary school, whereas in other countries the choice may occur later in a child’s education. 
A more complete understanding of how parents make the educational investment decision is useful 
for policymakers. Our findings that high ability children within a family are more likely to be 
enrolled and receive more educational resources suggest that parents focus on getting the most 
talented children through higher levels of education, rather than spreading some education evenly 
amongst all of their children. If fixed costs for schooling and non-convexities in the education 
production function are important factors in the decision to not invest in education equally across all 
children, then supply-side schooling interventions (such as building schools, reducing class size, or 
school inputs like textbooks or uniforms) to raise the schooling of all children and achieve the 
Millennium Development Goals might not be effective if they are not large enough to overcome 
these non-convexities. These types of policies might raise the schooling of the more talented 
children rather than the schooling of all children, and so to increase overall education rates, demand 
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side policies might be necessary. The results also point towards additional benefits of early 
childhood development programs that improve the cognitive ability of children and help them better 
compete with their siblings. 
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TABLES FOR CHAPTER 2 
 
Table 2.1. Summary Statistics of Burkina Faso Social Protection Evaluation (BSPE) Data 
 Variable: Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Percentage of 
Households with 
Variation 
Household Size 8.88 3.81  
Number of Wives 1.47 0.95  
Number of Siblings 3.81 2.32  
Number of Sisters 1.79 1.50  
Number of Non-Biological Children in 
Household 0.41 0.89  
Male (Fraction Male) 0.54 0.50  
Age 9.41 2.99  
Birth Order 2.27 1.34  
Proportion Either Parent Ever Enrolled 0.13 0.34  
Log Household Assets 12.36 1.49  
Parent Perception of Chance Child Succeeds in Formal Employment 
 Percentage ‘Small’ Chance 25   
 Percentage ‘Medium’ Chance 38   
 Percentage ‘Large’ Chance 29   
 Percentage ‘Very Large’ Chance 8   
Raven’s Raw Test Score 4.86 3.35  
Own Ability (Raven’s age adjusted z-score) -0.01 1.00  
WISC Raw Test Score 7.58 4.56  
WISC Age Adjusted Z-Score -0.02 0.99  
Average Grades Completed 1.81 2.08  
Proportion Children Currently Enrolled 0.54 0.50 56% 
Proportion Children Ever Enrolled 0.59 0.49 54% 
Proportion Children with an On-Time Start 0.40 0.49 54% 
Grade Progression  0.52 0.48  
Discretionary Education Expenditures (in 
FCFA) 845 1752   
Number of Households 1507    
Number of Children 4635   
Notes: All summary statistics are based on information for the 4635 children age 5 to 15 in Year 1 unless 
otherwise noted. Household assets are measured in FCFA (415 FCFA=$1) and the variable is created by taking 
the log of the sum of household durable goods and livestock. Parent perceptions of the chance their child 
succeeds in formal employment ranges from 0 to 3, with 0 indicating a small chance and 3 indicating a very large 
chance, own ability is measured using the Raven’s Colored Progressive Matrices and normed by age (z-score), 
timely start indicates if the child started school by age 7 or younger, grade progression in school is the child’s 
grade in school divided by number of years since the child started attending school and ranges from 0 to 1, 
discretionary education expenditures is the sum of per child expenses for school supplies and parent association 
fees in FCFA. Summary statistics for grade progression and average grades completed are based on only 4476 and 
4633 children respectively due to missing grade data. Data source: Burkina Faso Social Protection Evaluation 
(BSPE) data from 2008. 
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Table 2.2. Marginal Effects from Logit and Conditional Logit Regressions Estimating Relationship 
between Current School Enrollment, Sibling Rivalry, and Parent Perceptions 
Dependent Variable: Current 
Enrollment 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
 0.184*** 0.162*** 0.111*** 0.109*** Parent Perceptions of Child's Chance of 
Success in Formal Employment  [0.025] [0.023] [0.019] [0.019] 
      
Highest Sibling Perception   -0.065***   
   [0.019]   
   -0.070**  Higher Sibling Dummy (1 if any sibling 
with a higher perceived chance of 
success)   
 [0.033]  
    -0.053 One Higher Sibling Dummy (1 if only 1 
sibling with a higher perceived chance 
of success)   
  [0.036] 
    -0.075 Two Higher Sibling Dummy (1 if 2 
siblings with a higher perceived 
chance of success)   
  [0.048] 
    -0.146** Three or More Higher Sibling Dummy 
(1 if 3 or more siblings with a higher 
perceived chance of success)   
  [0.063] 
Number of Siblings -0.025***  -0.025*** -0.026*** -0.025*** 
 [0.009]  [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] 
Number of Sisters 0.022**  0.021** 0.022** 0.022** 
 [0.010]  [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] 
Birth Order 0.014  0.025** 0.023** 0.025** 
 [0.009]  [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] 
Male 0.031* 0.040** 0.026 0.027 0.027 
 [0.018] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] 
0.181***  0.171*** 0.166*** 0.166*** Parent Schooling (Either parent ever 
enrolled=1) [0.040]  [0.045] [0.044] [0.044] 
Log Household Assets 0.018*  0.018* 0.017* 0.017* 
 [0.010]  [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] 
      
Age Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Village Fixed Effects? Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Household Fixed Effects? No Yes No No No 
Number of Children 4635 3210 4536 4536 4536 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at village level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%. Columns 1, 3, 4, and 5 present marginal effects for logit regressions. Column 2 presents 
marginal effects from a household fixed effects conditional logit regression. Regressions are restricted to 
children age 5 to 15, and number of siblings and number of sisters are for all siblings and sisters in the 
household. Regression sample includes 4635 children, of which 4536 have parent perception measures and 
3210 have siblings with differing outcomes and parent perception measures. Data source: Burkina Faso Social 
Protection Evaluation (BSPE) data from 2008. 
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Table 2.3. Marginal Effects from Logit and Conditional Logit Regressions Estimating Relationship 
between Current School Enrollment and Child Ability 
Dependent Variable: Current Enrollment 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
0.165*** 0.147*** 0.095*** 0.085*** Own Ability (Raven’s age adjusted z-score) 
[0.017] [0.014] [0.016] [0.016] 
     
Highest Sibling Ability  -0.068***   
  [0.013]   
  -0.110***  Higher Sibling Dummy (1 if any sibling with 
an ability > own ability)   [0.024]  
   -0.086*** One Higher Sibling Dummy (1 if only 1 
sibling with an ability > own ability)    [0.025] 
   -0.161*** Two Higher Sibling Dummy (1 if 2 siblings 
with an ability > ability)    [0.032] 
   -0.177*** Three or More Higher Sibling Dummy (1 if 3 
or more siblings with an ability > own )    [0.041] 
     
Number of Siblings  -0.019** -0.023*** -0.018** 
  [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] 
Number of Sisters  0.018* 0.020** 0.019** 
  [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] 
Birth Order  0.028*** 0.025*** 0.029*** 
  [0.009] [0.009] [0.010] 
     
Male 0.026 0.019 0.019 0.018 
 [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] 
 0.182*** 0.181*** 0.180*** Parent Schooling (Either parent ever 
enrolled=1)  [0.041] [0.041] [0.041] 
Log Household Assets  0.018* 0.019** 0.020** 
  [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] 
     
Age Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Village Fixed Effects? No Yes Yes Yes 
Household Fixed Effects? Yes No No No 
Number of Children 2861 4635 4635 4635 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at village level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%. Column 1 presents marginal effects from a household fixed effects conditional 
logit regression. Columns 2 to 4 present marginal effects for logit regressions. Regressions are restricted to 
children age 5 to 15, and number of siblings and number of sisters are for all siblings and sisters in the 
household. Regression sample includes 4635 children, with 2861 having siblings with differing enrollment 
outcomes. Own and sibling ability are measured using the Raven’s Colored Progressive Matrices and 
normed by age (z-score). Data source: Burkina Faso Social Protection Evaluation (BSPE) data from 2008. 
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Table 2.4. OLS Regressions Estimating Relationship between Discretionary Education Expenditures 
and Child Ability, Only Enrolled Children 
Dependent Variable: Discretionary education 
expenditures on supplies and parent associations 
fees (FCFA) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
169.53*** 139.23** 123.26* 112.35 Own Ability (Raven’s age adjusted z-score) 
[54.60] [55.71] [70.35] [75.67] 
     
Highest Sibling Ability  -36.25   
  [40.94]   
  -10.74  Higher Sibling Dummy (1 if any sibling in household 
with an ability > own ability)   [65.65]  
   26.72 One Higher Sibling Ability Dummy (1 if only 1 
sibling in household with an ability > own ability)    [70.90] 
   -136.03* Two Higher Sibling Ability Dummy (1 if 2 siblings in 
household with an ability > ability)    [76.93] 
   -46.74 Three or More Higher Sibling Ability Dummy (1 if 3 
or more siblings in household with an ability > 
own)    [140.12] 
     
Number of Siblings  27.23 24.06 27.63 
  [34.28] [33.40] [35.33] 
Number of Sisters  -69.66* -68.48* -69.65* 
  [40.02] [39.92] [40.18] 
Birth Order  -19.96 -24.38 -16.57 
  [38.86] [39.80] [37.71] 
     
Male -82.35 -62.57 -61.95 -61.85 
 [84.72] [67.57] [68.16] [67.92] 
Parent Schooling (Either parent ever enrolled=1)  257.47** 256.14** 255.01** 
  [116.486] [116.79] [116.99] 
Log Household Assets  12.42 11.95 12.54 
  [25.83] [25.58] [25.93] 
     
Age Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Village Fixed Effects? No Yes Yes Yes 
Household Fixed Effects? Yes No No No 
Number of Children 1994 2511 2511 2511 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at village level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%. All regressions are restricted to children ages 5 to 15 who are currently enrolled in 
school. Discretionary education expenditures are the sum of per child expenses for school supplies and other 
parent association fees in FCFA, with a mean of 845 FCFA. The regression in column 1 includes household 
fixed effects and the sample is restricted to children in households with at least 2 enrolled children. Columns 
2 to 4 include village fixed effects and the sample is restricted to children who are currently enrolled. Own 
and sibling ability are measured using the Raven’s Colored Progressive Matrices and normed by age (z-score). 
Data source: Burkina Faso Social Protection Evaluation (BSPE) data from 2008. 
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Table 2.5. Marginal Effects from Logit and Conditional Logit Regressions Estimating Relationship between Alternative Schooling 
Outcomes and Child Ability 
Dependent Variable: 
 
Ever 
Enrolled 
Ever 
Enrolled 
On Time 
Start 
On Time 
Start 
Grade 
Progress 
Grade 
Progress 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
0.174*** 0.079*** 0.156*** 0.071*** 0.146*** 0.052*** Own Ability (Raven’s age adjusted z-score) 
[0.017] [0.014] [0.018] [0.014] [0.015] [0.010] 
 -0.073***  -0.044**  -0.043*** One Higher Sibling Dummy (1 if only 1 sibling 
with an ability > own ability)  [0.023]  [0.020]  [0.016] 
 -0.162***  -0.094***  -0.106*** Two Higher Sibling Dummy (1 if 2 siblings with an 
ability > own ability)  [0.028]  [0.027]  [0.019] 
 -0.167***  -0.130***  -0.120*** Three or More Higher Sibling Dummy (1 if 3 or 
more siblings with an ability > own ability)  [0.041]  [0.034]  [0.029] 
Number of Siblings  -0.016*  -0.008  -0.012** 
  [0.009]  [0.008]  [0.006] 
Number of Sisters  0.016  0.016  0.017*** 
  [0.011]  [0.010]  [0.006] 
Birth Order  0.024**  -0.007  0.016** 
  [0.010]  [0.010]  [0.007] 
Male 0.040* 0.033* 0.010 0.001 0.048** 0.028* 
 [0.022] [0.019] [0.023] [0.017] [0.021] [0.014] 
 0.203***  0.160***  0.120*** Parent Schooling (Either parent ever enrolled=1) 
 [0.047]  [0.039]  [0.027] 
Log Household Assets  0.023**  0.027***  0.014** 
  [0.010]  [0.008]  [0.006] 
Age Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Village Fixed Effects? No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Household Fixed Effects? Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Number of Children 2751 4635 2716 4635 2584 4476 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at village level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Cols 1 and 3 present marginal 
effects for a household fixed effects conditional logit regression. Cols 2 and 4 present marginal effects for logit regressions. Regressions are restricted to children age 5 
to 15. On-time start indicates if the child started school by age 7 or younger, grade progression is grade in school divided by number of years since the child started 
school and ranges from 0 to 1. Own and sibling ability are measured using the Raven’s CPM and normed by age. 
58  
Table 2.6. Marginal Effects from Logit and Conditional Logit Regressions Estimating Relationship between Current School Enrollment 
and Child Ability, Restricted to Children in Grades 2 or Lower 
Grade 2, 1 or Not Enrolled  Grade 1 or Not Enrolled  Dependant Variable: Current Enrollment 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
0.114*** 0.065*** 0.048*** 0.044*** 0.083** 0.026*** 0.021* 0.018 Own Ability (Raven’s age adjusted z-score) 
[0.026] [0.012] [0.014] [0.015] [0.040] [0.010] [0.011] [0.012] 
Highest Sibling Ability  -0.025**    -0.007   
 [0.010]    [0.009]   
  -0.035    -0.010  Higher Sibling Dummy (1 if any sibling with 
an ability > own ability)   [0.021]    [0.016]  
   -0.024    -0.000 One Higher Sibling Dummy (1 if only 1 
sibling with an ability > own ability)    [0.023]    [0.017] 
   -0.062**    -0.039** Two Higher Sibling Dummy (1 if 2 siblings 
with an ability > own ability)    [0.026]    [0.020] 
   -0.053    -0.012 Three or More Higher Sibling Dummy (1 if 3 
or more siblings with an ability > own 
ability)    [0.044]    [0.034] 
Number of Siblings  -0.021** -0.023*** -0.021**  -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.017*** 
 [0.008] [0.008] [0.009]  [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] 
Number of Sisters  0.001 0.002 0.002  0.005 0.005 0.005 
 [0.009] [0.009] [0.009]  [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] 
Birth Order  0.027*** 0.026** 0.028***  0.020** 0.019** 0.020*** 
 [0.011] [0.011] [0.011]  [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] 
Male 0.036** 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.044 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
 [0.041] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.048] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] 
Household Characteristics? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Age Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Village Fixed Effects? No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Household Fixed Effects? Yes No No No Yes No No No 
Number of Children 1409 3118 3118 3118 730 2548 2548 2548 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at village level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Sample in columns 1 to 4 includes 
3118 children in Grades 2 or lower, with 1409 having siblings with differing enrollment outcomes. Sample in columns 5 to 8 includes 2548 children in Grade 1 or lower, 
with 730 having siblings with differing enrollment outcomes. Columns 1 and 5 present marginal effects from a household fixed effects conditional logit regression. 
Columns 2 to 4 and 6 to 8 present marginal effects for logit regressions. Regressions are restricted to children age 5 to 15, and number of siblings and number of sisters 
are for all siblings and sisters in the household. Mean enrollment for the sample of children in Grades 2 or lower is 0.35 while for children in Grade 1 or lower is 0.23. 
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Table 2.7. Marginal Effects from Logit and Conditional Logit Regressions Estimating Relationship between School Enrollment in Year 2 
and Child Ability Measured in Year 1 
Dependent Variable: Current Enrollment Year 
2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
0.192** 0.060** 0.037 0.031 0.204 0.050 0.009 0.005 Own Ability (Raven’s age adjusted z-score) 
[0.092] [0.028] [0.028] [0.028] [0.156] [0.034] [0.033] [0.032] 
Highest Sibling Ability  -0.038*    -0.069**   
  [0.021]    [0.029]   
  -0.043    -0.080  Higher Sibling Dummy (1 if any sibling  with 
an ability > own ability)   [0.040]    [0.050]  
   -0.020    -0.049 One Higher Sibling Dummy (1 if only 1 sibling 
with an ability > own ability)    [0.043]    [0.048] 
   -0.122    -0.173* Two Higher Sibling Dummy (1 if 2 siblings 
with an ability > own ability)    [0.076]    [0.101] 
   -0.135    -0.152 Three or More Higher Sibling Dummy (1 if 3 
or more siblings with an ability > own 
ability)    [0.094]    [0.095] 
Number of Siblings  -0.034 -0.038* -0.033  -0.029 -0.033 -0.030 
  [0.021] [0.021] [0.021]  [0.022] [0.023] [0.023] 
Number of Sisters  0.010 0.013 0.012  0.002 0.005 0.002 
  [0.024] [0.024] [0.025]  [0.030] [0.031] [0.031] 
Birth Order  0.060** 0.060** 0.062**  0.076*** 0.075*** 0.079*** 
  [0.026] [0.027] [0.027]  [0.026] [0.027] [0.027] 
Male -0.183 -0.078* -0.079* -0.082* -0.16 -0.082 -0.084 -0.088* 
 [0.129] [0.044] [0.044] [0.043] [0.197] [0.056] [0.056] [0.053] 
Household Characteristics? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Age Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Village Fixed Effects? No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Household Fixed Effects? Yes No No No Yes No No No 
Number of Children 123 643 643 643 52 442 442 442 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at village level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Columns 1 and 5 present marginal effects 
from a household fixed effects conditional logit regression. Columns 2 to 4 and 6 to 8 present marginal effects for logit regressions. Regressions in columns 1 to 4 are 
restricted to children age 5 to 7 who were not enrolled during Year 1 and in columns 5 to 8 are restricted to children age 5 to 6 who were not enrolled during Year 1. Sample 
includes 643 children ages 5 to 7, with 123 having siblings with differing enrollment outcomes. Mean enrollment in Year 2 for the sample of children ages 5 to 7 (columns 1 
to 4) is 0.29, while for children ages 5 to 6 (columns 5 to 8) average enrollment in Year 2 is 0.27. Sibling ability measures are for all siblings not enrolled during Year 1. 
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Table 2.8. Marginal Effects from Logit and Conditional Logit Regressions Estimating Relationship between Current School Enrollment 
and Alternative Child Ability Measures 
Raven’s (raw score)    WISC Digit Span (z-score by age)  Dependant Variables: Current Enrollment 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
0.055*** 0.045*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.221*** 0.221*** 0.180*** 0.171*** Own Ability [Raven’s raw, WISC age adjusted z-
score] [0.006] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.028] [0.022] [0.024] [0.025] 
 -0.010***    -0.043**   Highest Sibling Ability [Raven’s raw score, WISC 
age adjusted z-score]  [0.004]    [0.018]   
  -0.085***    -0.115***  Higher Sibling Dummy (1 if any sibling has an 
ability > own ability) [Raven’s raw, WISC age 
adjusted z-score] 
  [0.022]    [0.031]  
   -0.080***    -0.100*** One Higher Sibling Dummy (1 if only 1 sibling with 
an ability score > own score) [Raven’s raw, WISC 
age adjusted z-score] 
   [0.024]    [0.029] 
   -0.104***    -0.138*** Two Higher Sibling Dummy (1 if 2 siblings with an 
ability score  > own score) [Raven’s raw, WISC 
age adjusted z-score] 
   [0.032]    [0.043] 
   -0.095***    -0.191*** Three or More Higher Sibling Dummy (1 if 3 or 
more siblings with an ability score > own score) 
[Raven’s raw, WISC age adjusted z-score] 
   [0.037]    [0.052] 
Number of Siblings  -0.025*** -0.026*** -0.025***  -0.020** -0.020** -0.015* 
  [0.009] [0.009] [0.009]  [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] 
Number of Sisters  0.020** 0.020** 0.020**  0.014 0.014 0.014 
  [0.010] [0.010] [0.010]  [0.011] [0.011] [0.010] 
Birth Order  0.031*** 0.030*** 0.032***  0.022** 0.022** 0.027** 
  [0.010] [0.010] [0.010]  [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] 
Male 0.025 0.020 0.021 0.021 0.045** 0.018 0.020 0.019 
 [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.021] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] 
Age Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Village Fixed Effects? No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Household Fixed Effects? Yes No No No Yes No No No 
Number of Children 2861 4635 4635 4635 2843 4463 4463 4463 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at village level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Columns 1 and 5 present 
marginal effects from a household fixed effects conditional logit regression. Columns 2 to 4 and 6 to 8 present marginal effects for logit regressions. Columns 
1 to 4 calculate ability measures using the Raven’s CPM raw score. Columns 5 to 8 calculate ability measures using the WISC Digit Span normed by age (z-
score). Sample sizes vary due to missing WISC Digit Span data. All regressions are restricted to children age 5 to 15 and also include household level controls 
for parent schooling and assets. Data source: Burkina Faso Social Protection Evaluation (BSPE) data from 2008.
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Figure 2.1. Example Problems from the Raven’s Colored Progressive Matrices 
and WISC Digit Span Tests 
 
Panel A : Raven’s Colored Progressive Matrices 
 
 
 
   
Correct Response: Option 2 Correct Response: Option 3 
  
Panel B: WISC Digit Span  
Question Correct Response 
Digit Span Forward:  
“8-2” “8-2” 
“5-1-7-4-2-3-8” “5-1-7-4-2-3-8” 
  
Digit Span Backward:   
“8-2” “2-8” 
“1-6-5-2-9-8” “8-9-2-5-6-1” 
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CHAPTER 3 
RISK AND PROTECTIVE FACTORS FOR SCHOOL DROPOUT IN MEXICO AND 
CHILD42  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 Determinants of educational attainment have been well studied in both developed and 
developing countries.  Poverty level is often cited as an explanation for poor educational 
achievement: poor youth are more likely to leave school early than non-poor youth. However, the 
mechanism through which poverty contributes to low educational achievement is not fully 
understood. There are many potential explanations for why young people might leave school early, 
including having to work, becoming a parent, engaging in violent activity, and repeating grades until 
they are either forced to or choose to leave school.  Poor youth are also more likely to be engaging 
in these activities or other risky behaviors than are non poor youth.  Similarly, there are many other 
factors present in young peoples lives (and are not typically observed by researchers) that could be 
driving the relationship between poverty and educational achievement.  This study aims to better 
understand the wide variety of factors in young people’s lives that might be able to explain how 
poverty may affect the decision to leave school prior to completing a secondary degree.   
The specific needs of young people are an increasingly debated subject in the development 
community. A large literature has emerged to inform the debate in Latin America, principally by 
mapping youth behaviors, positing policy and program interventions to address the behaviors, and, 
to a lesser extent, to identifying the (economic) factors driving young people’s decisions (Lloyd 2005, 
World Bank 2006).  A primary shortcoming of the research is that it treats youth as a homogenous 
group and reports average behaviors, thereby not capturing the complexities of the youth population 
across its many dimensions.  
                                                 
42 This work is co-authored with Wendy Cunningham at the World Bank 
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Even if we do understand the heterogeneity in the youth population, appropriate policy 
requires an understanding of why young people make the decisions they do.  The evidence for Latin 
American youth is limited.  The role of economic incentives and budget constraints affecting 
decision-making by young people in developing countries has been examined (World Bank 2006 and 
the sources within), building on Gruber’s (2001) work in the US.  A second line of work considers 
the broader context in which young people form their preferences and make their decisions (World 
Bank 2003, 2007), building on the public health and psychology research in the US.  While this 
literature gives good insights as to how to modify behaviors, it is silent on to whom prevention 
programs should be targeted.   
This paper uses a regression framework to look at various factors related to early school 
dropout, finding that while parent education is important, risk and protective factors are strongly 
correlated as well.  Many of these typically unobservable factors are also strongly correlated to six 
additional risky behaviors.  We then construct a more complete picture of the heterogeneous youth 
population in LAC by quantifying and describing the at-risk youth population, focusing on the 
relationship between early school dropout and risk.  We use a non-parametric methodology and 
special cross sectional youth surveys from Mexico and Chile that permit us to identify the factors 
that today’s risk-taking youth had in their childhoods.  Despite our inability to determine causality, 
these factors are potential candidates to use in identifying who should be the target of prevention 
policies and programs.43   
The paper finds that over 20 percent of 18 to 24 year olds in Chile and 40 percent in Mexico 
have influences in their early and current lives that predispose them to negative behaviors, they have 
engaged in these behaviors, and they are suffering the consequences.  Of these young people with 
high levels of risk in their lives, 77% in Chile and 70% in Mexico have left school prior to 
                                                 
43 Causality can only be determined using panel data that includes information on behaviors and household factors, 
which do not exist in LAC, to the best of our knowledge.   
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completing secondary education.  Conversely, 40 percent of Chileans age 18 to 24 and 16 percent of 
Mexicans of the same age do not display any of these risks, behaviors, or consequences.  Of these 
youth with low risk, 93 to 94 percent completed secondary schooling.  In both the stepwise 
regressions and the cluster analysis, several key factors emerge as important in addition to poverty, 
gender, age, and living in a rural area.  These factors include having a good relationship with parents 
and peers, strong connection with local governmental institutions and schools, urban residence, 
younger age, and spirituality  
There are six sections following this introduction.  Section 2 provides a brief review of the 
literature.  Section 3 presents the conceptual framework.  Section 4 describes the methodology and 
Section 5 discusses the data.  The results are presented in section 6 and section 7 concludes.   
2. Review of the Literature  
 There is a large literature that looks at the determinants of education in developing 
countries.  One thread in this literature (e.g. Horowitz and Souza (2011)) finds that poverty has a 
causal impact on the educational achievement and has informed policy makers.  Many social 
programs, such as cash transfer programs which are widespread in LAC, assume that improving a 
family’s wealth will improve educational attainment.  Positive shocks to household income has been 
found to affect school attendance in Mexico (Skoufias and Parker 2001), Brazil (Duryea, Edwards, 
and Ureta 2003), and Colombia (Attanasios, Meghir, and Santiago 2005).  Another thread (e.g. 
Carniero and Heckman (2002)) argues that unobservable characteristics of the child and his or her 
development and family that affect educational achievement are also correlated with poverty, thus 
driving the relationship between wealth and schooling.   
 Understanding determinants of behaviors other than schooling and employment are 
relatively recent in the field of economics.  Perhaps the most extensive study in the economic 
literature is Gruber (2001), which investigates the determinants and implications of nine different 
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behaviors among US youth – school dropout, smoking, risky driving, sexual activity, suicide, 
marijuana use, crime, alcohol use, and mis-nutrition – using both cross sectional and time series data.  
This study expands the rational addiction model developed by Becker and Murphy (1988) to allow 
for youth-specific characteristics identified in the psychology and human development literature, 
namely myopia, time inconsistent preferences, and projection bias.44   The study concludes that 
youth respond to incentives such as age-specific legal penalties, prices, and income and that the 
marginal cost to additional risk taking is small once participation in risky behavior has begun.   
 Recent studies have tested these conclusions in the context of developing countries, 
finding similarities and differences with the US45.  Cunningham and Maloney (forthcoming) found 
that negative shocks to household income affect labor force entry.  Similarly, household poverty 
increases youth violence in Brazil (World Bank 2007), Colombia (Duque, Klevens, and Ramirez 
2003) and the US (Grogger 1998, Mocan and Reese 1999). 
 A shortcoming of the economic literature is the absence of a discussion about preference 
formation and that early experiences vary across the youth population, leading to heterogeneity in 
decision-making during the youth years.46  In contrast, an extensive literature in the public health and 
psychology fields start from the assumption that preference formation and constraints before the 
youth years, as well as during them, explain a significant portion of the variation in youth behaviors.  
The ecological risk framework posits that youth are a product of individual (personal), micro-, and 
macro-environmental factors (Bronfenbrenner 1979).  The individual factors are those skills, 
behaviors, and ideas that are “hardwired”, rather than formed, such as rage, optimism, or general 
health.  The micro factors include preferences taught and formed by the family, peers, community, 
and local institutions and the constraints imposed by the same, including household poverty.  The 
                                                 
44 “Projection bias” is understood as today’s preferences may not be representative of future adult preferences. 
45 See Lloyd ed. (2005), World Bank (2006), and Attanasio et al. (2005) for example. 
46 Gruber (2001) discusses preferences, but it focuses on the time-inconsistency of preferences between the youth period 
and adulthood.  It does not investigate why different youth have different preferences. 
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macro factors include more general influences and constraints, such as gender/race discrimination, 
armed conflict, poverty and economic inequality.  These factors are commonly classified into two 
groups: the set of personal, macro, and micro factors that increase the risk of negative behaviors 
(risk factors) and the set that prevent youth from engaging in negative behaviors, commonly called 
protective factors.  Each person has a set of risk and protective factors that influence preference 
formation, constraints, and thus behaviors.     
 Most of the empirical testing of the ecological risk framework depends on correlations 
between current risky behaviors and personal, micro, and macro factors of the youth population.  
The literature in the US primarily focuses on identifying factors related to single risky behaviors (e.g. 
substance use).47  Recent US literature has begun to take advantage of longitudinal data available in 
the US to demonstrate that many of those factors correlated with risk taking behaviors are actually 
causal factors.48  
The few studies that have tested the ecological risk framework using data from Latin 
American and Caribbean find similar results to those in the US, however most do not consider 
schooling behaviors.  Blum (2004) uses data collected in 11 Caribbean countries and finds that a 
positive relationship with a caring adult, whether in the family or in school, is a key factor that is 
                                                 
47 There is an extensive literature in the US which is too large to cover here.  The US National Library of Medicine and 
National Institute of Health maintains a web page (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez), that lists hundreds of 
published articles that have used this methodology.  A few of the papers that motivated this paper include: Resnick et al. 
(2004) look at risk and protective factors related to youth violence; Blum et al. (2002) describe the ecological risk 
framework and provide empirical evidence for three risky behaviors (weapon related violence, ever had sexual 
intercourse and ever used cocaine); Scal et al. (2003) look at risk and protective factors related to smoking; Zweig et al 
(2002) identify methods of predicting risk profiles using risk and protective factors such as psychosocial development, 
school and family characteristics using OLS and multinomial logit regressions with cross sectional data; and Bernat and 
Resnick (2006) provides a comprehensive review of the resiliency framework and additional empirical support for this 
framework in promoting healthy youth development.   
48These studies, which also appear on the NIH web site, use the National Longitudinal Survey of Adolescent Health 
(ADDHEALTH) through the University of North Carolina, Carolina Population  Center, surveys youth in grades 7-12 
with the first wave of interviews in 1994 (http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/addhealth/design).  Follow-up waves were 
in 1996 and 2002, the latter enabling more detailed analysis.  This survey is school based and asks about risk and 
protective factors as well as behaviors.  The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) 1997 from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, surveyed males and females born in 1980-1984 (http://www.bls.gov/nls/nlsy97.htm) and focuses 
primarily on educational and employment outcomes. The previous NLSY was from 1979.   
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positively correlated with less risky sexual behavior (sexual debut and condom use), contraception, 
pregnancy and childbearing.  Youth in the English-speaking Caribbean who have lower risky 
behaviors49 are also those who are more connected to parent/family, attending religious services, feel 
little rage, have not been abused or witnessed parental violence, do not have family members who 
have attempted suicide, have mentally healthy parents, and have households free of illegal substances 
(World Bank 2003).  A series of papers by Brook, et. al. (2001, 2002a, 2002b) find similar 
correlations between household factors, poverty, and community factors for explaining substance 
use and violence among Colombian youth, while Hutz and Silva (2003) find that young Brazilian 
men who have been incarcerated for violence are disproportionately the sons of poor, uneducated, 
and violent fathers. 
A few studies in LAC do consider behaviors related to education.  Lloyd (2005) identifies the 
positive effects of schooling and health on transitions to risk-free adulthood using DHS surveys 
from developing countries.  World Bank (2007) finds that low self-esteem, spirituality, school 
connectedness, abuse in the home, abuse in the community, connectedness to institutions, poverty 
and gender are the factors most associated with risky behaviors and negative outcomes in Brazil.50  
However, these studies do not consider the relationship between education related behaviors and 
other behaviors.   
 Young people who engage in one risky behavior often engage in many; i.e. negative 
behaviors often co-occur (Zweig et. al. 2002).  The US data show that most of the risky behavior is 
being undertaken by a small set of young people who are engaging in multiple risky behaviors 
(Lindberg et. al. 2000, Bartlett et. al. 2005, Husler et. al. 2005, Brener et. al. 1998, and Zweig et. al. 
2001). Similarly, smoking, drug and alcohol use, early sexual initiation, violence, and delinquencies 
                                                 
49 Behaviors and outcomes studied include: perception of general health, ever had sexual intercourse, ever attempted 
suicide, violent behavior, problems due to alcohol and drugs. 
50 Behaviors and outcomes studied include: grade repetition, early labor force entry, early sexual initiation, risk taking 
sexual practices, alcohol use tobacco use, illegal drug use, violence and suicide attempt.   
 68 
co-occur in the Caribbean (Ohene et. al. 2005) and in Brazil (World Bank 2007).  The co-ocurrence 
is not surprising given the common set of risk and protective factors correlated with different 
negative behaviors.  However, the co-occurrence may also be due to causal factors between 
behaviors.  For example, youth in Peru, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Brazil, and Argentina 
report that early school dropout results primarily from early work as well as substance abuse, 
violence and pregnancy and a myriad of other risk factors.  Further, the respondents point to early 
dropout and early parenthood as underlying causes of their current unemployment or employment 
in low-quality jobs (IDDI 2006, Dasso 2006, Weiss 2006, World Bank 2006b). 
3. Conceptual Framework 
 We formalize the ecological risk framework in the following model.  A person i has a set 
of behaviors, iB , that are determined by a vector of risk factors, ir , and protective factors, ip , 
determined at the individual ( iI ), micro ( ic ), and macro ( iM ) levels.   
( ) ( )( )iiiiiii McIpMcIrfB ,,,,,=    (1) 
If an element in any of the vectors iI , ic , or iM  leads to a positive behavior in iB , it will take a 
positive value in ( )iii McIp ,, and a 0 in ( )iii McIr ,, .  Likewise, an element that leads to risky 
behavior in iB  will take a 0 value in ( )iii McIp ,, and a positive value in ( )iii McIr ,, .  A weighted 
average of the risk ( ir ) and protective factors ( ip ) specific to each person will predict the behavior 
elements in the vector iB .  Behaviors include elements such as unprotected sex, school truancy, or 
substance use.   
 The outcomes of these behaviors are a function of the behaviors, the individual, micro, 
and macro environments, and luck (δ ).  The outcome, iO , is given by 
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 ( )δ,,,, iiiii McIBfO =      (2) 
Outcomes can be good (not dropping out of school early, youth participation) or negative (school 
dropout, exclusion).  Risk and protective factors are included in the function since they can magnify 
or mitigate the outcomes of a behavior.  We assume a distribution of δ  that is constant across 
people, but instrumental in determining if behavior iB  becomes outcome iO .   
 We assume that both risk and protective factors are constant during a person’s youth.  
For example, we assume that family risk factors do not vary extensively over a youth’s age range.  
This assumption is necessary since we do not have longitudinal data that would allow variance in 
factors over time, however the model can be expanded to allow for time varying factors and 
behaviors.   
Equations 1 and 2 can be used to link the concepts of risk/protective factors, behaviors, and 
outcomes to levels of risk and give insight to policy.  A person with high values of the elements in 
( )iii McIr ,, , low values of the elements in ( )iii McIp ,, , and a iB  and iO  that displays few negative 
behaviors and negative outcomes, is defined as being type I risk.  More generally, a person classified 
as type I risk has many risk factors and few protective factors, indicating that they have a 
predisposition to engage in negative behaviors, but the person has not undertaken any risky 
behaviors.  Prevention programs would be targeted to this group.51  A person with high values of the 
individual elements in ( )iii McIr ,, , low values of the individual elements in ( )iii McIp ,, , a iB  that 
displays many negative behaviors, and an iO , with few negative outcomes would be classified as 
type II risk, where risk factors are present, protective factors are few, and the young person has 
engaged in risk-taking behaviors without having experienced any negative consequences.  These 
                                                 
51 See Blum (1998) for a discussion of resiliency based intervention programs.   
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youth are at-risk of suffering consequences and can thus benefit from prevention or second chance 
programs.  Youth with positive values in the iO  vector are those who are suffering the 
consequences of their behaviors and are thus categorized as type III risk.  These youth tend to have 
high risk factors, poor protective factors, and many negative behaviors, many of which might be 
identified prior to their suffering the consequences of their risky behaviors.  They are candidates for 
second chance (remedial or rehabilitation) programs. 
4. Methodology  
4.1. Stepwise Regression Analysis 
This paper uses step-wise regression analysis to identify those variables with the highest 
explanatory power for early school dropout and other positive youth behaviors.  The regressions are 
estimated using the forward stepwise method, which is an iterative process in which a set of 
independent variables (the risk and protective factors in this study) is identified a priori.  A variable 
is then randomly selected from that set and included in the regression.   If the newly included 
variable is significant at the 1% level, it is maintained in the regression and another randomly 
selected variable is added to the regression.  If any variable loses significance, it is dropped in the 
next round.  Once all the variables in the initial set have been tested, the regression will only contain 
those variables that are significant at the 1% level, which can be interpreted as the sub-set of 
variables that are most correlated with the dependent variable.  The regressions were also run using 
the backward stepwise method as a robustness check, with similar results.  We run three different 
models, depending on the nature of the dependent variables:  Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) for 
continuous dependent variables, Logit for binary dependent variables and Ordered Logit for ordered 
ordinal variables, where higher numbers correspond with a better outcome.   
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We estimate the key correlates for seven behavioral outcomes in Mexico and six outcomes in 
Chile. We run separate analyses for each country since the data are sufficiently different to not allow 
pooling.  However, to the extent possible, similar variables are used in our analysis of Chile and 
Mexico.  We estimate separate regressions for men and women to ensure that differences between 
genders would not confound results.52       
4.2. Cluster Analysis  
Cluster analysis is a means to identify correlations across large data sets without imposing, a 
priori, a structure on the data.  Observations are grouped based on minimizing a distance measure 
between each variable for each observation, i.e. the observations in a cluster share a set of common 
variables.  By comparing the mean values of various variables across clusters, we can characterize 
each cluster.    
Ward’s method (minimum-variance) was selected since it provided the most distinct and 
interpretable clusters.53  Ward’s linkage cluster analysis uses the error sum of squares criteria and is a 
commonly used agglomerative hierarchical method.54  The variance is minimized by calculating the 
sum of squared errors from the mean of the cluster for each of the m  variables for each 
observation:  
∑∑∑ −=
k j i
jkijk xxW
2)(      (3) 
ni ,....,1= observations, mj ,...,1= variables, and lk ,...,1= clusters 
Initially, each of the n observations forms its own cluster.  The first merge is identified by 
calculating the sum of squares for each pair of cluster.  The pairing with the smallest sum of squares 
                                                 
52 Bagby and Cunningham (2007) find large differences between male and female youth typologies, including different 
incidence of certain behaviors and different exposure to/levels of risk and protective factors.   
53 There are many different ways to perform cluster analysis, and no particular method is considered the best.    
54 An attractive feature of the Ward’s method is that it performs well with groups that are of unequal size, which, as will 
be shown in the results, strongly characterizes the data.  See Everitt et al. (2001) for a theoretical discussion of Cluster 
Analysis and Ward’s criterion.  See Cunningham and Maloney (2001) for an application.  
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is identified and those clusters are joined, leaving n-1 clusters.  The second grouping calculates the 
sum of squared errors again and pairs the two clusters that have the smallest value, leaving n-2 
clusters.  The process is repeated until the optimal number of clusters has been reached.   
Three tools were used to determine the optimal number of clusters.  First, stop commands 
following two possible rules (Calinsky-Harabasz and Duda-Hart) were used to find criterion for each 
cluster possibility.55  The Calinski and Harabasz method suggests the optimal number of clusters (g) 
that maximizes an index C(g) which uses the pooled within-cluster covariance matrix (W) and the 
between-cluster covariance matrix (V), where 
C(g) = [trace (V)/(g-1)]/[trace (W)/(n-g)]    (4) 
The Duda and Hart method maximizes D(g), where 
D(g) = Je(2)/Je(1)        (5) 
Je(2) is the sum of the within cluster sum of squared distances between the objects and centroid if 
the cluster is split into two and Je(1) is the within cluster sum of squared distances.  The local criteria 
calculated in equations 4 and 5, C(g) and D(g), are then combined with test statistics for each 
clustering option to suggest the optimal number of clusters.  Larger values of both methods indicate 
that the clusters are more distinct from each other while lower values indicate that the clusters are 
not very different from each other and therefore are artificially sub-divided.   
Second, dendrograms were used to select among the multiple “right” clusters that the other 
methods may give.  Dendrograms graphically depict the hierarchical relationship between the 
clusters by showing the order in which clusters are merged as well as the distance between the 
clusters.  At each level of the cluster formation process, a dendrogram can be generated to view the 
relationships between the clusters.  The dendrogram changes as clusters are grouped and un-
grouped, thus enabling the researcher to optimally choose the clustering level.   
                                                 
55 These two methods are implemented in STATA.  They were identified as the two best methods available (out of 30) 
by Milligan and Cooper (1985) and are discussed in Everitt et al. (2001).   
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Third, once the optimal number of clusters is suggested and the dendrograms generated, the 
clusters themselves are observed and the means of the variables are compared across clusters.  The 
differences found between the different clusters are used to ultimately determine the optimal 
number of clusters.  For instance, if 5 clusters were suggested, 6 clusters were investigated to see if 
there was an interpretable difference.  If not, 5 clusters were used, however if so, 6 clusters were 
used.  This process could then repeat. 
The cluster analysis is performed for 10 cohorts, identified by age, gender, and country.  The 
sample for each country is divided ex-ante by age and sex since, when pooling the sample, these two 
variables dominated the clusters to such an extent that the risk and protective factors of interest 
played a very small role.  In addition, we do not want to confound the effects of different factors 
and behaviors amongst youth that are at very different points in their lives.  We therefore separate 
out the age cohorts for young people that are at different points in the age profile.  Six cohorts from 
Mexico are analyzed: female ages 12 to 14, female ages 15 to 17, female ages 18 to 24, and males in 
each of the three age groups.  Only the four older cohorts from Chile are analyzed since youth age 
12 to 14 were not included in the sample. 
  While the objective of a cluster analysis is to identify which variables move together, a 
decision was made to treat some variables endogenously and others exogenously.  For example, a 
hypothesis is that poverty status is a good indicator for a youth being “at-risk”.  If we use this 
variable to create the clusters, it is possible that poverty is such a strong factor that it drives the 
clusters and renders the other variables meaningless.  Thus, for these type variables, we carried out 
the analysis treating them as both endogenous and exogenous and found little difference.  We thus 
report only the results for treating them exogenously.  
The advantage of cluster analysis is that the only priors required are in the variable construction, 
such that they range between 0 and 1.  For continuous variables, the value was normalized.  Binary 
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variables were assigned a 0 or 1 and discrete variables were assigned a value between 0 and 1 based 
on the ordering of the responses.  A variable takes a value of 1 the closer it is to the variable being 
described.  For example, the variable “abuse” takes a value of 1 if there is abuse in the household 
and a 0 if there is not while the variable “connected” takes a value of 1 if the respondent reports that 
they reach out for help all of the time if they have problems, a value of 0 if they never reach out, and 
a value in between depending on how frequently they reach out.  Variables that could not be ordered 
in a logical way were not included in the analysis.  
5. Data Description  
5.1. Data 
As youth departments and governments become more sophisticated in their efforts to 
understand the lives of young people, several LAC countries have developed specialized youth 
surveys.  We use two surveys in this paper: the 2003 National Youth Survey (Encuesta Nacional de 
Juventud) from Chile and the 2000 National Youth Survey from Mexico.  Youth are defined as being 
between the ages of 12 and 24 for this analysis, consistent with World Bank (2006). In addition to 
having information about youth education and employment, these cross-sectional data contain rarely 
available information on perceptions, family background, attitudes, and behaviors, thus providing a 
rare insight into the youth populations in these countries.     
Chile initiated its National Youth Survey, Encuesta Nacional de Juventud (ENJ), in 1994 and has 
repeated it every three years.  We use the 2003 data, which was the most recent that could be 
accessed at the time of the analysis.  The survey contains information about risk factors – household 
poverty, ethnicity, family cohesion, neighborhood violence, and social exclusion – and protective 
factors - trust in institutions, connectedness, good relationship with parents, and mental health.  The 
behaviors and outcomes are limited to schooling, employment, sexual health, and participation in 
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activities.  There is no information about drug use or violent behavior.  We limit the sample to those 
aged 15-24, giving us a sample size of 5321.56    
Mexico’s National Youth Survey, Encuesta National de Juventud (ENJ) was carried out in 
2000.57  The sample is nationally representative and was performed in two stages: first, the entire 
household was surveyed and asked basic household characteristics, and later, youth ages 12-29 were 
asked a separate set of youth-specific questions.  Only those aged 12 to 24 were included in this 
analysis, resulting in a sample of 37,979 respondents.58    
As with Chile, the Mexican dataset includes information on several risk and protective 
factors and behaviors.  However, the survey also includes information about attitudes towards 
alcohol and drugs, parental residence in the household, parental response to their children’s 
behaviors, attitudes toward school (a proxy for school connectedness) and various proxies for family 
poverty.  Unfortunately, this dataset does not have information about connectedness with other 
adults, abuse in home (aside from the form used to respond to misbehavior), community violence, 
ethnicity, or sexual behavior for those aged 12-14.  To the extent possible, similar variables are used 
in our analysis for both countries, although the Chilean data are more robust with the protective 
factors and the Mexican data include more risk factors.   
                                                 
56 For this analysis, 195 observations out of 7,189 (2.7% of sample) for youth aged 15 to 29 were dropped due to missing 
data.  We then restricted the sample to youth aged 15 to 24 dropping another 1674 observations.  In many cases, missing 
responses could be coded based on responses to related questions so as to maintain a larger sample size.  For instance, if 
someone does not respond as to whether they attend church, after they have already indicated that they do not believe in 
God, then we assume that they do not attend church. 
57 The survey was repeated in 2005, but the data were not available at the time this paper was under preparation. 
58 Of the almost 60,000 youth in the original sample, about 10,000 youth aged 12-29 were not surveyed the second time, 
and were dropped from the sample used for the analysis. The reasons for not interviewing these youth were tracked in 
the dataset:  they did not want to participate, were not at home at the time of the interview and would not return within 
the week, were on vacation, were working or at school in another city, were disabled, and other.  Comparing the poverty 
variables (education level and monthly earnings of heads of households) and rural means of this dataset before and after 
dropping the data showed no significant difference at α=.01.    An additional 5% of the observations were dropped in 
creation of the variables;  the resulting sample was not statistically different from the original. Finally, the data were 
restricted to youth aged 12 to 24, thus further decreasing the sample size by 8903.   
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Three groups of variables are used as posited by the ecological risk framework: protective 
factors, risk factors, and behaviors/outcomes.59   The empirical findings from the US, Latin 
America, and Caribbean studies guided our selection of risk and protective factors to include in the 
Mexico and Chile analysis.  The twelve risk factors in the analysis include low socioeconomic status 
(parental education level);60 rural residence, indigenous ethnicity, low healthcare access, social 
exclusion, weak family cohesion, physical or psychological abuse by a parent, household substance 
abuse, poor parental response to bad behavior, positive parental influence on smoking and alcohol, 
perceived high neighborhood violence; and experienced discrimination.  The fifteen protective 
factors considered include trust in institutions (government & community); live with both parents; 
connectedness (overall, with mother, with father, with other adult); engage in activities with parents; 
church attendance and spirituality; school quality; feeling of preparedness for the future; optimism 
towards employment; and sense of wellbeing.  The data permit us to analyze secondary school 
dropout as well as six additional positive behaviors/outcomes: not inactive,61 older age at first job62, 
safe sexual behavior (not sexually active, using contraception if sexually active), older age at first 
pregnancy/parenthood, participation in activities, and healthy attitudes towards alcohol. Table 3.1 
shows which variables are used in the Mexico analysis and which are used for Chile, defines the 
variables, and discusses the methodology for the creation of composite proxy variables.   
                                                 
59 The classification of a variable as a “risk factor” or “protective factor” may seem like an artificial distinction.  For 
example, poverty is a risk factor while lack of poverty may be a protective factor.  However, there are some risk factors 
without corresponding protective factors and vice versa.  Rather than enter the debate in this paper, we simply classify a 
factor as “risk” or “protective” based on how the question was asked in the survey.   
60 Various proxies for poverty were tested, including household earnings, household luxury/durable goods ownership, 
and socio-economic indicators generated by the government.  All had similar results as the “parental education” variable, 
but the parental education was used since the first alternative is a poor measure due to earnings being only a temporal 
measure of wealth, there was not sufficient variance in the second measure, and the algorithm for the third variable was 
not available.   
61 Inactivity is defined as not being in school or work and not searching for a job. 
62 In an environment where many children are engaging in child labor activities, considering the age at which the children 
start work for the first time is informative.  We must note however that we must be careful to distinguish between those 
that delay work so that they can stay in school and those older youth that are not able to find a job and are unemployed.   
For this reason, we look both at age of first job and inactivity.   
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All variables were normalized in the range 0 to 1.  Behaviors were normalized such that a 1 
indicates good behavior and a 0 indicates “risky” behavior.  For factors, a high level of a risk factor 
would get a 1 and a high level of a protective factor would be 1.  So for example, a risk factor 
variable that takes on three values would be assigned a 1 for the worst situation (for example, 
household abuse), a 0 for the best situation (for example, no household abuse), and a 0.5 for 
intermediate (for example, the threat of household abuse).   
5.2. Descriptive Statistics 
In both Chile and Mexico, a significant percentage of youth are dropping out of school early.  
Nearly 30 percent of Mexican and 14 percent of Chilean youth in the samples dropped out of school 
prior to completing high school (Table 3.2).  While about 30 percent of Mexican and Chilean youth 
are inactive after age 18, 12.8 percent of Mexican and 6.7 percent Chilean youth are inactive before 
age 18.   
Chileans have earlier, and more risky, sex than Mexicans.  While only 13 percent of Mexicans 
age 15 to 17 report having had their first sexual experience, 27 percent of Chileans in this age group 
report the same.  Half of the sexually active Mexicans use contraception; Chileans are 12 percentage 
points less likely to use protection than are Mexicans.   2.5 percent of Mexicans age 15-17 have had 
their first child while nearly 4 percent of Chileans in the same age group are parents (Table 3.2).  
Nearly 30 percent of Mexican youth and 80 percent of Chilean youth report having ever been 
involved in activities outside of school; this percentage decreases with age.  Finally, only 3.4 percent 
of the sample of youth aged 12-24 in Mexico can justify getting drunk and 1 percent justify drug use. 
Many of these behaviors by Mexican and Chilean youth co-occur, as is also reported by 
young people interviewed across Latin America (IDDI 2006, Dasso 2006, Weiss 2006, World Bank 
2006b) and found in empirical work in the US (Bartlett et. al. 2005), Caribbean (World Bank 2003), 
and Brazil (World Bank 2007).  For example, inactive youth disproportionately leave school before 
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completing their secondary education as demonstrated by the high correlation between not dropping 
out early and not being inactive (0.42 in Mexico and 0.38 in Chile).  Risky and early sexual behaviors 
are also positively correlated with early school leaving (0.35 in Mexico and 0.27 in Chile), early 
working (0.14 in Mexico and 0.29 in Chile), and youth inactivity (0.21 in Mexico and 0.30 in Chile) 
(Tables 3.3a and 3.3b).  There is a positive correlation between participation in activities and positive 
youth behaviors in both countries (Tables 3.3a and 3.3b).   
Many Mexican and Chilean youth have risk factors in their lives, which may underlie their 
negative behaviors.  Over half of the Mexican sample and one-third of the Chilean sample are from 
families whose parents have no more than a primary education and thus can be considered poor.  In 
Chile, about 13 percent of the sample is considered rural63 while in Mexico about 25 percent is rural. 
About 11 percent of the Chilean sample self-identifies as indigenous.  Fortunately, abuse and 
substance abuse in the home are not very prevalent; six percent of Chileans report suffering abuse in 
the home and 8.5 percent report substance abuse in their homes.  Approximately half of Mexican 
youth and 18 percent of Chilean youth report social exclusion.  The incidence increases with age in 
Chile and decreases with age in Mexico (Table 3.2).   
These risk factors are correlated with many negative behaviors.  Figure 3.1a and 3.1b shows 
the strong correlation between school dropout and parent education.  Young people with better 
educated parents (a proxy for lower poverty level) are less likely to drop out before completing 
secondary school.  They also engage in riskier behaviors as shown by the negative correlation 
coefficients in Tables 3.3a and 3.3b.  Living in a rural area is negatively correlated secondary school 
completion and with five additional behavior variables – not inactive, later age of initial job, later age 
of first parenthood and participation in activities.  Figures 3.2a and 3.2b suggest that rural living has 
                                                 
63 The sampling was done in communities with at least 2000 inhabitants, so a rural indicator means that the respondent 
comes from a community with between 2000 and 5000 inhabitants.  An urban respondent lives in a community of at 
least 5000 people. 
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different implications for men’s and women’s behaviors.  Rural men generally initiate sexual activity 
later than do urban men, particularly in Mexico, while rural women begin their sexual lives earlier 
than do urban women.  In Mexico, rural men and urban women are more likely to use contraception 
but in Chile rural women are more likely to use contraception. Being indigenous is not highly 
correlated with most behavior variables (Table 3.3b). Indigeneity has a significantly negative 
correlation with older age at first job, but the magnitude is small (-0.05).  Table 3.3b shows that 
abuse and substance abuse are negatively correlated with all positive youth behaviors in Chile.  Poor 
parental response to misbehavior (such as hitting their child, insulting their child, or accusing their 
child in front of others) is significantly negatively correlated with all seven behaviors in Mexico.  
Social exclusion is negatively correlated with positive behaviors in Chile (Table 3.3b), while being 
socially excluded is positively correlated with not dropping out of school early, starting work at an 
older age, safe sexual behavior and later age at first parenthood in Mexico (Table 3.3b).64   
Protective factors are also prevalent in the lives of young Mexicans and Chileans.  More than 
70 percent of Mexican youth live with both parents (Chilean youth were not asked this question).  
Mexican and Chilean youth report a high level of personal connections with caring adults.  Mexican 
youth regularly discuss a wide range of topics with their parents including school, work, politics, and 
religion.  While Chileans report good relationships with their parents, ten percent of Chileans also 
note important relationships with other adults.  Fewer than 7 percent of Mexican youth are verbally 
or physically abused by their parents.  Nearly 95 percent of youth Chileans believe in a god, and 66 
percent of Mexican youth attend church with some frequency.  School quality, a proxy for school 
connectedness, is high in Mexico.  Youth are generally content with their schools in Mexico, with 
                                                 
64 The opposite trends in the two countries is likely due to the definition that “social exclusion” takes in each survey.  In 
Chile, social exclusion is defined as not having friends to spend time with, whereas the Mexico survey asks who the 
respondent spends his or her free time with.  If the respondent answers “friend” or “boyfriend/girlfriend”, he or she is 
not considered to be socially excluded.  However, most who were coded as socially excluded replied that they spend 
their free time with parents, siblings, and other family.  Thus, these respondents may have a rich social life such that they 
spend time with friends while in school or at their sports club while they are with family during their unstructured free 
time.    
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small percentages of youth reporting dissatisfaction in school attributes such as the physical 
environment, teacher preparedness, and teacher attendance (Table 3.2).  However, Mexican youth 
trust government institutions (6.5% trust politicians, 16.1% trust judges, and 12.3% trust the police) 
less than they trust local institutions (66.2% trust teachers, 70.8% trust doctors, 15.9% trust shop 
owners, 12.5% trust union leaders, and 61.8% trust priests). Similarly, in Chile, youth trust local 
institutions more than government institutions (Table 3.2).  Youth have positive outlooks towards 
life and the future. Nearly 70 percent of Mexican youth report that they are very happy (compared 
to 1.7 percent reporting they are not happy at all), In Chile, 87 percent of youth feel optimistic about 
future work possibilities. 
Living with both parents, having a positive relationship with parents, and spirituality are 
highly correlated with positive youth behaviors in both Chile and Mexico (Tables 3.3a and 3.3b). 
Trust in governmental institutions has a positive and significant correlation with many behaviors in 
Chile and Mexico, but the magnitude of the relationship is not very large. The school quality 
composite variable that focuses primarily on teacher and school characteristics is positively and 
significantly correlated with many behaviors by Mexican youth but the magnitude is small (Table 
3.3a).  A sense of well-being is weakly, but positively, correlated with Mexican youth behaviors 
(Table 3.3a).65    
6. Results 
6.1. Factors correlated with risky behaviors 
Many of the same risk and protective factors identified in the US and existing Latin 
American and Caribbean literature explain the variance in school dropout, inactivity, age of first job, 
safe sexual behavior, age of first pregnancy/parenthood and involvement in activities in Chile and 
                                                 
65 Based on the literature from the US, mental health is very important in a youth’s life, and one would expect these 
correlations to be larger. 
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Mexico.  The explanatory power of these sets of variables for our sample ranged from (0.01 R2 – 
0.25 R2), and correctly predicted 68% - 90%66 of the behaviors.  The variables are most successful in 
explaining the variance in staying in school, safe sexual behavior, and later age of first 
pregnancy/parenthood for boys and girls in Chile and Mexico and female inactivity in both 
countries.  They explain very little of the variance in involvement in activities in both countries, in 
later labor force entry and in attitudes toward alcohol in Mexico, and in inactivity among Chilean 
males.  Table 3.4a presents the coefficient estimates from the stepwise regressions for Mexico and 
Table 3.4b presents the results for Chile.  A positive coefficient indicates that the independent 
variable is correlated with a “good” behavior, i.e. not leaving school prior to completing the 
secondary level. 
Three micro-factors - household poverty, relationship with the family, and use 
of/relationship with local institutions - repeatedly emerge as key explanatory factors in both 
countries for school dropout and all additional behaviors, i.e. significant at the 1% level in the 
stepwise regressions. Consistent with previous literature, household poverty, proxied by parental 
education level, explains a significant amount of the variance in all the behaviors considered for both 
genders in both countries. Young men and women who live in poorer households leave school 
earlier, are more likely to be inactive, start working earlier, engage in riskier sexual activity, have their 
first pregnancy (females only) at a younger age, and engage in fewer activities than those in wealthier 
households.  This correlation emerges even though we have controlled for connectedness with 
parents and others.  They are, however, less likely to justify drunkenness compared to youth from 
wealthier households in Mexico.  However, even after having controlled for household poverty, 
many other protective and risk factors are strongly correlated with these behaviors.   
                                                 
66 This is only for the binary variables “not inactive” and “school completion”.  
 82 
The importance of personal connections with peers, parents or other adult figures and 
positive behaviors found in the US, Latin American, and Caribbean literature is confirmed for the 
cases of Mexico and Chile.  A positive relationship with parents as well as living with both parents 
explain some of the variance in all seven behaviors and is positively correlated with not dropping out 
of school early, not being inactive, older age at first job, less risky sexual activity, older age at first 
parenthood, and participation in activities. Males with a good relationship with their fathers or 
mothers stay in school, are not inactive, and participate in activities.  Girls’ relationships with their 
father is related to staying in school, not working and greater participation in activities while the 
relationship with the mother is also related to safe sexual practices.  Although living with both 
parents is important for all seven behaviors, the actual relationship with parents is also important, as 
shown by controlling for the former.  This relationship is largely an emotional connection, since 
engaging in activities with parents did not emerge as a strong protective factor in the analysis.   
Abuse in the family weakly emerges as a deterrent to positive behaviors and is not strongly 
correlated with school dropout.  Physical abuse in the household explains the variance of early 
working and early and unsafe sexual behavior for females but it does not emerge as a potential 
explanatory variable for male behaviors.  It does not emerge as an explanatory variable for school 
dropout.  Parental responsiveness to youth behaviors, whether good or bad, is a good explanatory 
variable for both males and females.  Poor parental response to misbehavior – which may range 
from a lack of parental responsiveness (no connectedness) to verbal abuse to physical abuse – is 
negatively correlated with an older age at first job, safe sexual behavior, later age at first parenthood 
and a healthy attitude towards alcohol for both genders in Mexico, but is not correlated with 
schooling.  On the other hand, poor parental response to good behavior is negatively correlated with 
school completion, an older age at first job and participation in activities for both genders.   
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Having a connection with peers is important in explaining variance in Chile, but the 
relationship is less clear in Mexico.  Chilean youth who do not have a group of friends with whom 
they spend time engage in a range of negative behaviors, including school dropout, inactivity, early 
labor force entry by women, unsafe sexual behavior, earlier parenthood and less participation in 
activities (males and females) –, i.e. more social exclusion and worse behaviors go together.  The 
Mexican data do not allow us to measure social exclusion directly, since it only tells us with whom 
Mexican youth spend their free time.  Not spending free time with friends or a girlfriend/partner 
means greater school completion among Mexican males and participating in fewer in activities 
among Mexican females; it also means an older work age, safer sexual behavior, an older age at first 
parenthood and a healthier attitude among males and females.  What this may be reflecting is that 
Mexican youth spend their free time (outside of school) with parents and siblings which, as 
discussed above, have a strong, positive correlation with good behaviors.  Thus the composite 
variable that we call “social exclusion” may actually be another proxy for family connections among 
Mexican youth. 
Trust in government institutions emerges as an explanatory factor of variance in Chilean 
behaviors, but it plays a much lesser role for explaining Mexican behaviors.  Chilean males who trust 
in government institutions are older when they take their first job and have safer sexual behaviors 
while females are less likely to complete school. In Mexico, females that trust in government figures 
are more likely to be younger when first becoming a parent.  Of course, this may be endogenous 
such that the trust is developed once these behaviors are established.  This difference between Chile 
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– where the variable emerges for several behaviors – and Mexico where it is virtually absent may 
reflect the difference in the access to, coverage of, and quality of institutions in the two countries.67  
School quality – which may be a proxy for school connectedness – is positively correlated 
with school- and labor market- related behaviors in Mexico (the variable is not included in the Chile 
data set).  Those who perceive high school quality are less inactive, and are older when they begin 
working but are more likely to not complete secondary school.  This particularly emerges for girls.  
It is also important for explaining responsible attitudes toward alcohol, however the link with sexual 
behaviors is not strong. 
Age and spirituality are the only individual factors that consistently emerged in the regression 
analysis.  Age plays a part in explaining the variance in all seven behaviors considered.  It is 
negatively correlated with all the behaviors in Chile and with all behaviors except “older age at first 
job” for males in Mexico.  Young people who identify themselves as being more spiritual also have 
safer sexual behaviors and participate in more activities.  Young Chilean males who are spiritual are 
more likely to complete school, while in Mexico it is correlated with younger labor force entry.  
Young Mexican women are particularly influenced by spirituality; however the exact role is not clear.   
Mental health is not correlated with school dropout and plays a small role in explaining the 
variance of the other six behaviors in Mexico and Chile.  Good mental health – proxied by feeling 
prepared for future employment, feeling optimistic about job prospects, or having a sense of well-
being – emerge as key explanatory variables for not being inactive in Mexico and Chile, and for older 
age at first job for Mexican females and younger age at first parenthood for Mexican males.   
                                                 
67 Or, it may reflect the different definitions of “government institutions” it the two surveys.  In Chile, it is defined as 
higher level institutions – congress, city government, the judicial system, political parties – while in Mexico it is more 
personal – police, judges, and politicians.   
 85 
Among the macro-factors, gender and rural/urban residence are key explanatory factors for 
many behaviors while ethnicity plays a lesser role.  For all seven behaviors in both countries, gender 
is one of the key variables that emerged in the stepwise regressions68 and risk and protective factors 
affect the schooling and work outcomes differently for males and females.  The R2 for each female 
regression is about equal to or much higher than that for males, suggesting that the regressions 
better explains the variance in girls’ behaviors than boys’ behaviors.  A large set of micro variables, 
ranging from the family to the community, were useful in explaining girls’ behavior, but not that of 
boys.  In Mexico, positive female behaviors were strongly and positively correlated with living with 
both parents and with a good relationship with the mother, while in Chile the relationship with the 
mother is positively correlated with better behaviors by girls.  These factors played a lesser role for 
boys. Finally, certain factors affected female behavior in an opposite manner than they affected male 
behaviors, especially among those variables that were measured only for Mexico.  For example, older 
females are less likely to be working and not in school (defined as “inactive”) while there is no 
strong work/age relationship for males.  This is clearly a result of gender roles where women 
increasingly allocate their time toward homecare as their families grow.   
Being from rural areas helps to explain who leaves school earlier, who goes to work at a 
younger age and who is inactive in both Chile and Mexico.  This is not surprising given the familial 
and greater informal nature of rural labor markets compared to those in urban areas.  Notably, these 
results emerge even when controlling for household poverty and ethnicity (Chile).  In spite of the 
unconditional positive correlation between rural residence and younger marriage or risky sexual 
activity discussed above, being from rural areas is not a key explanatory variable for risky sexual 
activity (proxied by earlier age of sexual initiation and use of contraception) in either country (with 
the exception of Mexican females) or for parenthood in Chile.   
                                                 
68 The regression estimates of the pooled sample can be obtained from the authors  
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Being indigenous does not emerge as a key explanatory factor for any of the behaviors in 
Chile.  While 11% of the sample is indigenous, it appears that other factors better explain the 
variance in behaviors. This seems contrary to evidence from elsewhere that suggests that ethnic 
disparities are important for explaining the seven behaviors discussed in this paper (Rew and Horner 
2003 for the US, Koller et. al. 2004 for Brazil).  However, we cannot conclude that indigeneity is not 
a valuable characteristic for understanding youth behavior since it is possible that other variables 
that consistently emerge as key explanatory factors are correlated with being indigenous and thus 
pick up the variance.  For example, there is a high correlation (significant at the 1% level) between 
indigeneity and household poverty (low parental education level).  Also, feelings of being 
discriminated against, which may be ethnic, racial, spatial, or based on other variables, emerges as a 
key explanatory factor for earlier age of employment for boys and girls. 
6.2. Risk profiles of youth in Mexico and Chile 
Table 3.5 presents an overview of the clusters arising from the cluster analysis.  More than 
half of young people in these two countries can be considered at-risk.  Of the youth that have 
dropped out prior to completing secondary school 70 percent are most at-risk and suffering the 
consequences of negative youth behaviors.  In Mexico, nearly one-third of youth age 12-24 are 
suffering the consequences of negative youth behaviors – early school dropout, adolescent mothers, 
not working – while 17 percent of Chilean youth are in this situation.  They also come from the 
poorest families and have the fewest social bonds.   
Another one-quarter of Mexican and Chilean youth are engaging in negative behaviors and 
on their way to the worst-off category.  A younger group in Mexico (20 percent) and Chile (8 
percent) are not engaging in risky behaviors, but they have factor in their lives that suggest that they 
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may be graduating to these more harmful groups before long since they also lack the social supports 
and mental health that the no-risk group boasts.   
Figures 3.2a and 3.2b show the average behavior and factor levels for each cluster type.  
Consistent with the stepwise regressions, good behaviors are positively correlated with protective 
factors in both Mexico and Chile.  As suggested by the ecological framework, the opposite is 
observed when considering the correlation between risk factors and positive behaviors.  First 
considering type III, we see these clusters have lower averages for those variables that might be 
considered protective factors and high values for those variables that might be considered risk 
factors. Youth with “no” risk in their lives have a low presence of risk factors and a higher level of 
protective factors and good behaviors than those with type II or III risk levels.  For youth with type 
I risk behaviors are better than for types II and III risk and comparable to type 0 risk.  Risk factors 
are worse than those with type 0 risk, but better than those with types II and III risk.  Protective 
factors in Mexico are comparable to those with no risk; however those who are classified as type I 
risk in Chile have the fewest protective factors of any risk type, suggesting that this is a temporary 
phase with potentially worse to come. Youth with type II risk have worse behaviors and outcomes 
compared to those with types 0 and I risk, however are not nearly as bad as those with type III.   
Risk and protective factors that are driving some of the differences between the clusters are 
consistent with those that arose in the stepwise regressions for each risky behavior.  The clusters 
themselves are presented in the Appendix.  Some factors repeatedly arise in the best-off or worst-off 
clusters.  Parent education is strongly correlated with risk level, as seen in Figures 3.2 and 3.3.  In 
addition, having a positive relationship with the family is a recurring protective factor across the 
clusters.  The clusters show that youth who live(d) with both parents have a lower incidence of all 
risky behaviors.  Those youth who feel connected to a parent, i.e. those who feel that they can relate 
to a parent, the parent cares for them, they can depend on the parent, etc, also have lower risky 
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behavior and negative outcomes than youth who do not feel connected.  Connection with non-
family members can partially compensate for absent parental connection, as shown by youth who 
are connected to non-family members having less risky behavior than those who do not have 
connections with anyone.  Conversely, family abuse, substance abuse and lack of family cohesion 
cluster with victimization in Chile, while non-positive feedback from parents is correlated with risky 
behaviors in Mexico. 
Positive institutional factors are also correlated with positive behaviors.  School quality 
matters in Chile, and an individual’s relationship with his/her community (trust, feeling of school 
quality) is positively correlated with voter registration.  Low spirituality/ church attendance clusters 
loosely with the risk type III groups.  Surprisingly, social exclusion is rarely correlated with negative 
behaviors.  Instead, the “loner” youth usually showed up as sub-groups in the less at-risk clusters. 
Ethnic identity is not strongly correlated with risk level, although indigenous youth are over-
represented among clusters defined as risk type III (Table 3.5b).  A closer look at the indigenous 
youth in the Chile sample shows that while indigenous youth have worse risk factors and behaviors, 
they have better protective factors.69  The more at risk clusters are about five percentage points more 
indigenous than the average, but the negative relationship with positive behaviors is slight as seen in 
Figure 3.2b.70   
7. Conclusion 
Based on unique youth surveys in Chile and Mexico, we find evidence that while early school 
drop out is strongly correlated with socioeconomic status (proxied by parent education), it is also 
strongly correlated with other risky behaviors (which are also strongly correlated with 
socioeconomic status) and several risk and protective factors.  Of the risk and protective factors 
                                                 
69 Further details available upon request.  
70 We must remember, however, that this is a self-reported survey, with the youth indicating if they identify with a 
particular indigenous group.  See Hall and Patrinos (2006) for documentation of the limitations of using self-reported 
ethnicity.  
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investigated in this study, good relationship with parents and peers (social inclusion), strong 
connection with local government and school institutions, urban residence, younger age, and 
feelings of spirituality cluster together and emerge as key explanatory factors for school dropout in 
the stepwise regressions.  These factors are also positively correlated with other youth behaviors 
examined for Mexico and Chile– not inactive, later age of first job, safe sexual behavior, later age of 
sexual initiation /parenthood, participation in activities, and healthy attitudes toward alcohol.   
Gender and age are also important variables.  The incidence of risk factors, protective 
factors, and behaviors differ by gender and age in the clusters and the set of factors that is most 
important in explaining behaviors differed by gender and across age profiles.  Most notably, the 
relationship with government institutions has differing effects on women’s and men’s behaviors 
(Chile) while local institutions (school) seem particularly relevant for women.  Spirituality also 
emerges as a more influential factor for women than for men. 
Young people in Mexico and Chile who engage in one positive behavior tend to engage in 
other positive behaviors, while negative behaviors (or outcomes) cluster together.  This is not 
surprising since a common set of protective factors continuously emerge as important explanatory 
variables for each behavior in the stepwise regressions.  Thus, strengthening positive factors and 
minimizing negative factors, has the potential to influence a range of youth behaviors.  
These findings, the first of their kind for Mexico and Chile, are consistent with those from 
other LAC countries - including the English-speaking Caribbean, Brazil, and Honduras - as well as 
studies using US data.  Unlike other studies, though, self identified indigeneity and household abuse 
do not emerge as key explanatory factors for Chile, and the variables that proxy positive mental 
health do not emerge strongly in the analysis for either country. 
Despite the limitations in identifying causality, our ability to determine the key factors 
important for a range of behaviors can be useful to policymakers.  While poverty alleviation and 
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education are common policy entry points, programs that tap into other areas of a young people’s 
lives to ensure the presence of positive influences have the potential for a significant impact in 
preventing risky youth behaviors in LAC.  For example, young people without family support can 
benefit from mentoring programs.  Or, certain models of “after” school clubs are effective for 
affecting a range of behaviors.  Or, those from poor households can benefit from cash transfers that 
reward positive behaviors.  In fact, there are a range of evidence-based program and policy 
interventions at the individual-, micro-, and macro-levels that prevent negative youth behaviors and 
provide second opportunities to those who have made poor decisions (Cunningham et. al. 2008).       
Our findings show that typically unobservable factors behaviors that are strongly correlated 
with poverty are also strongly correlated with school dropout.  While our findings are not causal, 
they lend support to the argument that it may be these unobservable variables that are driving the 
relationship between poverty and school dropout.  We advocate that studies looking at school 
dropout take these additional factors and behaviors into account.   
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FIGURES AND TABLES FOR CHAPTER 3 
 
Table 3.1.  Construction of Variables 
  Chile Mexico 
  
Risk 
Type  
    
Cluster 
analysis 
Factor 
analysis 
Behaviors/Outcomes 
No early school dropout (i.e. 
completed secondary school) 
II X X X X 
Not inactive – either in school nor 
working 
II, III X X X X 
Older age when started working II, III X X X X 
Safe sexual behavior (not sexually 
active, contraception use if active) 
II X X  X 
Older age at first 
pregnancy/parenthood 
III X Xa X 
X 
Participate in extracurricular activities II X X X X 
Attitude towards alcohol (respondent 
can justify getting drunk) 
II  Xa  
X 
Literate (can read and/or write a 
message)  
III  X X 
 
In school II, III X X   
Years of education completed I, III X X   
Working (Not Workingc) II, III X X   
Low number of sexual partners in the 
past year 
II  Xa  
 
Older age at onset of sexual activity II X Xa X  
Has at least one child (Does not have 
at least one childc) 
III X X  
 
Married (Not Marriedc) I, III X X X  
Registered to vote, planning on voting 
in the next election, desires to vote 
when of age (if under 18 years old) 
III X Xb X 
 
Has not been a victim of a crime 
(proxy for criminal activity) 
II X  X 
 
Attitude towards drugs (respondent 
can justify using drugs) 
II   Xa   
  
Protective Factors  
Trust in governmental institutions I Xd Xa,e X X 
Trust in community institutions I Xf Xa,g X X 
Connected (whether youth reaches out 
– for talk or help- to someone when 
they have problems) 
I X X X 
X 
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Table 3.1 (cont.) 
Living with both, one or no parents I  X X X 
Positive relationship with father I Xh Xi X X 
Positive relationship with mother I Xj Xk X X 
Connected with an adult other than 
parents 
I X  X X 
Church attendance I X X X X 
Spiritual influence in beliefs, opinions 
and attitudes 
I  X  X 
School qualityl I  X X X 
Feeling optimistic about future work I X   X 
Feeling prepared for future 
employment 
I X   X 
Sense of wellbeing (level of happiness 
reported) 
I  Xa  X 
Positive vew on youth employment I X   X 
Communication with parents (talk to 
parents when facing a personal 
problem) 
I  X  
 
Activities with parents I  X  X 
Risk Factors   
Low parental education level (proxy 
for poverty) 
I X X X X 
Have felt discriminated against I X   X 
Limited access to healthcare I  X X X 
Rural residence (versus urban) I X X  X 
Social exclusion I, III X X X X 
Poor family cohesion I X  X X 
Physical/verbal abuse in the home I X  X X 
Substance abuse in the home I X  X X 
Level of perceived violence in the 
neighborhood 
I X  X X 
Indigenous (self-identifying as 
indigenous) 
I X   X 
Parental influence regarding smoking 
and alcoholn   
I  X X X 
Parental response to misbehavioro     I  X  X 
Parental response to good behaviorp   I  X   
Household ownership of 
durable/luxury goodsm 
I  X   
Monthly earnings of heads of 
household 
I   X     
a for respondents age 15 or older 
b for respondents age 18 or older 
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Table 3.1 (cont.) 
 
c for respondents under age 18 
d indicates level of confidence in government, congress, city government, political parties, judicial system 
e indicates level of confidence in politicians, judges, the police, and the military 
f level of confidence in hospitals, the Catholic Church, schools, universities, and family 
g indicates level of confidence in teachers, doctors, shop owners, union leaders and priests  
h quality of relationship with father on various attributes (communication, demonstration of love or affection, 
understanding and help with problems, respect for private life of youth, the time spend with father) 
i variety of topics that the youth communicates with the father about (school, politics, religion, sexual relations, work, 
and other topics) 
j indicates quality of relationship with mother on various attributes (communication, demonstration of love or affection, 
understanding and help with problems, respect for private life of youth, the time spend with mother) 
k variety of topics that the youth communicates with the mother about (school, politics, religion, sexual relations, work, 
and other topics) 
l rank of the overall quality of the youth’s current/past school as reported by youth (physical building, scholastic 
materials, teachers preparation, content of courses and teachers assistance) 
m includes radio recorder, CD burner, TV, cable, VCR, game console, telephone, computer, internet, car/truck/van - 
could be used instead of household education level to indicate economic class 
n indicates level of control parents attempt to control children’s behaviors (do they forbid smoking/drinking, grant 
periodic permission, allow the child to make his/her own decision) 
o how parents respond when child bothers/angers them (0=by talking with their child, 0.5 = punishing, 1 = 
beating/hitting, insulting, accusation in front of others, stop talking) 
p indicates frequency with which parents use positive feedback (words of encouragement, hug/kiss, give a gift, concede 
to something) when child does something good/correct (0 = always, 0.5 = sometimes, 1 = never) 
94  
Table 3.2.  Descriptive Statistics 
 Mexico Chile 
 
Actual percentages 
All 
ages 
12 to 14 15 to 
17 
18 to 
24 
All 
ages 
15 to 
17 
18 to 
24 
Average age 17.19 13.0 16.0 20.8 18.9 15.95  20.8 
Percent female 53.5 50.65 52.9 55.9 53.0 50.5 54.6 
Percent indigenous - - - - 10.8 11.5 10.4 
Percent rural 24.7 28.1 26.0 21.6 13.2 13.3 13.1 
Behaviors and Outcomes        
Share dropping out of 
school before completing 
high school 
29.9 10.0 33.0 42.3 14.2 8.4 17.8 
Share in school 45.3 85.9 61.8 27.5 60.5 91.4 41.0 
Share idle/inactive 20.3 8.9 17.7 29.9 27.3 6.7 35.9 
Share working 41.9 17.2 35.1 35.1 21.4 4.7 32.0 
Share having sex 52.1 - 13.3 56.0 59.1 26.9 79.4 
Share of the sexually active 
using protection  
50.6 - 54.0 52.5 61.9 59.9 62.3 
Share reporting at least 1 
child 
19.4 - 2.5 28.9 18.6 3.9 27.9 
Share married 15.7 0.4 4.1 32.9 4.8 0.1 7.7 
Risk and Protective 
Factors 
       
Share reporting physical or 
psychological abuse in home 
- - - - 6.3 6.2 6.4 
Share reporting problems 
arising from substance 
abuse in home 
- - - - 8.5 7.0 9.5 
Share without access to 
medical services 
49.4 50.2 50.7 48.0 - - - 
Share attending church 
weekly 
9.3 11.3 10.3 7.3 21.6 20.9 18.1 
Share attending church at 
least once in the past month 
66.3 72.0 65.9 62.5 - - - 
Share believing in God - - - - 94.8 95.1 94.6 
Share optimistic about 
future work 
- - - - 87.7 88.2 87.3 
Share reporting being happy 
(sense of well-being) 
98.2 - 98.0 98.4 - - - 
Share reporting social 
exclusion 
53.2 66.8 53.9 43.1 17.7 10.1 22.5 
Share with parents who 
have a primary degree or 
less 
56.1 56.3 58.0 55.0 38.1 38.8 37.7 
Share reporting they have 
felt discriminated against 
- - - - 54.7 54.2 55.1 
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Table 3.3a. Correlation Coefficients Significant at the 1% Level, Mexico  
  Not 
inactive 
No 
school 
dropout 
Older age 
when started 
working 
Safe 
Sexual 
behavior 
Older age at 
first 
pregnancy/ 
parenthood 
Participate 
in activities 
Attitude 
towards 
alcohol  
No early school dropout  0.42       
Older age when started working -0.04 0.24      
Safe Sexual behavior 0.21 0.35 0.14     
Older age at first 
pregnancy/child 
0.35 0.32 0.07 0.53    
Participate in extracurricular 
activities 
0.12 0.15 -0.06 0.10 0.13   
B
e
h
a
v
i
o
r
s
/
O
u
t
c
o
m
e
s
 
Negative attitude towards 
alcohol  
-0.10 -0.04 0.06 0.04 -0.06 -0.05  
Low parental education -0.10 -0.21 -0.11 0.03 -0.03 -0.12 0.08 
Rural residence  -0.12 -0.08 -0.02 -- -0.04 -0.06 0.11 
Negative parental response to 
misbehavior 
-0.06 -0.08 -0.05 -0.13 -0.15 -0.03 -0.02 
R
i
s
k
 
f
a
c
t
o
r
s
 
Social exclusion  -- 0.11 0.11 0.18 0.05 -- 0.09 
Living with both parents 0.27 0.35 0.13 0.49 0.49 0.08 -0.03 
Positive relations with father 0.13 0.12 0.02 0.09 0.15 0.16 -0.03 
Positive relations with mother 0.08 0.09 0.03 0.09 0.12 0.15  
Church attendance -0.02 0.06 0.06 0.10 0.05 0.12 0.08 
Spiritual influence in 
beliefs/opinions/attitudes 
-- -- -0.07 0.03 0.04 0.15 -- 
Trust in government institutions -- -- -- 0.02 -- 0.03 0.02 
Trust in community institutions -- -- 0.02 -- -- 0.02 0.02 
School quality 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04 -- 0.04 
P
r
o
t
e
c
t
i
v
e
 
f
a
c
t
o
r
s
 
Well-being 0.03 0.05 0.05 -0.03 -- 0.04 0.02 
-- not significant at the 1% level 
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Table 3.3b. Correlation Coefficients Significant at the 1% Level, Chile  
   Not 
inactive  
No school 
dropout 
Older age 
when started 
working 
Safe sexual 
behavior 
Older age at first 
pregnancy/ 
parenthood 
Participate in 
activities 
No early school dropout  0.38       
Older age when started working 0.13 0.22      
Sexual behavior 0.30 0.27 0.29    
Older age at first pregnancy/ 
child 
0.36 0.40 0.13 0.41    
B
e
h
a
v
i
o
r
s
/
O
u
t
c
o
m
e
s
 
Participate in extracurricular 
activities 
0.19 0.17 -- 0.14 0.19   
Low parental education level -0.16 -0.23 -0.14 -0.08 -0.09 -0.10 
Rural residence  -0.11 -0.11 -0.10 -- -- -0.05 
Physical/Verbal abuse in the 
home 
-0.04 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -- 
Substance abuse in the home -0.05 -0.07 -0.08 -0.10 -0.04  -- 
Social exclusion -0.26 -0.23 -0.09 -0.17 -0.31 -0.21 
R
i
s
k
 
f
a
c
t
o
r
s
 
Indigenous  -- -- -0.05 -- -- -- 
Good relationship with father 0.10 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.14 0.07 
Good relationship with mother 0.13 0.16 0.10 0.15 0.15 0.06 
Spiritual influence in beliefs, 
opinions and attitudes 
-- 0.07 0.05 0.16 0.05 0.20 
Trust in governmental 
institutions 
-- -- 0.04 0.09 -- 0.04 
Trust in community institutions -- -- 0.06 0.09 -- -- 
Optimism towards future work 
opportunities 
0.09 0.05 -- -- 0.05 0.05 
P
r
o
t
e
c
t
i
v
e
 
f
a
c
t
o
r
s
 
Preparation for work -- -- -0.06 -0.09 -0.04 -- 
-- not significant at the 1% leve.  
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Table 3.4a. Key Correlates of Positive Youth Behaviors, Mexico 
 No school 
dropouta 
Not Inactivea Older age at 
first jobb 
Safe Sexual 
behaviorb 
Older age at 
first 
 parenthoodb 
Participation in 
activtiesb 
Healthy 
attitude 
towards 
alcoholb 
  Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Femal
e 
Male Female Male Female 
-2.83 -2.41 -0.89 -1.21 -1.14 -0.81 -- -0.36 -0.75 -0.72 -0.69 -0.82 0.65 1.07 Low 
parental 
education 
level 
(0.14) (0.12) (0.19) (0.12) (0.08) (0.08)  (0.11) (0.16) (0.12) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.12) 
-0.66 -0.84 -0.38 -0.90 -0.32 0.23 -- -0.17 -- -0.22 -0.38 -- 0.56 0.80 Rural 
residence (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.06) (0.06)  (0.07) (0.09) 
0.54 0.88 -- 1.32 0.47 0.40 0.98 2.12 1.89 2.22 -- 0.30 -- -0.39 Live with 
both 
parents 
(0.07) (0.05)  (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.08) (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.08) 
-- -- -- -- -0.13 -0.20 -0.13 -0.22 -0.21 -0.31 -- -- -0.20 -0.17 Poor 
parental 
response to 
misbehavio
r 
    (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05)   (0.05) (0.07) 
-0.61 -0. 73 -- -- -0.50 -0.45 -- -- -- -- -0.61 -0.55 -- -- Poor 
parental 
response to 
good 
behavior 
(0.12) (0.11)   (0.09) (0.08)     (0.11) (0.11)   
0.49 0.91 0.89 0.48 -- -- -- -- -0.70 -- 0.76 0.87 -- -- Positive 
relationship 
with father 
(0.18) (0.16) (0.23) (0.16)     (0.25)  (0.17) (0.16)   
1.56 1.43 -- 1.35 -- -0.63 -- 0.73 1.48 1.14 0.90 1.48 -- -- Positive 
relationship 
with 
mother 
(0.19) (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.11)  (0.14) (0.26) (0.15) (0.18) (0.16)   
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Table 3.4a (cont.) 
0.25 -- -- -- 0.17 0.10 0.63 0.60 1.19 0.38 -- -0.13 0.33 0.27 Social 
exclusion (0.05)    (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.11) (0.06)  (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) 
-- -- -- 0.30 -0.46 -0.32 0.21 0.32 -- 0.49 0.95 0.93 -- -- Spiritual 
influence    (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08)  (0.09) (0.08) (0.07)   
-- -- -- -- -- -- 0.43 0.62 -- 0.57 0.56 0.81 0.39 -- Church 
attendance       (0.07) (0.08)  (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08)  
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.26 -- -- -- -- Trust in 
governmen
t 
institutions 
         (0.10)     
-0.23 -0.31 -0.42 -0.44 -0.24 -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.13 -- -- Access to 
healthcare (0.05) (0.04) (0.07) (0.05) (0.04)       (0.05)   
-- 0.19 -- 0.16 -0.18 -- -0.17 -- -- -- -- 0.25 -0.37 -0.22 Parental 
influence  (0.05)  (0.05) (0.04)  (0.05)     (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) 
-- -0.27 -- 0.28 0.52 0.23 0.39 -- -- -- -- -- 0.55 0.44 School 
quality  (0.10)  (0.10) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09)      (0.11) (0.13) 
-- -- -- 0.31 0.30 0.27 0.38 0.95 1.35 1.10 -0.27 -- -- -- Connected 
   (0.07) (0.09) (0.06) (0.11) (0.07) (0.16) (0.07) (0.10)    
0.41 0.33 -- -- -- 0.39 -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.37 -- Activities 
with 
parents 
(0.12) (0.11)    (0.08)       (0.02)  
Age -0.89 -1.07 -- -2.17 1.09 -0.18 -5.64 -4.16 -5.51 -3.31 -0.41 -0.90 -0.45 -0.13 
 (0.15) (0.13)  (0.14) (0.12) (0.11) (0.15) (0.14) (0.24) (0.16) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.18) 
-- -- 0.56 -0.26 -- 0.30 -- -- -0.40 -- -- -- -- 0.50 Positive 
sense of 
wellbeing 
  (0.13) (0.09)  (0.07)   (0.15)     (0.12) 
a Logit; b Ordered Logit.  Standard errors in parentheses. 
-- indicates that the variable is not significant at the 1% level and was dropped from the regressions during the iterative process. 
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Table 3.4b. Key Correlates of Positive Youth Behaviors, Chile 
  No school dropout Not inactivea Older age at first 
jobb 
Safe sexual 
behaviorc 
Older age at 
parenthoodb 
Participate in 
activitiesc 
  Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
-4.18 -2.76 -2.02 -1.47 -0.28 -0.11 -0.79 -1.09 -- -0.11 -0.83 -1.06 Low parental 
education level (0.70) (0.31) (0.26) (0.23) (0.03) (0.03) (0.18) (0.18)  (0.02) (0.16) (0.18) 
-0.46 -- -- -0.63 -0.09 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- Rural residence 
(0.17)   (0.14) (0.02)        
0.61 -- -- -- -- 0.07 -- -- -- 0.06 -- -- Positive 
relationship with 
father 
(0.19)     (0.02)    (0.01)   
-- 1.59 0.76 0.75 -- -- -- 0.98 -- 0.10 -- -- Positive 
relationship with 
mother 
 (0.21) (0.25) (0.19)    (0.18)  (0.02)   
-- -- -- -- -- -0.07 -- -0.67 -- -- -- -- Abuse in 
household      (0.02)  (0.15)     
-- -- -- -- -- -- -0.70 -- -- -- -- -- Substance abuse in 
the home       (0.14)      
 -1.54 -- -1.29 -- -0.07 0.37 -0.98 -0.04 -0.16 -0.85 -1.20 Social exclusion 
 (0.12)  (0.10)  (0.01) (0.13) (0.10) (0.01) (0.01) (0.12) (0.11) 
-- -0.87 -- -- 0.07 -- 0.78 -- -- -- -- -- Trust in 
governmental 
institutions 
 (0.24)   (0.03)  (0.15)      
0.49 0.60 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- Connectedness 
(0.16) (0.17)           
 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.43 -- Connection with 
adult other than 
parent 
          (0.13)  
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.74 -- -- -- -- Perceived violence 
in community        (0.18)     
-- -- -- -- -0.11 -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.54 Poor family 
cohesion 
 
    (0.02)       (0.13) 
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Table 3.4b (cont.) 
-3.5 -2.62 -2.66 -4.01 -0.41 -0.47 -5.57 -5.25 -0.15 -0.32 -1.19 -1.37 Age 
(0.33) (0.31) (0.28) (0.25) (0.03) (0.03) (0.23) (0.21) (0.01) (0.02) (0.18) (0.20) 
0.70 -- -- -- -- -- 0.75 0.58 -- -- 1.19 1.39 Spirituality/church 
attendance (0.22)      (0.12) (0.11)   (0.11) (0.11) 
-- -- -- 0.41 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- Optimism towards 
future work    (0.13)         
-- -- -- -- -0.04 -0.03 -- -- -- -- 0.25 -- Have felt 
discriminated 
against 
    (0.01) (0.01)     (0.07)  
-- -- 0.17 0.04 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- Positive outlook 
towards work   (0.12) (0.10)         
a Logit; b OLS c Ordered Logit.  Standard Errors in parentheses  
-- indicates that the variable is not significant at the 1% level and was dropped from the regressions during the iterative process
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Table 3.5a. Mexico Cluster analysis overview 
 Type III Type II Type I None 
Percent of total sample 33.1 25.1 20.2 21.6 
Percent of early dropouts 69.7 17.9 8.5 3.9 
Percent of 12-14 year olds 14.1 33.1 24.3 28.5 
Percent of 15-17 year olds 38.9 11.9 27.5 21.7 
Percent of 18-24 year olds 43.4 26.8 13.1 16.7 
Percent of males 31.9 23.2 22.2 22.7 
Percent of females 34.2 26.7 18.4 20.7 
Average Parental 
Education (poverty proxy)  
Primary 
graduate, 
some 
secondary 
Primary 
graduate, 
some 
secondary 
Secondary 
graduate 
Secondary 
graduate 
Percent of rural 42.9 24.4 18.1 14.6 
Percent of urban 29.9 25.3 20.8 23.9 
 
Table 3.5b. Chile Cluster Analysis Overview 
 Type III Type II Type I None 
Percent of total sample 16.8 28.0 8.7 46.5 
Percent of early dropouts 77.3 19.0 0.5 3.2 
Percent of 15-17 year olds 8.3 20.4 15.9 55.5 
Percent of 18-24 year olds 22.2 32.8 4.2 40.8 
Percent of males 23.7 19.1 13.2 44.1 
Percent of females 10.8 4.7 35.9 10.8 
Average Parental 
Education (poverty proxy)  
Primary 
Graduate 
Some 
Secondary 
Education 
Some Secondary 
Education 
Secondary 
Graduate 
Percent of rural 27.2 29.5 7.0 36.3 
Percent of urban 15.3 27.7 9.0 48.0 
Percent of indigenous 21.7 26.3 8.7 43.3 
Percent of non-indigenous 16.3 28.2 8.7 46.9 
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Figure 3.1a.  Relationship between Early Dropout/Inactivity and Parent Education in Mexico 
 
 
Figure 3.1b.  Relationship between Early Dropout/Inactivity and Parent Education in Chile 
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Figure 3.2a. Cluster Group Means – Mexico 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2b. Cluster Group Means – Chile 
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Figure 3.3a. Relationship between Risk Level and Parent Education in Chile 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3b. Relationship between Risk Level and Parent Education in Mexico 
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APPENDIX 
 
A.1. Cluster analysis results:  Mexican Males Aged 12 to 14 
Cluster name at-risk very early 
workers 
advantaged 
loners 
advantaged 
youth 
Age 13.25 13.07 12.87 13.05 
Behaviors Average 0.41 0.69 0.83 0.77 
older age when first started working 0.42 0.11 1.00 0.62 
not idle 0.49 1.00 1.00 1.00 
no early school dropout 0.01 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Literacy 0.91 1.00 1.00 1.00 
not married 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 
participate in activities 0.14 0.29 0.17 0.23 
not working 0.51 0.58 0.99 0.81 
in school 0.01 1.00 1.00 1.00 
years of education completed 0.20 0.28 0.27 0.28 
Protective Factors Average 0.54 0.58 0.60 0.58 
relationship with father 0.37 0.42 0.40 0.40 
relationship with mother 0.42 0.48 0.46 0.46 
connected 0.96 0.84 1.00 1.00 
live with both parents 0.87 0.90 0.93 0.90 
church attendance 0.36 0.41 0.39 0.39 
school quality 0.75 0.81 0.83 0.82 
communication with parents 0.49 0.52 0.55 0.51 
spiritual influence  0.15 0.22 0.15 0.17 
Risk Factors Average 0.57 0.57 0.54 0.41 
parental influence (alcohol & smoking) 0.44 0.38 0.35 0.37 
social exclusion 0.58 1.00 1.00 0.00 
limited access to healthcare 0.63 0.52 0.45 0.47 
parental response to misbehavior 0.38 0.31 0.29 0.32 
parental response to good behavior 0.58 0.52 0.51 0.53 
rural 0.55 0.49 0.45 0.43 
parental education 0.80 0.70 0.67 0.67 
household ownership of goods 0.84 0.79 0.79 0.77 
monthly earnings household heads 0.85 0.80 0.78 0.78 
n 758 1193 1893 1989 
Risk Type III II I - 
Percent of sample 13.0% 20.5% 32.5% 34.1% 
Notes: The highlighted rows indicate that the variables were not included in the clustering exercise. 
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A.2. Cluster analysis results:  Mexican Females Aged 12 to 14 
Cluster name at-risk early workers advantaged 
loners 
advantaged 
youth 
Age 13.33 12.98 12.97 13.13 
Behaviors Average 0.43 0.79 0.83 0.80 
older age when first started working 0.66 0.74 1.00 0.77 
not idle 0.28 1.00 1.00 1.00 
No early school dropout 0.01 1.00 1.00 1.00 
literacy 0.92 1.00 1.00 1.00 
not married 0.97 1.00 0.99 1.00 
participate in activities 0.13 0.24 0.24 0.25 
not working 0.73 0.87 0.99 0.89 
in school 0.01 0.99 1.00 1.00 
years of education completed 0.20 0.27 0.29 0.29 
Protective Factors Average 0.56 0.59 0.61 0.59 
relationship with father 0.36 0.39 0.42 0.40 
relationship with mother 0.45 0.50 0.52 0.51 
Connected 0.95 0.93 1.00 1.00 
live with both parents 0.86 0.88 0.93 0.90 
church attendance 0.45 0.44 0.42 0.45 
school quality 0.77 0.82 0.81 0.81 
communication with parents 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.48 
spiritual influence  0.18 0.17 0.17 0.18 
Risk Factors Average 0.66 0.65 0.48 0.48 
parental influence (alcohol & smoking) 0.40 0.48 0.06 0.34 
social exclusion 0.73 1.00 1.00 0.00 
limited access to healthcare 0.64 0.69 0.00 0.43 
parental response to misbehavior 0.30 0.27 0.26 0.27 
parental response to good behavior 0.59 0.51 0.47 0.51 
Rural 0.59 0.49 0.35 0.40 
parental education 0.81 0.71 0.60 0.65 
household ownership of goods 0.86 0.81 0.76 0.76 
monthly earnings household heads 0.87 0.81 0.74 0.75 
N 908 2723 982 1376 
Risk Type III II I - 
Percent of sample 15.2% 45.5% 16.4% 23.0% 
Notes: The highlighted rows indicate that the variables were not included in the clustering exercise. 
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A.3. Cluster analysis results:  Mexican Males Aged 15 to 17 
Cluster name at-risk becoming at 
risk 
loners advantaged 
youth 
age 16.16 15.89 15.88 15.97 
Behaviors Average 0.64 0.84 0.85 0.84 
older age when first started working 0.25 0.41 0.52 0.48 
not idle 0.74 1.00 1.00 1.00 
no early school dropout 0.06 1.00 1.00 1.00 
literacy 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.00 
older age at onset of sexual activity 0.85 0.92 0.90 0.88 
older age at first pregnancy 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 
not married 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.00 
participate in activities 0.17 0.27 0.27 0.32 
not working 0.30 0.63 0.73 0.73 
in school 0.06 0.99 0.99 1.00 
years of education completed 0.28 0.39 0.42 0.42 
safe sex 0.85 0.93 0.91 0.90 
low number of sexual partners in past year 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.97 
does not have a child 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 
attitude towards drugs 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.95 
attitude towards alcohol 0.88 0.89 0.91 0.85 
Protective Factors Average 0.54 0.58 0.59 0.58 
Connected 0.91 1.00 1.00 1.00 
live with both parents 0.84 0.88 0.89 0.88 
relationship with father 0.38 0.42 0.44 0.43 
relationship with mother 0.44 0.47 0.50 0.49 
trust in governmental institutions 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.38 
trust in community institutions 0.58 0.60 0.60 0.61 
church attendance 0.32 0.35 0.35 0.32 
school quality 0.78 0.81 0.81 0.82 
communication with parents 0.44 0.48 0.51 0.47 
spiritual influence  0.19 0.19 0.18 0.18 
sense of wellbeing 0.82 0.85 0.89 0.87 
Risk Factors Average 0.54 0.57 0.45 0.29 
parental influence (alcohol & smoking) 0.54 0.46 0.42 0.45 
social exclusion 0.46 0.48 1.00 0.00 
limited access to healthcare 0.61 1.00 0.04 0.00 
parental response to misbehavior 0.29 0.27 0.21 0.24 
parental response to good behavior 0.60 0.55 0.50 0.53 
rural 0.51 0.49 0.35 0.29 
parental education 0.78 0.72 0.59 0.56 
household ownership of goods 0.82 0.78 0.73 0.69 
monthly earnings household heads 0.85 0.82 0.74 0.70 
n 1765 1120 681 869 
Risk Type III II I - 
Percent 39.8% 25.3% 15.4% 19.6% 
Notes: The highlighted rows indicate that the variables were not included in the clustering exercise. 
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A.4. Cluster analysis results:  Mexican Females Aged 15 to 17 
Cluster names early 
workers 
at-risk 
mothers 
& wives 
at-risk 
idle 
dropouts 
resilient 
loners 
advantaged 
loners 
advantaged 
youth 
age 16.20 16.42 16.07 15.85 15.85 15.92 
Behaviors Average 0.66 0.46 0.68 0.86 0.88 0.88 
older age when started 
working 
0.26 0.43 0.65 0.62 0.71 0.67 
not idle 1.00 0.21 0.02 1.00 1.00 1.00 
no early school dropout  0.00 0.07 0.00 0.96 0.99 1.00 
literacy 1.00 0.96 0.95 1.00 1.00 1.00 
older age at onset of sexual 
activity 
0.97 0.29 0.97 0.99 0.98 0.97 
older age at first pregnancy 1.00 0.43 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 
not married 0.99 0.34 0.99 1.00 0.99 1.00 
participate in activities 0.16 0.07 0.15 0.25 0.27 0.31 
not working 0.00 0.83 0.98 0.77 0.86 0.83 
in school 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.95 0.99 1.00 
years of education completed 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.38 0.42 0.42 
safe sex 0.96 0.19 0.96 0.99 0.98 0.97 
low number of sexual 
partners in past year 
0.99 0.89 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.99 
does not have a child 1.00 0.46 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 
attitude towards drugs 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.96 
attitude towards alcohol 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.95 0.93 0.89 
Protective Factors Average 0.57 0.49 0.57 0.57 0.62 0.60 
connected 1.00 0.85 0.96 0.82 1.00 1.00 
live with both parents 0.85 0.27 0.87 0.85 0.91 0.86 
relationship with father 0.43 0.41 0.45 0.48 0.52 0.45 
relationship with mother 0.39 0.35 0.36 0.41 0.44 0.42 
trust in governmental 
institutions 
0.35 0.32 0.34 0.33 0.36 0.37 
trust in community 
institutions 
0.59 0.57 0.58 0.58 0.60 0.62 
church attendance 0.20 0.16 0.18 0.22 0.20 0.21 
school quality 0.82 0.79 0.78 0.82 0.82 0.80 
communication with parents 0.51 0.46 0.46 0.53 0.57 0.54 
spiritual influence  0.42 0.31 0.45 0.45 0.43 0.42 
sense of wellbeing 0.81 0.85 0.79 0.82 0.89 0.86 
Risk Factors Average 0.54 0.53 0.57 0.62 0.43 0.35 
parental influence (alcohol & 
smoking) 
0.43 0.43 0.41 0.40 0.38 0.39 
social exclusion 0.60 0.39 0.68 1.00 1.00 0.00 
limited access to healthcare 0.62 0.63 0.64 0.92 0.01 0.39 
parental response to 
misbehavior 
0.26 0.38 0.28 0.25 0.22 0.24 
parental response to good 
behavior 
0.59 0.58 0.58 0.52 0.47 0.49 
rural 0.48 0.50 0.61 0.50 0.33 0.32 
parental education 0.78 0.77 0.80 0.72 0.60 0.60 
household ownership goods 0.83 0.84 0.84 0.80 0.74 0.72 
monthly earnings HH heads 0.85 0.85 0.86 0.83 0.74 0.73 
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A.4 (cont.)       
n 603 363 932 957 947 1178 
Risk Type III III III I I - 
Percent 12.1% 7.3% 18.7% 19.2% 19.0% 23.7% 
Notes: The highlighted rows indicate that the variables were not included in the clustering exercise. 
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A.5. Cluster analysis results:  Mexican Males Aged 18 to 24 
Cluster name idle drinkers working 
dads 
loners resilient 
loners 
advantaged 
students 
age 20.58 19.60 22.28 21.19 20.96 20.15 
Behaviors Average 0.47 0.56 0.64 0.58 0.63 0.69 
older age when started 
working 
0.42 0.30 0.30 0.32 0.40 0.46 
not idle 0.00 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
no early school dropout 0.27 0.51 0.11 0.00 0.25 1.00 
literacy 0.99 0.90 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
older age at onset of sexual 
activity 
0.66 0.69 0.50 0.62 0.71 0.68 
older age at first 
pregnancy/parenthood 
0.91 0.92 0.69 0.92 0.95 0.98 
married 0.14 0.14 0.99 0.05 0.06 0.01 
participate in activities 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.20 0.24 0.31 
registered to vote 0.95 0.95 0.98 0.96 0.96 0.93 
working 0.00 0.81 0.99 0.91 0.78 0.56 
in school 0.00 0.30 0.07 0.20 0.38 0.74 
years of education completed 0.36 0.34 0.37 0.35 0.44 0.69 
safe sex 0.57 0.61 0.22 0.51 0.63 0.64 
low number of sexual partners 
in past year 
0.89 0.90 0.87 0.87 0.90 0.89 
has a child 0.16 0.14 0.71 0.15 0.11 0.03 
attitude towards drugs 0.82 0.84 0.86 0.82 0.85 0.77 
attitude towards alcohol 0.73 0.06 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Protective Factors Average 0.54 0.53 0.53 0.55 0.55 0.59 
relationship with father 0.46 0.45 0.48 0.47 0.49 0.50 
relationship with mother 0.40 0.40 0.43 0.42 0.43 0.48 
connected 0.96 0.95 0.99 1.00 0.81 1.00 
live with both parents 0.75 0.73 0.34 0.73 0.79 0.83 
trust in governmental 
institutions 
0.34 0.36 0.35 0.34 0.38 0.36 
trust in community 
institutions 
0.59 0.60 0.62 0.61 0.63 0.64 
church attendance 0.30 0.28 0.31 0.30 0.31 0.31 
school quality 0.79 0.76 0.78 0.80 0.80 0.81 
communication with parents 0.47 0.45 0.48 0.48 0.49 0.53 
spiritual influence  0.19 0.20 0.19 0.17 0.20 0.19 
sense of wellbeing 0.82 0.83 0.91 0.85 0.84 0.89 
Risk Factors Average 0.58 0.56 0.50 0.51 0.60 0.45 
parental influence (alcohol & 
smoking) 
0.66 0.66 0.68 0.74 0.73 0.72 
social exclusion 0.37 0.36 0.10 0.00 1.00 0.16 
limited access to healthcare 0.61 0.52 0.38 0.46 0.40 0.44 
parental response to 
misbehavior 
0.28 0.29 0.31 0.29 0.24 0.22 
parental response to good 
behavior 
0.59 0.60 0.59 0.60 0.56 0.54 
rural 0.48 0.44 0.38 0.36 0.38 0.24 
parental education 0.74 0.73 0.66 0.73 0.69 0.54 
household ownership goods 0.78 0.80 0.80 0.76 0.75 0.66 
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A.5 (cont.) 
monthly earnings household 
heads 
0.84 0.83 0.80 0.82 0.81 0.71 
n 743 1511 837 1778 1335 1142 
Risk Type III III III II I None 
Percent 10.1% 20.6% 11.4% 24.2% 18.2% 15.5% 
Notes: The highlighted rows indicate that the variables were not included in the clustering exercise. 
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A.6. Cluster analysis results:  Mexican Females Aged 18 to 24 
Cluster name at risk, 
idle 
married 
mothers 
at risk, 
idle, and 
excluded 
married 
mothers 
poor 
working 
early 
dropouts 
somewhat 
advantaged 
married 
moms 
resilient 
poor 
advantag
ed 
students 
age 21.35 21.09 21.27 21.48 19.02 20.27 
Behaviors Average 0.50 0.51 0.63 0.63 0.62 0.72 
older age when started 
working 
0.53 0.56 0.47 0.46 0.48 0.63 
not idle 0.00 0.07 1.00 1.00 0.95 0.89 
no early school dropout 0.07 0.19 0.00 0.10 0.62 1.00 
literacy 0.99 0.92 1.00 0.98 1.00 1.00 
older age at onset of sexual 
activity 
0.58 0.67 0.85 0.70 0.92 0.91 
older age at first 
pregnancy/parenthood 
0.60 0.68 0.87 0.76 0.97 0.96 
married 0.63 0.40 0.12 0.45 0.03 0.05 
participate in activities 0.11 0.11 0.18 0.18 0.22 0.29 
registered to vote 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.97 
working 0.00 0.05 0.83 0.82 0.60 0.40 
in school 0.00 0.02 0.29 0.26 0.48 0.69 
years of education completed 0.29 0.29 0.35 0.39 0.40 0.71 
safe sex 0.36 0.50 0.75 0.54 0.88 0.86 
low number of sexual partners 
in past year 
0.90 0.93 0.96 0.93 0.98 0.98 
has a child 0.68 0.56 0.23 0.40 0.05 0.06 
attitude towards drugs 0.96 0.95 0.93 0.90 0.92 0.88 
attitude towards alcohol 0.76 0.73 1.00 0.93 0.00 0.99 
Protective Factors Average 0.53 0.51 0.57 0.56 0.58 0.61 
relationship with father 0.43 0.43 0.46 0.45 0.46 0.51 
relationship with mother 0.37 0.36 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.48 
connected 1.00 0.64 0.85 1.00 1.00 0.95 
live with both parents 0.26 0.52 0.74 0.47 0.80 0.80 
trust in governmental 
institutions 
0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.34 0.36 
trust in community institutions 0.61 0.61 0.62 0.62 0.61 0.63 
church attendance 0.37 0.39 0.39 0.36 0.41 0.39 
school quality 0.80 0.76 0.81 0.81 0.80 0.82 
communication with parents 0.49 0.48 0.54 0.55 0.54 0.60 
spiritual influence  0.18 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.25 
sense of wellbeing 0.89 0.82 0.82 0.90 0.82 0.89 
Risk Factors Average 0.51 0.65 0.59 0.42 0.54 0.46 
parental influence (alcohol & 
smoking) 
0.47 0.49 0.55 0.53 0.50 0.59 
social exclusion 0.00 0.97 0.80 0.01 0.52 0.42 
limited access to healthcare 0.51 0.65 0.57 0.14 0.54 0.36 
parental response to 
misbehavior 
0.36 0.33 0.28 0.30 0.26 0.21 
parental response to good 
behavior 
0.58 0.59 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.49 
rural 0.45 0.54 0.40 0.26 0.40 0.24 
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A.6 (cont.) 
parental education 0.71 0.75 0.74 0.63 0.72 0.55 
household ownership of goods 0.82 0.83 0.79 0.76 0.78 0.68 
monthly earnings household 
heads 
0.84 0.86 0.84 0.75 0.82 0.72 
n 1810 2324 1693 999 850 1644 
Risk Type III III II II I - 
Percent 19.4% 24.9% 18.2% 10.7% 9.1% 17.6% 
Notes: The highlighted rows indicate that the variables were not included in the clustering exercise. 
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A.7. Cluster analysis results:  Chilean Males Aged 15 to 17 
Cluster name at-risk risky 
sex  
doing ok loners advantaged 
youth - some 
sexual activity 
advantaged 
youth 
age 16.31 16.01 15.90 15.95 15.78 15.72 
Behaviors/Consequences 
Average 
0.53 0.77 0.82 0.78 0.84 0.86 
older age when first working 0.39 0.52 0.67 0.71 0.74 0.97 
not idle 0.36 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
no early school dropout 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 1.00 1.00 
older age at onset of sexual 
activity 0.60 0.63 0.83 0.73 0.86 0.98 
older age at first 
pregnancy/child 0.97 0.99 1.00 0.98 1.00 1.00 
not married 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Participate in activities 0.09 0.16 0.18 0.11 0.23 0.14 
not a victim 0.92 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.93 0.94 
not working 0.64 0.92 0.95 0.92 0.98 0.99 
in school 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.99 1.00 
years of education completed 0.31 0.46 0.45 0.46 0.45 0.45 
safe sex 0.58 0.62 0.82 0.72 0.87 0.98 
does not have a child 0.96 0.99 1.00 0.97 1.00 0.99 
desires to vote 0.53 0.55 0.63 0.44 0.64 0.59 
Protective Factors Average 0.59 0.62 0.75 0.50 0.76 0.66 
relationship with father 0.65 0.62 0.70 0.70 0.92 0.86 
relationship with mother  0.85 0.88 0.79 0.86 0.95 0.93 
Connected to other adults 0.05 0.02 0.93 0.00 0.00 0.02 
Connected 0.72 0.96 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
trust in government 0.31 0.33 0.37 0.28 0.44 0.37 
trust in community 0.74 0.79 0.83 0.74 0.84 0.81 
Spirituality 0.26 0.21 0.34 0.23 0.97 0.22 
Risk Factors Average 0.35 0.31 0.27 0.26 0.25 0.24 
poor family cohesion 0.38 0.38 0.28 0.35 0.19 0.26 
abuse in the home 0.09 0.09 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 
substance abuse in the home 0.08 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
social exclusion 0.13 0.01 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.17 
community violence 0.15 0.21 0.25 0.18 0.29 0.19 
felt discriminated against 0.61 0.63 0.51 0.50 0.46 0.48 
live in a rural area 0.27 0.13 0.19 0.08 0.13 0.11 
indigenous 0.20 0.12 0.13 0.10 0.17 0.08 
low economic class (nse) 0.85 0.71 0.74 0.71 0.67 0.63 
low parental education 0.75 0.59 0.61 0.59 0.56 0.50 
N 75 359 88 105 126 265 
Risk Level III II I I - - 
Percent of sample 7.4% 35.3% 8.6% 10.3% 12.4% 26.0% 
Notes: The highlighted rows indicate that the variables were not included in the clustering exercise. 
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A.8. Cluster analysis results:  Chilean Females Aged 15 to 17 
Cluster name at-risk high risk 
but 
connected 
loners advantaged 
youth 
connected 
age 16.26 16.15 15.91 15.94 16.00 
Behaviors/Consequences 
Average 
0.44 0.79 0.81 0.83 0.82 
older age when started 
working 0.59 0.78 0.84 0.86 0.88 
not idle 0.07 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 
no early school dropout  0.01 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
older age at onset of sexual 
activity 0.37 0.67 0.84 0.89 0.87 
older age at first parenthood 0.61 0.99 0.96 0.99 0.99 
not married 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
participate in activities 0.02 0.12 0.08 0.11 0.11 
not a victim 0.92 0.91 0.94 0.93 0.92 
not working 0.93 0.93 0.99 0.99 0.98 
in school 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 
years of education completed 0.31 0.45 0.47 0.46 0.47 
safe sex 0.28 0.63 0.82 0.88 0.84 
does not have a child 0.51 0.98 0.95 0.98 0.99 
desires to vote 0.62 0.55 0.50 0.55 0.49 
Protective Factors Average 0.61 0.60 0.55 0.66 0.74 
relationship with father 0.59 0.55 0.57 0.75 0.71 
relationship with mother  0.75 0.71 0.85 0.91 0.86 
connected to other adults 0.12 0.20 0.02 0.00 1.00 
connected 0.84 1.00 0.41 1.00 1.00 
trust in government 0.38 0.24 0.30 0.31 0.29 
trust in community 0.79 0.70 0.70 0.81 0.77 
spirituality 0.28 0.36 0.32 0.42 0.42 
Risk Factors Average 0.39 0.48 0.34 0.27 0.29 
poor family cohesion 0.39 0.69 0.39 0.33 0.38 
abuse in the home 0.14 1.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 
substance abuse in the home 0.13 0.20 0.05 0.05 0.06 
social exclusion 0.55 0.10 0.53 0.00 0.07 
community violence 0.25 0.29 0.34 0.31 0.33 
felt discriminated against 0.52 0.82 0.55 0.51 0.58 
live in a rural area 0.25 0.18 0.08 0.12 0.10 
indigenous 0.11 0.20 0.12 0.10 0.08 
low economic class (nse) 0.85 0.73 0.73 0.69 0.71 
low parental education 0.72 0.59 0.59 0.56 0.58 
n 95 60 133 661 90 
Risk Level III II I - - 
Percent of sample 9.1% 5.8% 12.8% 63.6% 8.7% 
 Notes: The highlighted rows indicate that the variables were not included in the clustering exercise. 
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A.9. Cluster analysis results:  Chilean Males Aged 18 to 24 
Cluster name idle 
dropout 
(dads) 
idle high 
school 
graduates 
working 
(fathers) 
- socially 
exclude
d 
connect
ed 
not well 
protecte
d 
advant
aged 
advanta
ged 
students 
age 20.99 19.98 21.02 20.65 20.43 20.41 21.72 
Behaviors/Consequences 
Average 
0.37 0.37 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.51 0.56 
older age when started 
working 0.38 0.60 0.48 0.49 0.53 0.57 0.56 
not idle 0.62 0.00 0.80 0.79 0.79 0.93 0.81 
no early school dropout  0.28 1.00 0.80 0.85 0.99 0.98 0.93 
older age at onset of sexual 
activity 0.41 0.54 0.53 0.48 0.47 0.51 0.48 
older age at first parenthood 0.90 0.97 0.90 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.98 
married 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.00 
participate in activities 0.08 0.11 0.07 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.12 
registered to vote 0.02 0.01 0.14 0.17 0.01 0.01 1.00 
not victim 0.93 0.92 0.92 0.90 0.90 0.91 0.91 
working 0.53 0.00 0.57 0.42 0.38 0.39 0.38 
in school 0.13 0.00 0.28 0.44 0.52 0.64 0.56 
years of education completed 0.43 0.61 0.55 0.61 0.62 0.65 0.68 
safe sex 0.22 0.37 0.35 0.33 0.30 0.35 0.32 
has a child 0.22 0.06 0.25 0.12 0.09 0.13 0.06 
Protective Factors Average 0.58 0.66 0.62 0.78 0.50 0.63 0.66 
relationship with father 
0.56 0.85 0.69 0.74 0.61 0.68 0.72 
relationship with mother  0.81 0.86 0.85 0.87 0.79 0.87 0.87 
connected to other adults 0.02 0.00 0.02 1.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 
connected 0.75 1.00 0.81 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.85 
trust in government 0.27 0.34 0.29 0.33 0.28 0.29 0.39 
trust in community 0.72 0.81 0.73 0.75 0.72 0.74 0.76 
spirituality 0.19 0.32 0.28 0.39 0.21 0.27 0.35 
Risk Factors Average 0.36 0.25 0.38 0.27 0.28 0.25 0.25 
poor family cohesion 0.42 0.25 0.31 0.31 0.41 0.31 0.29 
abuse in the home 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.09 0.08 0.01 
substance abuse in the home 0.42 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.15 0.03 0.08 
social exclusion 0.09 0.00 1.00 0.13 0.01 0.01 0.00 
community violence 0.18 0.18 0.23 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.18 
felt discriminated against 0.55 0.47 0.56 0.56 0.55 0.54 0.59 
live in a rural area 0.22 0.16 0.17 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.11 
indigenous 0.14 0.10 0.17 0.12 0.09 0.09 0.16 
low economic class (nse) 0.83 0.75 0.74 0.68 0.69 0.65 0.59 
low parental education 0.71 0.62 0.58 0.59 0.55 0.53 0.47 
n 237 111 169 117 137 576 134 
Risk Level III III III II I - - 
Percent of sample 16.0% 7.5% 11.4% 7.9% 9.3% 38.9% 9.0% 
Notes: The highlighted rows indicate that the variables were not included in the clustering exercise. 
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A.10. Cluster analysis results:  Chilean Females Aged 18 to 24 
Cluster name early drop 
out 
mothers 
resilient spiritual connected advantaged 
students 
age 21.74 20.80 20.83 20.86 20.49 
Behaviors/Consequences 
Average 
0.31 0.44 0.45 0.48 0.56 
older age when first started 
working 0.54 0.57 0.60 0.60 0.71 
not idle 0.12 0.55 0.36 0.63 0.93 
no early school dropout  0.00 0.73 0.92 0.88 1.00 
older age at onset of sexual 
activity 0.38 0.52 0.58 0.58 0.69 
older age at first parenthood 0.50 0.75 0.78 0.80 0.93 
married 0.30 0.05 0.18 0.09 0.01 
participate in activities 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.07 
registered to vote 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.16 
not victim 0.94 0.91 0.93 0.93 0.93 
working 0.12 0.24 0.24 0.33 0.29 
in school 0.00 0.38 0.16 0.36 0.75 
years of education completed 0.36 0.56 0.60 0.61 0.68 
safe sex 0.12 0.30 0.34 0.39 0.53 
has a child 0.88 0.46 0.45 0.39 0.15 
Protective Factors Average 0.58 0.59 0.61 0.72 0.64 
relationship with father 
0.57 0.53 0.64 0.61 0.72 
relationship with mother  0.72 0.73 0.84 0.82 0.86 
connected to other adults 0.02 0.13 0.00 1.00 0.01 
connected 0.86 0.89 0.79 1.00 1.00 
trust in government 0.33 0.24 0.27 0.30 0.30 
trust in community 0.75 0.73 0.75 0.74 0.76 
spirituality 0.30 0.32 0.37 0.34 0.33 
Risk Factors Average 0.36 0.48 0.31 0.30 0.25 
poor family cohesion 0.32 0.59 0.31 0.30 0.30 
abuse in the home 0.01 0.56 0.02 0.01 0.00 
substance abuse in the home 0.00 0.67 0.01 0.01 0.00 
social exclusion 0.58 0.33 0.46 0.34 0.02 
community violence 0.32 0.29 0.27 0.29 0.29 
felt discriminated against 0.52 0.70 0.55 0.58 0.51 
live in a rural area 0.23 0.16 0.15 0.11 0.08 
indigenous 0.13 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.10 
low economic class (nse) 0.80 0.75 0.71 0.70 0.65 
low parental education 0.66 0.62 0.58 0.56 0.52 
n 209 210 582 160 622 
Risk Level III II II II - 
Percent of sample 11.7% 11.8% 32.6% 9.0% 34.9% 
 Notes: The highlighted rows indicate that the variables were not included in the clustering exercise. 
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